臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討審委會中若成員具有鑑識會計專業背景對於宣告重編後會計師更換之影響，鑑識會計專業對於財務報導允當表達與續後財務訴訟評估之影響日益受到重視，倘若審計委員會中具有鑑識會計專家，理應能較為有效防堵財務報導舞弊與確保簽證會計師之品質。
　　本研究針對2003年至2011年美國宣告財務報表重編之上市公司，共6,971筆樣本資料裡，由於鑑識會計專家佔審計委員會中比例相對低，另外加入財務專家強化模型，本研究參考Mande and Son (2013)之研究建立迴歸模型。
　　研究發現如下：審委會中有鑑識會計專家會降低重編後的會計師變動且鑑識會計專家比起財務專家更能減少會計師更換，研究結果有助於提供國內外主管機關關於鑑識會計專業對於確保簽證會計師品質之相關證據。

This paper examines whether the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of member who is a forensic accounting expert are associated with subsequent auditor change after financial restatements. Recently, forensic accounting expert for fair presentation of a company’s financial reporting and assessing the impact of the litigation are thinking highly. If forensic accounting expert is comprised in the audit committee, it should be able to be more effective attempts to prevent fraud and ensure the quality of financial reporting. The Sample consists of 6,971 observations that listed on Compustat. Using a large sample of restatements that include auditor change and non-auditor change we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, the likelihood of existence of forensic accounting expert decrease auditors change after firms announce restatements. As expected, we also find that the negative association between Financial Expert and auditors change after firms announce restatements. Finally, we find that forensic accounting expert is more effective to decrease auditor changes than financial expert. The last result supports the idea that forensic accounting expert have a positive view of increasing the quality of financial reporting.

第一章　　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景 1
第二節　研究動機與目的 2
第三節　論文架構 3
第二章　　文獻探討與建立假說 4
第一節　財務報表重編 4
第二節　會計師更換 5
第三節　審計委員會 6
第四節　鑑識會計 6
第五節　研究假說 7
第三章　研究模型、變數與實證結果 9
第一節　研究模型 9
第二節　樣本選取 10
第三節　實證結果與分析 11
第四章　　結論與限制 16
第一節　研究結論 16
第二節　研究限制 16
參考文獻 17

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