臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文建構一個品質差異化下模型探討國際委託代工生產行為與研發支出的因果關係。在不同的最終財產品品質差異程度下，我們求導代工廠商的最適生產代工型態與研發支出策略。我們證明當委託代工廠商與代工廠商的最終財產品品質差異程度不大時，相較於無代工的情況，委託代工的存在確實會有誘因使代工廠商調低研發支出。但是當委託代工廠商與代工廠商的最終財產品品質差異程度很大時，委託代工的存在反而會使代工廠商有較高的誘因調高研發支出以提升生產力。就全域性均衡而言，當委託代工廠商與代工廠商的最終財產品品質差異程度不大時，代工廠商會以較高的研發支出並採取拒絕代工而只生產自有品牌的策略；隨著最終財的產品品質差異程度增大，代工廠商會調低研發支出，並採用接受代工契約且同時生產自有品牌的策略；最後，當委託代工廠商與代工廠商的最終財產品品質差異程度很大時，代工廠商甚至會過度調高研發支出提升生產力以爭取代工契約。
在產業組織文獻中，本文的貢獻為證明當委託代工進行時，被委託代工的廠商之研發行為不會受到數量競爭或價格競爭模式不同而有所影響。在國際貿易文獻中，本文的貢獻為指出代工型態的存在取決於最終財產品品質差異程度，且代工型態的存在有可能會提高代工廠商的生產技術。

目錄
頁次
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機與目的 1
第二節　文獻回顧 3
一、代工相關文獻 4
二、成本內生化的技術研發相關文獻 5
三、數量競爭和價格競爭行為探討相關文獻 7
第三節　研究方法與論文架構 10
第二章　數量競爭模型 11
第一節　基本模型 11
第二節　無代工生產型態均衡 13
一、最終財市場均衡 13
二、最適研發水準 14
第三節　代工生產型態均衡 16
一、最終財市場均衡 16
二、代工市場均衡 17
三、代工下最適研發水準 19
四、研發誘因分析 22
五、全域性生產與研發策略 25
第四節　本章小結 27
第三章　價格競爭模型 28
第一節　無代工生產型態均衡 28
一、最終財市場均衡 28
二、最適研發水準 32
第二節　代工生產型態均衡 36
一、最終財市場均衡 36
二、代工市場均衡 38
三、代工下最適研發水準 40
四、研發誘因比較 44
五、全域性生產與研發策略 46
第三節　本章小結 48
第四章　數量競爭模型與價格競爭模型比較 49
第一節　最終財市場與代工市場均衡比較 49
第二節　最適研發策略 52
第三節　本章小結 56
第五章　社會福利分析 57
第一節　數量競爭模型 58
第二節　價格競爭模型 60
第三節　數量競爭模型和價格競爭模型 62
第六章　結論 65
附錄 66
附錄1：雙占數量競爭模型中廠商代工前後利潤相等線 66
附錄2：高品質獨占數量競爭模型 67
附錄3：研發成本函數 68
附錄4：價格競爭模型的全域性生產與研發均衡 68
附錄5：低品質財貨獨占市場 70
附錄6：低品質廠商純代工 71
參考文獻 74
一、期刊論文 74
二、網站報導 77

參考文獻

一、期刊論文

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二、網站報導

DIGITIMES中文網。取自http://www.digitimes.com.tw/tw/dt/n/shwnws.asp?CnlID=1&cat=170&cat1=20&id=0000195670_N1B7PN9F6H9W9X1CSE388&ct=1&PACKAGEID=3422#ixzz2MkX30xMh
MoneyDJ財經知識庫。取自http://www.moneydj.com/KMDJ/News/NewsViewer.aspx?a=7302cf37-d388-4254-82b4-018a61fdf295#ixzz2MkQd6Lu7
http://www.moneydj.com/funddj/ya/yp050000.djhtm?a=0D33C2D9-41F7-4A7D-985F-CAF773FF6EF5
http://www.moneydj.com/KMDJ/News/NewsViewer.aspx?a=a99b0a3f-8a30-47f7-bae5-ccc8183d15e2#ixzz2Ml45dpm2
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http://reader.chinatimes.com/forum_74642.html
工商時報。取自http://md.ctee.com.tw/news.php?pa=TUTnrMbLPT1SEsy836xWWNEPUy9ews3MeTqkdnohhXP2KyHNLfR3Jg%3D%3D
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http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/11050106/122012100300088.html
經濟日報。取自http://www.uvmc.com.tw/columnpro/enewspage_add_v2.asp?id=3280
鉅亨網新聞中心。取自http://news.cnyes.com/Content/20130226/KH662MRDPHZ4Q.shtml
華為官方網站。取自
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