臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文除了以公司治理指標來預測舞弊機率外，也整合了內部控制指標，依據SAS：美國審計準則公報第82、99號「財務報表查核舞弊之考量」、COSO Report「內部控制－整體架構」建構較完整之舞弊預警模型。在樣本選取以1999年至2008年間之上市櫃公司為研究對象，篩選因舞弊遭受起訴公司且上市櫃已滿3年以上為樣本。不同以往文獻，皆以同產業或公司規模作配對，本文採取隨機抽樣方法之1：2配對以降低偏誤，並以舞弊前一年與舞弊前二年為研究時點。

在二元邏輯斯迴歸模型的實證結果發現，對舞弊機率最具解釋力的公司治理變數舞弊前一年為監察人規模、董事質押比率，舞弊前二年為董事質押比率、國外機構持股比率。舞弊公司在發生舞弊前監察人規模小，董事會監督功能不佳，以及董事質押比率越高，越有動機侵占公司資產，致使公司發生舞弊機率增加，而國外機構持股高則在公司內部的制衡力量越強。在內部控制變數方面，財務危機、董監質押比率、財測次數、財報重編次數與公司舞弊呈現正相關；舞弊前一年董監持股比例與公司舞弊呈現負相關。財務經營上負債比率、負營業活動淨現金流量、資產報酬率等財務性指標持續出現問題的話，則公司舞弊機率增加。越接近舞弊時間點時提供不實之財務資訊次數呈現顯著關係，高階主管異動次數於舞弊前二年呈現顯著。再者，上述舞弊公司預警模型大多能通過模型適合度檢定。

另外，整合公司治理、SAS與COSO模型之正常公司、舞弊公司與整體正確率，相較於其它個別模型分類正確率最高。全樣本舞弊前一年較佳分類正確率之切割點在0.2至0.3之間，正常公司、舞弊公司與整體正確率皆超過80%以上；舞弊前二年較佳分類正確率之切割點在0.4至0.5，整體正確率超過80%以上。如同時考慮整合模型之預測準確率與模型效度，以2005年至2008年做預測正確率，則全樣本舞弊前一年最佳之模型切割點在0.3，正常公司、舞弊公司與整體正確率為91.38%、82.76%、88.51%。舞弊前二年較佳之模型切割點同樣在0.3，正常公司、舞弊公司與整體正確率為81.03%、93.10%、85.06%。

This study unless used corporate governance to prediction fraud likelihood and integrate internal control, based on SAS-Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82 & 99” Conskderations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” and COSO Report “Internal Control-Integrated Framework “through creating a complete fraud warning model. The samples entirely collected from Taiwan listed companies during the period 1999-2008 years, and selected not only sued fraud companies ,but three listed years at least. Literatures often companies samples with the same industries or capitals, but this study use one to two paired sampling for reduce the problem of biases,and research during the period of one and two years before the fraud .

According to empirical results of binary logistic regression model, we found supervisors of board seats, shares pledged ratio by directors were powerful in explaining the causes of corporate governance variables during the period of one year before the fraud. Shares pledged ratio by directors and foreign institutions shareholding ratio were powerful in explaining the causes of corporate governance variables during the period of two years before the fraud. Before fraud happening, it has a few supervisors or the board’s monitor not intensity or shares pledged ratio by directors increase,and people has more cause to misappropriation of assets,fraud likelihood increase at the sametime.When foreign institutions shareholding ratio increase,which it were powerful of companies supervising powers. About internal control variables, financial distress, shares pledged ratio by directors and supervisors, numbers of changing financial plan, numbers of restatement,which has positive correlation with fraud. Shareholding ratio by directors and supervisors has negative correlation with fraud during the period of one year before the fraud.

The financial operational performance: debt ratio, negative operational net cash flow, return on assets,if that financial problem occur constantly, fraud likelihood were increase.When close to fraud time, numbers of false financial information are important in explaining fraud,and the change for managers are important in explaining fraud during the period of two years before the fraud. Otherwise, binary logistic regression models almost passed the tests of model fit.

Besides, integrate corporate governance and sas and coso model’s probability of correct classification best than the others. The best cut point of the full sample is between 0.2 and 0.3,correct classification was all more than 80% during the period of one year before the fraud. When during the period of two years before the fraud, the best cut point of the full sample is between 0.4 and 0.5,correct classification of all was more than 80%.

To ensure full model forecasting probability of correct and model validity,the forecasting probability of correct classification of fraud firms in 2005-2008 years, the best cut point of model is 0.3 during the period of one year before the fraud, 91.38% was health firms and 82.76% was fraud firms and 88.51% was all firms.The best cut point of model is 0.3 during the period of two years before the fraud, 81.03% was health firms and 93.10% was fraud firms and 85.06% was all firms.

第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究背景及動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究貢獻
第四節 論文架構

第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 舞弊及舞弊風險因子
第二節 內部控制與公司治理理論
第三節 財務報表舞弊預警模型
第四節 公司治理與財務舞弊

第參章 研究方法
第一節 研究樣本與研究期間
第二節 變數定義
第三節 研究假說
第四節 建立模型

第肆章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計與平均數差異檢定
第二節 二元邏輯斯迴歸模型
第三節 模型分類正確率
第四節 整合模型預測正確率
第五節 預測模型之型I錯誤與型II錯誤

第伍章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論
第二節 研究建議
附錄一 涉嫌舞弊公司明細表

參考文獻
中文部份
英文部份

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英文部份

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