臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

審計委員會設立之目的主要為財務報表之覆核、重大交易覆核以及會計稽核主管與會計師的任免。換言之，審計委員會對於財務報導具有一定的影響性。另一方面，管理階層可能為了特定目的而透過盈餘管理來影響財務報導的最後結果。綜合可知，若審計委員會能發揮一定的治理效用，將能強化財務數字忠實表達經濟成果之程度，進而提升財報之品質。因此，本研究將以審計委員會能否有效抑制管理階層利用不同盈餘管理工作進行盈餘操弄之行為進行探討。本研究首先以2007-2014年之臺灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本，探討審計委員會之設置與否是否能有效抑制管理當局利用不同盈餘管理工具來達其盈餘標竿，然而，實證結果顯示，不論係應計基礎或實質交易活動之操弄，並無法證實審計委員會的設置能有效降低管理當局的盈餘管理行為。再者，本研究針對已設置審計委員會之公司為樣本，進一步驗證較高的審計委員會品質是否較能有效發揮其治理成效，惟實證結果仍無法支持審計委員會具備較高的組成品質時能有效抑制管理當局利用應計項目或實質交易活動來達成盈餘目標之行為。

Since 2007, there are still few companies replace supervisor with audit committee. The main obligation of audit committee is to monitor the financial report processing, review material transactions and review the appointment of accounting manager and audit firm. It means that audit committees influence the result of financial statement. On the other hand, because of some specific purpose, managers may use earning management to change the consequence of financial report. Generally speaking, if audit committees fulfill its obligation, it will promote quality of financial report and enhance the connection between financial statement and economic consequences. Hence, this study is focus on whether audit committee mitigates managers using various tools to meet earning benchmark.

To investigate how audit committees effect on earning management. This study is segmented into two parts and used data between 2007 and 2014. First, I use accrual and real earning management as two different tools to test whether audit committee inhibit earning management which is to meet benchmark. Second, for further investigation, I use audit committee quality to exam whether higher level of audit committee quality reduce different earning managements more effectively than lower level. The empirical result shows that all hypotheses are not supported, which means there are no evidence support that audit committee can reduce managers’ earning management behavior to meet the specific thresholds in this study.

摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 4
第三節 研究貢獻 6
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 我國審計委員會發展與比較 7
第二節 審計委員會之相關文獻探討 15
第三節 研究假說之建立 21
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究期間、研究樣本與資料來源 24
第二節 實證變數 25
第三節 研究模型 33
第四節 增額分析 36
第四章 實證結果與分析 37
第一節 樣本分布及樣本選取 37
第二節 敘述性統計量 40
第三節 實證結果分析 45
第四節 增額分析之結果 51
第五章 研究結論、限制與建議 54
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究限制 55
第三節 實務及學術建議 55
參考文獻 57

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