臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

政府為了健全公司治理機制，引進獨立董監制度，並於2006年修正證交法，要求發行股票之公司設置獨立董事，人數不得少於兩人，且不得少於董事席次五分之一；而本研究主旨在探討宣告聘任獨立董事時，是否能產生超常報酬，進而有效提昇公司價值與股東財富。經由實證結果得知，首次聘任獨立董事於宣告日會產生正向的異常報酬，而非首次宣告聘任獨立董事則否；在產業方面，電子業聘任獨立董事於宣告日會產生正向的異常報酬，而非電子業則否。另一方面，在董事會結構和過去經營績效對聘任獨立董事宣告效果的探討中，董監事持股比率、董事會規模、獨立董事人數和每股盈餘(EPS)等因素與異常報酬存在負向關係；董監事質押股票比率、董事長兼任總經理、股東權益報酬率(ROE)和資產報酬率(ROA)則與異常報酬存在正向關係，不過由於本研究的實證結果並未達到顯著，而過去文獻也紛紜雜沓，故在此部分的探討並沒有明確的定論。

In order to enhance corporate governance mechanism, the government adopted the system of independent directors and supervisors. Revising the securities regulation in 2006, the government enforce that public offerings must set up at least two independent directors, and its number should not be less than one fifths of the board of directors. The purpose of this study is to investigate the announcement effect of retaining the independent directors on improving investor’s confidence and producing abnormal return, which can increase the company’s value and shareholders’ profit. The results of this study are as follows. Firstly, the first time announcement of retaining directors could produce abnormal return, but non-first time announcement could not. Secondly, in industrial field, retaining independent director at the day of announcement produce abnormal return in engineering industry, but this act doesn’t produce abnormal return in non-engineering industry. Besides, having reviewed the effects of board of directors structure and the past operation achievement on hiring independent directors, the results are as follows: abnormal return shows negative correlation with insiders' holdings, scales of board of directors, the number of independent director, and EPS; however, it has positive correlation with equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors, CEO can be the chair man, ROE and ROA. However, since this study results are under significant and, also many researchers have different opinions about this issue, this study doesn’t come to a clear conclusion.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
1-1 研究背景 1
1-2 研究動機與目的 2
1-3 研究範圍及限制 2
1-4 研究架構與流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
2-1 公司治理準則及我國公司治理之沿革 5
2-1-1 OECD公司治理原則 5
2-1-2 強化組織公司治理 6
2-2 公司治理與代理問題 8
2-2-1 公司治理 8
2-2-2 代理問題 10
2-3 董事會屬性對於經營績效 11
2-4 內部與獨立董事對公司價值 19
2-4-1 引進獨立董事具有正向效果 19
2-4-2 引進獨立董監事有負向的效果 23
2-4-3 引進獨立董監事無關公司營運 24
2-4-4 內部董事與獨立董事的差異 24
2-5 獨立董事的宣告效果 25
第三章 研究方法 27
3-1 樣本描述與選擇 27
3-2 事件研究法 29
3-3 研究限制 32
第四章 結果與分析 33
4-1 獨立董事選任宣告效果 33
4-2 不同產業獨立董事選任宣告效果 37
4-3 公司規模之獨立董事選任宣告效果 42
4-4 影響獨立董事選任宣告效果之分析 45
4-4-1 自變數Pearson相關分析迴歸分析 47
第五章 結論與建議 50
5-1 結論 50
5-2 建議 51
5-2-1 對政府與業界之建議 51
5-2-2 對後續研究者的建議 51
參考文獻 52

1. 中文部分
(1) 書籍
[1] 謝易宏、陳德純，2002，後安隆時代的一線曙光。
[2] 鐘惠民等，2003，財金計量。

(2) 期刊
[1] 柯承恩，2000，我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（上），會計研究月刊，第173期，頁次75-81。
[2] 柯承恩，2000，我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（下」，會計研究月刊，第174期，頁次79-83。
[3] 曾令寧、黃仁德，2003，公司治理原則與健全實務，台灣金融財務季刊，第四輯第四期。
[4] 葉銀華、李存修，2003年，台灣之獨立董監制度的改革-政策性建議，會計研究月刊，第213期。

