臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

工業生產所排放的溫室氣體(greenhouse gas：GHG )與全球氣候變遷(global climate change）有密切的關聯性，因此，溫室氣體排放量的抑制成為各個國家間急需解決的重要議題。目前經濟學家所建議的政策包含直接管制(command and control：CAC)、課徵排放稅(emission tax)、排放權交易(emission trading：ET)、清潔發展機制(clean development mechanism：CDM)及跨國聯合執行(joint implementation：JI)。其中排放權交易政策為1997年京都會議以來，最主要的政策考量，以往對於該項政策理論的研究著重於靜態與完全競爭市場分析(Baumol and Oates,
1971 、Montgomery,1972)；而Hahn(1984)、Westskog(1996)則考慮靜態與不完全競爭市場的分析；楊曙聰(1999)則將跨國聯合執行併入排放權交易市場進行共同討論，其分別考慮靜態完全競爭與不完全競爭的排放權交易市場結構；Rubin(1996)、Kling and Rubin(1997)則開始探討跨期排放權交易政策的可行性與其影響，不過仍然建立在完全競爭的排放權市場結構上。本研究期望基於環境品質的考量及一些限定條件，於動態體系下分析不同市場結構（即完全競爭與不完全競爭）的排放權交易機制。本文的主要結論與建議如下：
一、若商品市場、傳統要素市場、排放權交易市場均為完全競爭結構， 則所有廠商的邊際防治成本一致，與加入傳統要素市場與否並不相關，和前述之Montgomery (1972)、Falk and Mendelson (1993)、Rubin (1996)以及Kling and Rubin (1997)等文獻有相同的結論，此外，跨期的排放權交易市場具有成本的效率性。
二、當定態均衡的狀況下，若所有廠商的總排放權稟賦固定，則針對完競爭廠商，排放權稟賦分配的公平性將不會影響到防治成本的效率性，所以在講求效率性的經濟範疇中，管制者毋需刻意加以干涉，透過市場機制的運行仍然能夠達到成本極小化的目標。另外，透過調整廠商投入的傳統生產要素，亦有助於降低污染排放量。
三、若具有價格制訂能力的優勢廠商會是排放權交易市場的獨賣者，則當經濟體系為定態均衡時，優勢廠商的排放權需求價格彈性需為-1 ，故改變優勢廠商的排放權稟賦會影響到個別廠商的防治成本與所有廠商的總防治成本，表示分配的公平性與成本的效率性間會有一定程度的關連性，所以符合Hahn(1984)、Westskog(1996)在不完全競爭市場下，排放權稟賦的分配會影響市場效率性的看法。
四、假使排放權市場存在一家優勢廠商且為獨賣者，當體系為定態均衡時，管制當局可以透過降低優勢廠商的排放權稟賦，而降低所有廠商的總防治成本，可知為了換取更有效的總防治成本，忽略公平性是逼不得已的手段。

The emission of greenhouse gas (GHG) from the industrial production has caused the global climate change. The big trade-off between economic growth and CO2 reduction has become an important issue for most countries in the world. There are four important strategies, such as command and control, emission tax, emission trading, clean development mechanism, and joint implementation, has been proposed.
After the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the emission trading has been treated as the most suitable policy to restrain CO2 emission. Some previous studies assumed that the market of emission trading was static and perfect competition (Baumol & Oates, 1971; Montgomery, 1972). But Hahn (1984) and Westskog (1996) concluded that the market was static but imperfect Competition. Based on the same assumption, Yang (1999) concluded that the emission trading and joint implementation could be applied simultaneously and cost effectively. Rubin (1996) and Rubin & Kling (1997) began to treat the market of emission trading was a dynamic and perfect competition. Thus, the certified emission reduction could be borrowed or lent intertemporally. This study employs the theory of dynamic optimization to analyze the mechanism of emission trading under the perfect competition and oligopoly respectively. There are four major conclusions as follows:
1.When all of three markets, general commodity, traditional factor and emission trading, are perfect competition, each firm has identical marginal CO2 abatement cost.And the intertemporal emission market also can fulfill the goal of cost effectiveness. The same conclusion can be found in some previous studies, such as Montgomery (1972), Falk and Mendelshon (1993), Rubin (1996), and Kling and Rubin (1997).
2.In the steady state, if the total emission endowments are constant, the rule of distribution of emission endowment among the firms will not affect the cost effectiveness with perfect competition. Any improper regulation should not be allowed. And just let the emission market is operated by that invisible hand. However, it is helpful to cut down emission level by adjusting the firm’s inputs in production.
