臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

生產全球化開創了蓬勃發展的製造服務產業，許多高科技製造服務廠商已經是大型國際化的企業，經常主動與產品廠商建立生產供應關係，形成新的「產品工程－技術製造」複合鏈。在高科技製造領域，產品需求非常不確定、產能投資成本又很高，製造廠商進行產能投資面對非常高的企業風險，但若產能擴充保守，產能供應不足的可能性往往成為產品公司關切的議題。本文將「工程－製造」鏈的產能確定性視為製造服務的競爭策略，建構服務競爭的數學模式，並分析雙佔廠商的競爭行為。基於產能服務的品質，本文提出一個新穎的需求分配法則，推導兩家廠商在競爭情境的反應函數，並證明兩家廠商的產能策略存在單一均衡點。基於產能服務品質的均衡點與反應函數，本研究發現，當領導廠商面對跟隨廠商的激進產能擴充行為，會採取較為保守的反應，以避免產業供給過剩，而當跟隨廠商面對領導廠商的激進行為，卻傾向採取激進行為，以防止其客戶流失。

Globalization of production has ushered in vibrant manufacturing service industries. Many high-technology manufacturing service firms are no longer small shops on the receiving end of outsourced jobs. Instead, they frequently take initiative to forge supply relationships with product firms. In these engineering-manufacturing chains, certainty of capacity supply is an important concern as conservative (insufficient) capacity expansion is frequently prompted by high uncertainty of demand and investment risk. Capacity strategy has traditionally been discussed from a manufacturer’s perspective to time or size the investment, or to compete in a game setting. In the era of manufacturing services, customers’ concern of capacity (supply) certainty should be included as an important factor in formulating a capacity strategy. This paper presents a mathematical analysis of this new aspect. Uncertain demand is modeled as a lognormal random variable. A novel service-based demand rationing rule is developed for a duopoly of differentiated prices and lognormal random demand. Through numerical calculation, this paper shows the equilibrium of capacity strategy of the duopoly and analyzes their competition behavior on capacity services.

目錄 I
圖目錄 III
表目錄 IV
第1章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 問題描述 3
1.3 研究目的與核心議題 6
1.3.1 需求配給方法 6
1.3.2 產能賽局的建構 6
1.3.3 產能賽局的反應函數 7
1.4 研究構想 7
1.5 論文架構 9
第2章 文獻回顧 10
2.2 以價格為需求配給因素的配給法則 11
2.3 以產能與價格為需求配給因素 14
2.4 以效用做為需求配給因素的配給法則 16
2.5 產能決策與競爭賽局模型 17
2.5.1 以品質競爭的賽局模型 18
2.5.2 以等候時間為考慮的的產能競爭行為 19
2.6 不確定需求乘數模型 20
2.6.1 獨佔廠商之需求乘數模型 20
2.6.2 雙佔廠商之需求乘數模型 22
2.7 市場佔有率模型 27
2.8 產能、價格與生產數量等三項決策不同順序的效果 28
2.9 小結 29
第3章 以產能服務為考量的需求配給模型 30
3.1 以產能服務為考量的配給法則 30
3.2 期望有效需求 33
第4章 雙佔廠商的反應函數 37
4.1 領導廠商的反應函數 38
4.2 跟隨廠商的反應函數 39
4.3 廠商反應函數斜率的意涵 42
第5章 競爭行為分析 44
5.1 數值範例 44
5.2 反應函數交點的意涵 46
5.3 敏感度分析 47
第6章 結論及建議 49
6.1 結論與貢獻 49
6.2 後續相關研究方向 50
參考文獻 51
附錄 54

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