(3) 學術論文
[1] 王繼和，2004，公司治理機制與經營績效之關係研究－以台灣上市櫃電子公司為例，雲林科技大學，碩士論文。
[2] 李瑛娟，2004，宣告引進獨立董監事之股價效果探討，成功大學，碩士論文。
[3] 李亭誼，2003，董事身份特性與董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度關係之研究，政治大學，碩士論文。
[4] 何幸芳，2003，獨立董監事對公司價值與盈餘資訊內涵影響之研究，輔仁大學，碩士論文。
[5] 呂宜峰，2004，資訊揭露程度與公司特徵之關聯性研究－以國內IC相關產業為例，中國文化大學，碩士論文。
[6] 呂春綢，2004，我國獨立董監制度與公司績效關係研究，台北大學，碩士論文。
[7] 林政衛，2004，公司治理結構、資訊透明度與股票報酬變異關聯性之研究，政治大學，碩士論文。
[8] 林瑞嘉，2004，勾結行為、公司治理與誘因契約—賽局理論的應用文，中原大學，碩士論文。
[9] 林麗珊，2003，董監事運作與企業績效關係之研究－公司治理理念觀點，台北大學，碩士論文。
[10] 洪世馨，2003，設立外部董事與企業經營績效之關係，成功大學，碩士論文。
[11] 高宏鎰，2004，委託書決定因素及委託書與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，中原大學，碩士論文。
[12] 陳麗娟，2004，董事會組成、股權結構、關係人交易與企業績效關係之研究—以紡織業及電子業為實証，成功大學，碩士論文。
[13] 陳政宏，2005，董事會屬性、公司績效、董監事背景對獨立董監宣告效果之影響，開南管理學院，碩士論文。
[14] 許雅芳，2004，以權益代理問題觀點論經理人幹練程度、公司短視投資與公司監理機制，嘉義大學，碩士論文。
[15] 張雅琳，2004，我國企業獨立董事機制與經營績效之關聯性研究，大葉大學，碩士論文。
[16] 郭學平，2004，台灣上市櫃公司自願設置獨立董監事因素之研究，政治大學，碩士論文。
[17] 莊政裕，2004，我國上市公司董監事結構、中概特性與公司財績效關連性之探討，雲林科技大學，碩士論文。
[18] 曾智楊，2002，董事會特性、經營策略與經營績效關係之研究—以台灣上市電子公司為例，臺灣大學，碩士論文。
[19] 曾雅鳳，2001，台灣公司董事監察人結構與經營績效之探討，義守大學，碩士論文。
[20] 葉麗玉，2000，所有權結構、董事會組成與公司非行為關係之研究—以台灣股票上市公司為例，雲林科技大學，碩士論文。
[21] 游昀玲，2004，公司經營績效與代理問題對獨立董監事聘任宣告效果影響之研究，朝陽科技大學，碩士論文。
[22] 楊慧玲，2000，董事會結構及其變動對股東財富與經營績效影響之研究，朝陽科技大學，碩士論文。
[23] 葉淑玲，2004，我國上市公司自願聘任獨立董監事動機之研究，臺北大學，碩士論文。
[24] 趙維穎，2004，董事會屬性、董事會功能與企業經營績效之關聯性研究，中原大學，碩士論文。
[25] 蔡忠君，2004，外部董監事加入對上市上櫃公司績效之再檢驗，義守大學，碩士論文。
[26] 賴柏勳，2004，我國上市公司強制性與自願性設立獨立董監事對經營績效影響之實證研究，中國文化大學，碩士論文。
[27] 劉嘉惠，2004，公司治理下股權結構與經營績效關係之研究—兼論美、日、韓公司治理制度，長榮大學，碩士論文。
[28] 廖益興，2004，董監事獨立性、企業結構特徵與盈餘管理之關性研究，國立台北大學，碩士論文。
[29] 羅肇偉，2003，公司治理、董事會董立性與公司績效關係之研究—以電子業與營造業為例，銘傳大學，碩士論文。
[30] 魏早啟，1997，上市公司董監事特性與經營績效之研究，東吳大學，碩士論文。