3.In the steady state, the dominant firm decides the price of emission permit with monopoly. Since the demand elasticity of emission permits is , the change of initial emission endowment of the dominant firm will affect each firm’s abatement cost and total abatement costs for all firms. Thus, the rule of distribution of emission endowment among the firms will affect the cost effectiveness with imperfect competition. The same conclusion was also obtained in the studies of Hahn (1984) and Westskog (1996).
4. The invisible hand can’t be operated completely in monopoly. The total abatement costs for all firms can be reduced when the dominant firm’s initial emission endowment is cutting down. Therefore, the big trade-off between efficiency and equity is really existed.

第一章 緒 論 1
1.1研究動機與目的……………………………………………………… 1
1.2研究方法……………………………………………………………… 2
1.3章節安排……………………………………………………………… 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
2.1環境維護政策的經濟理論基礎……………………………………… 4
2.2排放權交易之政策..…………….……………………………………5
2.3 其他相關政策工具….……………………………………………..11
2.3.1排放稅…………………………………………………………11
2.3.2跨國聯合執行…………………………………………………13
2.3.3清潔發展機制…………………………………………………14
第三章 完全競爭之排放權交易市場 18
3.1理論模型………………………………………………………………18
3.2模型推導………………………………………………………………20
3.3完全競爭市場之成本有效性…………………………………………24
3.4比較靜態分析…………………………………………………………25
第四章 不完全競爭之排放權交易市場 32
4.1 理論模型………………………………………………………………32
4.2 模型推導………………………………………………………………34
4.3 不完全競爭市場與防治成本…………………………………………37
第五章 結論與建議 43
附錄一 46
附錄二 46
附錄三 47
參考文獻 48
圖目錄
圖2.1 排放權為獨賣的市場結構 10
圖2.2 排放權為獨買的市場結構 11
表目錄
表2.1 四種政策工具的比較 16

中文部分：
台灣綜合研究院 (2000)﹐＜我國空氣污染物之排放權交易制度建置＞﹐行政院環保署專案研究計畫﹐計畫編號EPA-89-FA11-03-150。
台灣綜合研究院 (2001)﹐＜因應新經濟發展之產業競爭力提升策略—以排放交易制度設計為例＞﹐行政院經濟建設委員會綜合計畫處。
吳再益、李堅明 (1999)﹐＜建立溫室氣體排放權交易制度之規劃研究＞﹐行政院經濟建設委員會專案研究計畫。
張明芳 (1996)﹐＜污染排放許可權交易市場之經濟效果分析＞﹐國立中興大學法商學院都市計畫所碩士論文。
楊曙聰 (1999)﹐＜排放權交易、跨國聯合減量與市場結構＞﹐國立中興大學經濟學系碩士論文。
賴麗瑩 (1998)﹐＜聯合國氣候變化綱要公約第三次締約國大會之後續發展分析＞﹐《能源季刊》﹐30(3)﹐pp﹒2-18。
魏國棟 (1998)﹐＜氣候變遷與經濟政策的省思＞﹐《能源與環境研究會論文集》﹐pp﹒53-73。
魏國棟 (2002)﹐＜氣候變遷與因應經濟政策工具：文獻回顧＞﹐國立台北大學經濟學系﹐初稿。
外文部分：
Baumol﹐W﹒J﹒and W﹒E﹒Oates (1971)﹐“ The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment﹐”Swedish Journal of Economics﹐7(1) ﹐pp﹒42-54﹒
Baumol﹐W﹒J﹒and W﹒E﹒Oates (1988)﹐The Theory of Environmental Policy ﹐Cambridge University Press﹒
Cline﹐W﹒R﹒(1992)﹐The Economics of Global Warming﹐Institute for International Economics﹐Washington D.C.﹒
Coase﹐R﹒H﹒(1960)﹐“ The Problem of Social Cost﹐”Journal of Law and Economics﹐3(1)﹐pp﹒1-44﹒
Dales﹐J﹒H﹒(1968)﹐Pollution﹐property and prices﹐University of Toronto Press﹒
Ekins﹐P﹒(1995)﹐“ Rethinking the Costs Related to Global Warming：A Survey of the Issues﹐”Environmental and Resource Economics﹐6﹐pp﹒231-277﹒
Falk﹐I﹒and R﹒Mendelsohn (1993)﹐“ The Economics of Controlling Stock Pollutants：An Efficiency Strategy for Greenhouse Gases﹐”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management﹐25﹐pp﹒76-88﹒
Farzin﹐Y﹒H﹒and O﹒Tahvonen (1996)﹐“ Global Carbon Cycle and the Optimal Time Path of a Carbon Tax﹐”Oxford Economic Papers﹐48(4)﹐pp﹒515-536﹒
Goulder﹐L﹒(1995)﹐“ Effect of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Problems：How The Patient Followed The Doctor’s Orders﹐”Journal of Economic Perspectives﹐3﹐pp﹒95-144﹒
