臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討家族企業對過度自信經理人是否具有影響。過去研究發現家族企業欲將公司留給後代，故對投資較保守，以期公司未來穩定發展；而過度自信經理人因其高估計畫之報酬、低估風險，易過度投資。故本研究欲探討家族企業持股數對於過度自信經理人過度投資之行為是否有影響。本研究針對2001年至2010年S&P 1500之公司進行分析，研究結果發現，過度自信經理人在資本支出及研發支出皆會受到家族企業保守特性之影響而減少過度投資傾向，其投資對現金流量之敏感度亦會顯著減少。家族企業特性會弱化過度自信經理人對風險喜好之傾向，使總風險下降。過度自信經理人在家族企業中雖會減少過度投資、降低風險喜好，但其決策品質會因受到家族企業限制而下降，進而降低公司績效。

This study examines the influence of family ownership on overconfident CEOs. The literature suggests that because family owners of firms seek to leave family businesses to their descendants, they are more likely to be risk averse to maintain firm stability and survival. This study’s analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2010 shows that overconfident CEOs, who overestimate future cash flow of investment project and underestimate project risk, leading to overinvestment, will be affected by the conservative tendency of the family firms and reduce their overinvestment behaviors. Further, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is also reduced significantly. Family ownership also mitigates overconfident CEOs’ risk preferences. As a result, the total risks of firms with overconfident CEOs are negatively related to family ownership. Although overconfident managers in family firms reduce their overinvestment and risk-taking behaviors, the over monitoring of family ownership make overconfident CEOs tend to reduce their innovation activities and abandon positive NPV projects rather than negative NPV projects, reducing firm value.

目　錄
謝詞 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 5
2.1 Family Firms Related Literature 5
2.2 CEO Overconfidence Related Literature 6
2.3 Hypotheses Development 8
3. Data and Methodology 11
3.1 Data 11
3.2 Variable Measurement 11
3.3 Methodology 13
4. Empirical Results 18
4.1 Summary Statistics 18
4.2 Regression Analyses 19
5. Conclusion 24
Appendix 1 Variable Definitions 26
References 27
著作權聲明 47


表　次
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Full Sample 31
Table 2 Difference of Means Tests 32
Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 33
Table 4 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Capital Expenditure 34
Table 5 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and R&D Intensity 35
Table 6 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Asset Growth, PP&E Growth, and SG&A 36
Table 7 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flows 38
Table 8 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Beta 40
Table 9 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and MSE 41
Table 10 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Stock Return Volatility 42
Table 11 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and EBIT 43
Table 12 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Tobin’s Q 44
Table 13 Family Ownership, CEO Overconfidence, and Investment Decision Quality 45

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