臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

現今既有的文獻有探討多階段競租架構與競租浪費，亦有討論集團間的競租架構，然而，將跨階段移轉效果導入集團間的競租活動，以及其變化是否對集團成員於各階段競租投入產生影響，尚未有文獻考慮且進行比較。

本文擬參考Kate and Tokatlidu (1996)的模型架構，將跨階段移轉效果導入進行分析，並針對集團內個別成員如何決定兩階段競租活動的投入比例，以及獲勝團體於首階段獲勝後，進入到次階段時，其租利分配策略是否考量個別成員在首階段的競租投入程度，進行模型推導分析。此外，針對Hausken(2012)對傳統兩階段集團間競租模型的分析結論所提出質疑，本研究將跨階段移轉效果導入該模型架構，所得結論可以解決Hausken對於首階段競租投入水準偏低的質疑。

In existing literature, never has a rent-seeking analysis and comparison been demonstrated that whether the variation of the carryover effect in the group rent-seeking contest will affect rent dissipation in each stage.

The thesis took the paper “Group competition for rents” published by Kate and Tokatlidu (1996) as reference and considered the carryover effect in the rent-seeking structure. Moreover, this research will focus on how groups’ members distribute their rent outlays in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest, and whether the winning group consider members’ outlays in the first stage to distribute the rents. In addition, this research also aims to solve that Hausken (2012) concluded the first stage’s outlays could be extremely low in the two-stage group rent-seeking contest.

目錄
第一章 緒論...............................1
第一節 研究背景............................1
第二節 研究動機與目的.......................3
第二章 文獻回顧........................... 5
第一節 多階段競租模式與競租浪費...............5
第二節 集團競租............................8
第三節 跨階段移轉效果......................10
第四節 小結..............................11
第三章 理論模型與均衡......................12
第一節 研究方法...........................12
第二節 模型設定...........................12
第二節 均衡解推求.........................15
第四章 跨階段移轉效果對競租活動之效果分析......21
第一節 基本分析結果........................21
第二節 相關文獻比較........................31
第五章 結論..............................33
參考文獻.................................35

中文部分
翁仁甫（2003），「競租與護租分析－社會資源浪費之評量與控制」，《經社法制論叢》，第31期，頁187-208。
蔡攀龍、張寶塔 (2005)，《個體經濟學》，聯經出版公司。

英文部分
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Baik, Kyung Hwan, & Kim, In-Gyu. (1997). Delegation in contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 13: 281-298.
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