臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討董事外部連結與企業社會責任(CSR)之關係。研究樣本為2007 ~2011年上市上櫃公司扣除金融業，實證結果指出公司規模影響董事外部連結，董事外部連結越高會使公司更會去從事企業社會責任及公司對企業社會責任投入越多。我們用三個先前的假說說明公司為何會從事企業社會責任:過度投資假說(Barnea and Rubin, 2006)，產品訊號假說(Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2005)及策略選擇假說(Cespa and Cestone, 2000)。本研究結果主要與策略選擇假說的預測一致。有較強的管理防禦的管理者較不會去從事企業社會責任。

另外，我們更進一步發現，當做企業社會責任的邊際貢獻較低(管理者的位子鞏固，管理防禦強)以及當做企業社會責任的邊際成本較高(董事持股高)時，公司做企業社會責任的傾向就會被降低。

In this study we explore how board external connectedness is related to corporate social reasonability. Our result from 1,120 listed firms in the Taiwan stock market indicates that firm size dictates board external connectedness which in turn positively associated with firm’s engagement of social responsibility and the extent of social responsibility. We use three previously-developed hypotheses to illustrate why firms would engage in social responsibility: overinvestment (Barnea and Rubin, 2006), product signaling (Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2005), and strategic choice (Cespa and Cestone, 2000). Our result is mainly consistent with the prediction of the strategic choice hypothesis in the sense that a well-entrenched CEO (as manifested in CEO/chairman duality) is less likely to engage in social responsibility.
Moreover, we find that firm’s CSR engagement is positively related to size-dictated board external connectedness, but is somewhat thwarted by a lower marginal benefit (high managerial entrenchment) and a higher marginal cost (high directors’ shareholding) of CSR engagement.

第一章 緒論........................................................1
第一節 研究背景及動機...........................................1
第二節 研究目的.................................................4
第二章 文獻探討.....................................................5
第一節 企業社會責任.............................................5
第二節 董事會與公司治理.........................................9
第三節 董事會(公司治理)與企業社會責任之關聯....................12
第三章 研究方法....................................................13
第一節 研究假說................................................13
第二節 研究樣本與資料來源......................................16
第三節 變數操作行定義與衡量....................................18
第四章 實證結果....................................................24
第一節 敘述性統計..............................................24
第二節 羅吉斯迴歸分析..........................................31
第三節 董事連結、管理防禦與董事持股............................37
第五章 結論與建議..................................................46
第一節 研究結論................................................46
第二節 研究建議................................................48
參考文獻............................................................49
表目錄
表3-3-1 Entrenchment指標彙總表......................................21
表3-3-2 變數彙總表..................................................23
表4-1-1 樣本分佈....................................................24
表4-1-2 基本統計量..................................................25
表4-1-3 單變量差異檢定..............................................27
表4-1-4 Pearson相關係數矩陣表.......................................29
表4-2-1 羅吉斯迴歸(Logistic Regresion)-大公司 V.S 小公司................31
表4-2-2 董事連結配適值與企業社會責任迴歸分析........................33
表4-3-1 管理防禦、董事連結配適值與企業社會責任羅吉斯迴歸分析.........38
表4-3-2 董事連結及管理防禦交乘項與企業社會責任羅吉斯迴歸分析........40
表4-3-3 董事連結及董事持股交乘項與企業社會責任羅吉斯迴歸分析........42
表4-3-4 董事持股及管理防禦交乘項與企業社會責任羅吉斯迴歸分析........44

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