臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討集團企業公司治理機制對負債成本的影響，研究期間為2003年到2009年台灣上市櫃公司，以負債成本為負債成本之代理變數。本研究以內部監理機制中董事會組成與股權結構來衡量公司治理機制，利用多元迴歸分析來探討集團企業之公司治理與負債成本之關聯，並進一步探討績優集團企業與集團企業經營虧損時，其公司治理機制對負債成本之影響。實證結果如下：
集團企業之公司治理機制對負債成本有顯著影響。集團企業之董事會規模與獨立董監事持股比率與負債成本呈負相關，而集團企業之大股東持股比率與負債成本呈正相關。績優集團企業之公司治理機制與負債成本呈顯著相關，包含獨立董監事、外部股東持股比率與機構投資人持股比率與負債成本呈負相關；而其董事會規模、獨立董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率與負債成本呈正相關。經營虧損下，集團企業之公司治理機制與負債成本無顯著相關。由實證結果得知，集團企業之公司治理機制會影響負債成本高低，但當集團企業是屬於績優集團企業時，其董事會組成與股權結構對負債成本影響的方向與集團企業稍有差異，隱含集團企業應視本身經營狀況配套公司治理機制措施才能有效降低負債成本；另外，集團企業經營虧損時進行融資授信，發現財務報表比率對負債成本之影響較公司治理機制來得顯著。

This research discussion group enterprise governs the mechanism to the debt cost influence, research period was 2003 to 2009 the Taiwan going on the market listed and cabinet company, take was in debt the cost proxy of variable as the debt cost.
This research the board of directors composition and the stockholder''s rights structure weighs the company by the internal overseeing mechanism in to govern the mechanism, discusses company of the group enterprise using the multiple regression analysis to govern connection with the debt cost, and further discusses twists when the superior group enterprise and the group enterprise manage the loss, its company governs. The real diagnosis result is as follows:
Company of the group enterprise governs the mechanism to have the remarkable influence to the debt cost. Board of directors of scale and independent directors and supervisors the group enterprise won stocks the ratio and the debt cost assume the inverse correlation, but major stockholders of the group enterprise own stocks the ratio and the debt cost present correlation. Twists company of the superior group enterprise to govern the mechanism and the debt cost assumes the markable correlation, contains independent directors and supervisors, exterior shareholder owns stocks the ratio and the organization investor owns stocks the ratio and the debt cost assumes the inverse correlation; But its board of directors scale, independent directors and supervisors own stocks the ratio, the major stockholder own stocks the ratio and the debt cost present correlation. Under the management loss, company of the group enterprise governs the mechanism and the debt cost is not remarkable is connected. Knew by the real diagnosis result that, company of the group enterprise governs the mechanism to be able to affect the debt cost height, but when the group enterprise is belongs twists the superior group enterprise, its board of directors composes with the stockholder''s rights structure to the debt cost influence direction and the group enterprise slightly has the difference, the concealed group enterprise should regard itself manages the condition necessary company to govern the machine-made measure to be able to reduce the debt cost effectively; Moreover, the group enterprise manages when the loss carries on financing to give the letter, discovered the financial report form ratio compares the company to influence the debt cost to govern the mechanism to come obviously.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程與架構 3
第四節 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 集團企業 5
第二節 代理理論 10
第三節 負債成本 13
第四節 公司治理 17
第五節 公司治理與負債成本 23
第六節 集團企業與負債成本 24
第七節 集團企業、公司治理與負債成本 25
第三章 研究方法 26
第一節 觀念性架構 26
第二節 樣本選取 27
第三節 資料來源 28
第四節 研究假說 29
第五節 實證模型 35
第六節 變數定義與衡量 37
第四章 實證結果與分析 44
第一節 敘述性統計 44
第二節 Pearson相關數矩陣 46
第三節 迴歸分析之實證結果 50
第四節 額外測試 58
第五章 敏感性分析 68
第六章 結論與建議 70
第一節 結論 70
第二節 研究限制 72
第三節 研究建議 73
參考文獻 74

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