臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以2004年至2007年在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市之公司作為研究對象，從高階經理人獎酬以及公司治理的觀點出發，探討台灣上市公司中不同的經理人獎酬以及公司治理結構的差異性是否會對公司之現金股利政策造成影響。本研究之目的在於驗證公司給予經理人獎酬水準的高低和公司治理中董事會機能及股權結構監督制衡機制的發揮，是否能促使公司內部人之利益與外部人一致，進而提高現金股利發放的水準，以降低代理問題的嚴重性。而由於國內多以家族控制型企業為主，其公司企業文化及治理型態皆與非家族控制型企業有所不同，因此本研究進一步將樣本區分為家族控制型與非家族控制型企業，藉以觀察兩者之間不同的差異性。而本研究實證結果發現：
(1)當經理人獎酬越高時，更能使經理人之利益與股東利益一致，進而使公司現金股利支付水準越高。
(2)大股東持股比例越高時，越能監督內部人提高股利的發放，以避免多餘的現金遭到內部人不必要的浪費或是投資次佳的決策。
(3)主動機構投資人持股比例越高時，越能透過主動機構投資人的監督而促使公司內部提高現金股利的發放。
(4)當獨立董事占董事會席次比例越高時，越能避免內部人掌控董事會，使內部監督機制更加健全，進一步使公司提高現金股利的發放，避免公司內部人侵占公司內部的現金。
(5)在家族控制型企業當中，大股東以及主動機構投資人持股比例以及獨立董事比例的提高，可強化公司外部及內部監督機制，提高股利的發放，避免公司的現金遭到家族成員的侵占。
(6)在非家族控制型企業當中，經理人獎酬以及經理人持股比例的提高，可使得公司經理人之利益與公司股東趨於一致，以降低經理人與股東之間的利害衝突，進而提高股利發放的水準。

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the structure of executives’ compensation and the corporate governances affects cash dividend policy based on the data from listed companies in Taiwan stock exchange market during 2004 to 2007. Family controlled firms display different governance culture and monitoring mechanism than non-family controlled firms, so this study further investigates the difference between them. The empirical results we document are below:
(1)Executive compensation is associated with higher dividend payouts. This result indicate better aligning the interests of management and shareholders, could result in a higher level of dividend payouts.
(2)Blockholders’ ownership concentration is associated with higher dividend payouts.
(3)Higher active institutional investors’ ownership results in higher dividend payouts.
(4)Independent board membership affects higher dividend payouts. Higher Independent board members could improve board’s monitoring mechanism and result in higher dividend payouts to protect minority shareholders’ interest.
(5)In the family controlled firms, higher blockholders’ ownership, active institutional investors and independent board membership could result in higher dividend payouts.
(6)Executive compensation and managerial stock ownership are associated with higher dividend payouts, in the non-family controlled firms. These results indicate that firms apply managerial incentives to relieve agency problems when making dividend policy decision.

第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 5
第三節　研究架構與流程 8
第貳章　文獻探討與假說建構 11
第一節　公司支付股利的動機 11
第二節　經理人獎酬與股利政策 12
第三節　公司治理機制與股利政策 17
第四節　家族企業特性與股利政策 33
第參章　研究設計 35
第一節　研究樣本、期間及資料來源 35
第二節　變數定義與衡量 36
第三節　主要實證模型 44
第四節　研究方法 47
第肆章　實證結果與分析 49
第一節　敘述性統計與相關分析 49
第二節　多元迴歸分析 61
第三節　敏感性分析 69
第伍章　結論與建議 75
第一節　討論與結論 75
第二節　研究限制與建議 82
參考文獻 83

圖表目錄
圖1-3-1　本研究流程 9
表2-2-1　經理人獎酬與股利政策相關文獻整理 15
表2-3-1　公司治理與股利政策相關文獻整理 29
表3-3-1 操作性定義彙總表 46
表4-1-1 整體樣本產業分布情形 50
表4-1-2 家族控制型企業產業分布情形 51
表4-1-3 非家族控制型樣本產業分布情形 52
表4-1-4 整體樣本變數敘述性統計 56
表4-1-5 家族控制型企業樣本變數敘述性統計 57
表4-1-6 非家族控制型企業樣本變數敘述性統計 58
表4-1-7 自變數VIF值 59
表4-1-8 各變數相關性矩陣 60
表4-2-1 整體樣本迴歸結果 65
表4-2-2 家族控制型企業樣本迴歸結果 66
表4-2-3 非家族控制型企業樣本迴歸結果 67
表4-2-4 實證結果匯總表 68
表4-3-1 整體樣本迴歸結果-每股總支出 71
表4-3-2 家族控制型企業樣本迴歸結果-每股總支出 72
表4-3-3 非家族控制型企業樣本迴歸結果-每股總支出 73

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