(4) 報紙
[1] 張忠謀(2001)，公司治理 讓公司更上軌道，經濟日報，44 版。

(5) 網路
[1] 公開資訊觀測站：http://mops.tse.com.tw
[2] 台灣證券交易所：www.tse.com.tw


2. 英文部分
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[3] Barber, B.M., Lyon, J.D., 1996, “Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, pp.359-399, July.
[4] Baysinger, B.D., and Butler, H.N., 1985, “Corporate governance and the board of directors：performance effects of changes in board composition”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 1, pp.101-124.
[5] Bacon, J., 1973, “Corporate directorship practices：membership and committees of the board,” New York, The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries.
[6] Berle, A. A., Means, G.. C., 1932, “The Modern Corporate and Private Property”, New York: Macmillan.
[7] Beasley, M. S., 1996, “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud”, Accounting Review, Vol. 71, pp.443-465, October.
[8] Bhagat, S., Black, B., 1999. ” The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance”, Business Lawer, Vol. 54, pp.921-963, May.
[9] Bhagat, S., Carey, D.C., Elson, C.M., 1999, “Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover”, Business Lawer, Vol. 54, pp.885-918, May.
[10] Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C., Smith, C.W., 1988, “Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp.267-291, April.
[11] Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L., Terry, R.L., 1994, “Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 35, pp.71-390, April.
[12] Byrd, J., Hickman, K., 1992, “Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, pp.195-221, October.
[13] Cho, D. S., 2003, “Determinants in introduction of outside directors in Korean companies”, Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 10, pp.1-20.
[14] Cotter, J.F., Shivdasani, A., Zenner, M., 1997, “Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43, pp.195-218, February.
[15] Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F., 1999, “Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, pp.371-406, March.
[16] Claessens, S., Djankov, S. , Lang, L.H.P., 2000, “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp.81-112
[17] Dann. L.1981, “Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 101-138.
[18] Denis, D.J., Sarin, A., 1999, “Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations”, Journal of financial Economics, Vol. 52, pp.187-223, May.
[19] Fama, E.F., and M. C. Jesen, 1983, “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law Economics, Vol. 26, pp.301-325, June.
[20] Fosberg R.H, 1989, “Outside directors and management monitoring”, Akron Business and Economic Review, Vol. 20, pp 24-32.
[21] Fuerst & Kang, 2000, “Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing,” Working paper, Yale School of Management, New Haven..
[22] Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1988, “The determinants of board composition,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, pp.589-606, Winter.
[23] Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1991, “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance”, Financial Management, Vol. 20, pp.101-112, Winter.
[24] Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1998, “Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO” The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, pp.96-119, March.
[25] Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., Baysinger and Barry D., 1998, “The role of corporate law in the theory of the Firm,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, pp.179-192.
[26] Jensen, M. C., 1993, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 831-880.
[27] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W. H., 1976, “Theory of the firm：managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp.305-360.
[28] Jumreornvong, S., and Sukcharoensin, S., 2002, “Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Thailand”, National Sun Yat-set University (NSYSU), 11th Conference on the Theories and Practices of Securities and Financial Markets.
[29] Lin, S., Pope, P. F., Young, S., 1997, “Stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30, pp.351-383.
[30] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999, “Corporate ownership around the world”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp.471-517.
[31] Mark, H., 2003, “Outside Directors Don't Mean Outsize Returns”, New York Times, pp.3-10.
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