臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在一連串的會計醜聞發生後，審計委員會被認為是確保財報品質之最主要的公司治理機制；另一方面，機構投資人也被視為是公司治理制度中極重要的監督角色。本研究擬探討審計委員會的特性以及機構投資人之角色對於財報品質的影響。審計委員會特質包含: 開會次數、規模大小以及董事出席率。本研究之研究期間為2012年到2014年，共654筆樣本，實證方法為迴歸分析法。本研究結論如下: 當(1)審計委員會開會次數越多、(2)審計委員會之董事的出席率越高時，將能顯著地降低管理當局透過使用裁決性應計數或是使用實質盈餘管理之操弄所進行的盈餘管理行為，使財務報表品質有所提升。

Recent corporate scandal have triggered a crisis of confidence in the reliability and integrity of financial reports. The role of the audit committee (AC) and the institutional investors in corporate governance are the subject of increasing public and regulatory interest. This study focuses on the AC’s characteristics, including the size, meeting times, the average attendance rate and so on will affect the corporate managers’ earning management behavior or not. Besides, this study investigates the relationship between institutional investors, and managers’ earning management behavior to discuss the quality of financial reports. Using data from 2012-2014, the results show that when an AC is comprised of more frequency of meetings and higher rate of average attendance, the financial reporting quality will improve. This study contributes to our understanding of AC function and provides new evidence that AC plays a critical role in financial reporting quality in Taiwan.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節、 研究背景與動機 1
第二節、 研究目的 2
第三節、 研究內容及流程 3
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 5
第一節、 財務報表品質之相關文獻 5
第二節、 審計委員會與財務報表品質 9
第三節、 機構投資人與財務報表品質 12
第參章 研究設計 13
第一節、 資料蒐集與樣本選取 13
第二節、 研究變數定義 14
第三節、 實證模型 20
第肆章 實證結果 23
第一節、 敘述性統計 23
第二節、 相關性分析 27
第三節、 實證結果 29
第四節、 額外測試 33
第伍章 結論與建議 39
第二節、 貢獻與管理意涵 40
第三節、 研究限制 41

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