臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本研究主要探討中國公司之公司治理與管理者薪酬-績效的關係，其中管理者薪酬分別以固定薪酬及權益薪酬進行分析。樣本資料選定2003-2012年1288家中國上市公司為研究對象，並對2006-2012年198家發放權益薪酬之公司做配對樣本分析。本研究使用之主要公司治理變數為兩權偏離程度，以ROA、Tobin’s Q 為績效衡量指標，並進一步將資料依最終控制人，分國營企業及非國營企業，藉以瞭解公司治理如何影響管理者薪酬與管理者薪酬-績效間的敏感度。
　　本文將配對樣本進行Logistic迴歸分析及總資料進行Panel tobit regression with fixed effects。結果顯示，不論總樣本或配對樣本，兩權偏離程度越高，管理者的(固定、權益)薪酬越高，且其會弱化管理者(固定、權益)薪酬與績效之間的關係。國營企業之管理者薪酬與會計績效ROA關係較為顯著，與市場績效Tobin’s Q無顯著相關；而非國營企業之管理者薪酬則與市場績效Tobin’s關係較為顯著，與會計績效ROA無顯著相關。並且，本文將總資料以各公司股改時點，分前後兩期進行分析。發現股改前，管理者薪酬與會計績效之關係較為顯著；股改後，管理者薪酬與市場績效之關係較為顯著。

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use matched sample on 198 company which using stock incentive pay from 2006 to 2012.
We find that the excess control right is positively related to both types of managerial compensation, and is negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance in state controlled company, while managerial compensation is positively correlated to market performance in non-state controlled company. This paper also prove that managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance before the split share structure reform while correlated to market performance after the split share structure reform.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 4
第一節 薪酬與績效關係 4
第二節 偏離與薪酬績效 4
第三節 公司治理與權益誘因 5
第四節 中國股改與公司績效 6
第五節 假說建立 7
第三章 研究方法 8
第一節 資料來源與樣本期間 8
第二節 變數定義 8
第三節 研究設計 11
第四節 研究方法 12
第四章 實證結果與分析 13
第一節 基本統計分析 13
第二節 迴歸分析 16
第五章 結論與建議 28
第一節 結論 28
第二節 建議 29
參考文獻 30

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