Hagem﹐C﹒(1996)﹐“ Joint Implementation Under Asymmetric Information and strategic Behavior﹐”Environmental and Resource Economics﹐8(4)﹐pp﹒431-447﹒
Hahn﹐R﹒W﹒(1984)﹐“ Market Power and Transferable Property Rights﹐ ”The Quarterly Journal of Economics﹐99(4)﹐pp﹒753-765﹒
Jorgenson﹐D﹒and P﹒Wilcoxen (1995)﹐“ Reducing U.S. Carbon Emissions：An Econometric General Equilibrium Assessment﹒”CA：Stanford University Press﹒
Jorgenson﹐D﹒and K﹒Yang (1990)﹐“ The Excess Burden of Taxation in the U.S.”Discussion papers 1528﹒Cambridge﹐MA﹒：Harvard Institute of Economic Research﹒
Kamien﹐M﹒I﹒and N﹒L﹒ Schwartz (1991)﹐Dynamic Optimization：The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management﹐Second Edition﹐Elsevier﹐New York﹒
Kling﹐C﹒and J﹒Rubin (1997)﹐“Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution﹐”Journal of Public Economics﹐64﹐pp﹒101-115﹒
Lerner﹐A﹒P﹒(1943)﹐“The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power﹐”Review of Economic Studies﹐11﹐pp﹒157-175﹒
Matsuhashi﹐R﹒﹐W﹒Chang and H﹒Ishitani (1999)﹐“ A Study on System for a Clean Development Mechanism to Reduce CO2 Emissions﹐”Environmental Economics and Policy Studies﹐2(4)﹐pp﹒289-303﹒
Misiolek﹐W﹒and H﹒W﹒Elder (1989)﹐“Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for Pollution Rights﹐ ” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management﹐16(2)﹐pp﹒156-166﹒
Montgomery﹐W﹒D﹒(1972)﹐“ Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs﹐”Journal of Economic Theory﹐5(3)﹐pp﹒395-418﹒
Nordhaus﹐W﹒D﹒(1991)﹐“ To slow or not to slow︰The economics of the greenhouse effect﹐”Economic Journal﹐101(407)﹐pp﹒920-937﹒
Painuly﹐J﹒P﹒(2001)﹐“ The Kyoto Protocol﹐Emission Trading and the CDM：An Analysis from Developing Countries Perspective﹐”Energy Journal﹐22(3)﹐pp﹒147-169﹒
Petrakis﹐E﹒﹐E﹒S﹒Sartzetakis and A﹒Xepapadeas (1999)﹐Environmental Regulation and Market Power﹐Elgar﹐U.S.﹒
Rubin﹐J﹒and C﹒Kling (1993)﹐“ An Emission Saved Is an Emission Earned：An Empirical Study of Emission Banking for Light-Duty Vehicle Manufacturers﹐” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management﹐25﹐pp﹒257-274﹒
Rubin﹐J﹒D﹒(1996)﹐“ A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading﹐Banking and Barrowing﹐”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management﹐”31(3)﹐pp﹒269-286﹒
Tietenberg﹐T﹒(1985)﹐Emission Trading：An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy﹐Resource for the future﹐Washington﹐DC﹒
Tietenberg﹐T﹒(1992)﹐Environmental and Natural Resource Economics﹐Harper Collins﹐New York﹒
Tietenberg﹐T﹒(2000)﹐Environmental and Natural Resource Economics﹐5th Edition﹐Addision Wesley Longman﹐Inc﹒﹐Press﹒
Westskog﹐H﹒(1996)﹐“ Market Power in a System of Tradable CO2 Quotas﹐ ”The Energy Journal﹐17(3)﹐pp﹒85-103﹒
Williams﹐Michael﹒(1995)﹐“ Global Warming and Carbon Taxation：Optimal Policy and the Role of Administration Costs﹐”Energy Economics﹐17(4)﹐pp﹒319-327﹒
Wirl﹐F﹒﹐C﹒Huber and I﹒O﹒Walker (1998)﹐“ Joint Implementation ：Strategic Reactions and Possible Remedies﹐”Environmental and Resource Economics﹐12(2) ﹐pp﹒203-224﹒
Zhang﹐Z﹒X﹒(1998)﹐“Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading and the Word Trading system﹐”Journal of Word Trade﹐32(5)﹒