臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來資本市場的興起，導致所有者與經營者之間因資訊不對稱而存在著代理問題，而如何透過公司治理機制來制衡企業管理當局，也逐漸受到學者與投資大眾所關注；此外，在企業欲募集大量資金並避免失去控制權之情況下，發行公司債成為籌資之主要方式。因此，本研究主要以債權人之觀點，探討公司治理機制中，有效的董事會組成及特性是否能降低代理問題與債權人所面對之違約風險，致能減輕企業所負擔之負債資金成本。
本研究選取2003年至2007年上市公司，共7個年度，2936個觀察值，來分別檢視機構投資人佔董監事之席次比例、獨立董監事席次比例、董事會規模、董監事持股比例及董事長兼任總經理分別與負債資金成本之關聯性。實證結果彙整如下：
一、當外部法人董監握有董監事之席次比例越高，其越能夠提高企業公司治理之有效性，並降低債權人所面對之違約風險，進而減輕企業所負擔之負債資金成本。
二、獨立董監事佔董監事會席次比例越高，越能夠有效監督管理階層，提升公司治理之有效性，降低債權人所面臨之違約風險，進而減輕企業所負擔之負債資金成本。
三、七人以下的董事會，其與負債資金成本呈負向顯著，顯示小董事會規模可有效監督管理階層，並有助於改善企業本身公司治理之有效性，進而減輕企業所負擔之負債資金成本。
四、董監事持股與負債資金成本未達顯著，將此進一步分析後發現，當董監事持股低於25％時，董監事將趨向與外部股東之利益一致，以追求公司利益最大化為目標，使債權人相信能降低所面臨之違約風險，進而減輕企業所負擔之負債資金成本；反之，當董監事持股高於25％時，易採取對自身利益極大之政策，故使債權人對企業之經營績效產生疑慮並要求提高風險溢酬，使企業所負擔之負債資金成本增加。
五、董事長兼任總經理與負債資金成本未達顯著，而進一步分析後發現，在台灣企業多為家族型之情況下，家族企業若同時由董事長擔任總經理時，反會因權力過大使公司治理機制形同虛設，在債權人面對較高風險下自然會提高風險溢酬，使企業增加其所負擔之負債資金成本。

Agency problems between the principal and the agent have been arisen because of the information asymmetry in the capital market recently. Thus, how to balance the executives through the corporate governance becomes a major topic. Besides, the enterprise mainly issues corporate bonds which can help the business collect a large amount of funds and avoid losing the control rights in the same time. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine whether the effective board of directors can reduce the agency problems and the default risk the debtees face, and finally to diminish the cost of debts in business from the debtees’ sight.
This research chooses the listed companies which contain 2,936 observations from 2003 to 2007 to examine the relationship between the percentages of institutional investors seating in the board, the percentages of independent board directors seating in the board, the board size, the percentages of boards’ holdings on stocks, the CEO duality and the cost of debts respectively. The results are summarized as the following.
1. The higher percentages of institutional investors seating in the board, the more efficient the corporate governance. It can help debtees reduce the default risk, and diminish the cost of debt in the enterprises.
2. The higher percentages of independent board directors seating in the board, the more efficient supervising the executives. Enhancing the effectiveness of the corporate governance can help debtees to reduce the default risk, and thus the cost of debt in the enterprises will be diminished.
3. When the board size is under 7 directors, it is significantly negative with the cost of debts. It reveals that the small size of the board can supervise the executives efficiently, improve the corporate governance, and reduce the cost of debts in the enterprises.
4. The percentages of boards’ holdings on stocks are not significantly related to the cost of debts. However, when the percentages of boards’ holdings are within 25%, the benefit of boards and outside stockholders becomes the same. They will pursue the maximum of the business benefits that let debtees reduce the default risks and diminish the cost of debts in the enterprises. On the contrary, when the percentages of boards’ holdings are over 25%, the directors will pursue the maximum of benefits themselves. In this situation, the performance of debtees will be doubtful. They will ask for the higher risk premium, and thus the cost of debts in the enterprises will be increased.
5. The CEO duality is not significantly related to the cost of debts. To do the additional analysis, there are more family firms in Taiwan. When the chairmen are also CEOs, they will have more power to reduce the corporate governance. Consequently, the risk premium will be raised because debtees will be confronted by more risks, and the cost of debts in the enterprises will be increased.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究步驟 6
第貳章 文獻探討 8
第一節 代理理論與負債資金成本 9
第二節 公司治理 10
第三節 董事會在公司治理中的重要性與所扮演之角色 13
第四節 董事會、機構投資人與負債資金成本之關聯性探討 14
第參章 研究設計 19
第一節 研究流程 19
第二節 研究假說 20
第三節 變數定義與衡量 24
第四節 研究模型 28
第五節 研究樣本 29
第肆章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計分析 30
第二節 相關性分析 34
第三節 多元迴歸分析 36
第四節 額外分析 42
第伍章 結論與建議 55
第一節 結論 55
第二節 研究建議 57
參考文獻 58
中文部份： 58
英文部分： 59

表目錄
表3 1 研究假說彙整 23
表3 2 樣本選取 29
表4 1 應變數與主要變數之敘述性統計 32
表4 2 控制變數之敘述性統計 33
表4 3 模型一PEARSON與SPEARMAN之相關係數表 35
表4 4 信用評等與公司治理機制模型之迴歸結果 37
表4 5 模型一之迴歸結果 41
表4 6 考量非線性董監持股後之迴歸結果 44
表 4 7 考量家族企業後之迴歸結果 47
表4 8 考量外部法人組成項目後之迴歸結果 49
表4 9 考量機構投資人組成項目後之迴歸結果 52
表4 10 控制變數採因素分析後之迴歸結果 54
附錄一：債券發行概況表 63
附錄二：台灣歷年上市公司資本來源統計表 64

圖目錄
圖1 1 研究架構流程圖 7
圖2-1 文獻探討架構圖 8
圖2 2 世界銀行公司治理機制圖 12
圖3 1 公司治理與負債資金成本之觀念性研究架構 19

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