臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

道德危險一直以來都是保險市場中極為重要的問題之一，中外文獻的相關探討更是不勝枚舉，但對於猶如是保險市場強大後盾的再保險市場，關於道德危險之研究，國內外文獻著墨並不多。然而，近幾年來全球天災與巨災頻繁，導致再保險業者虧損連連，也使得全球再保險市場歷經一些重大的變革，例如：新興風險移轉方案的興起以及全球再保險業的併購風潮等等。由於台灣產險業者的承保容量不大，而大部分承保的業務都經由再保險移轉給國外的再保險業者，因此台灣的再保險市場是否存在著道德危險的問題，值得近一步的探索。

本文建構一個計量經濟模型，並且由台灣15家產險公司，自1989至1999的火災再保險資料中選取樣本，去驗證道德危險是否存在於台灣的再保險市場，並進一步去探究再保險業者都是採用什麼方式去抑制道德危險的發生。實證的結果，我們發現道德危險的確存在於傳統的再保險市場，而且再保險業者會藉由價格誘因去抑制道德危險。

This paper mainly verifies the existence of moral hazard in Taiwan's reinsurance market. In addition, I interpret how the reinsurance cycles aggravate its insufficiency on capacity and price as well. I adopt an econometric model, and use a data set about fire reinsurance to test our hypotheses. My sample consists of 15 insurers for the period 1991~1999 in the non-life insurance industry in Taiwan. I interpret some economic phenomena in the reinsurance market at present by exploring several hypotheses. The empirical results tell that the reinsurers control moral hazard via price incentives in Taiwan, especially by direct price control.

中文摘要 ...........................i
ABSTRACT ..........................ii
誌謝 ..........................iii
Table of Content....................v
List of Table .....................vi
List of Figure ...................vii
1.Introduction .............. ..... 1
1.1Background and Motivation........1
1.2Purposes.........................6
1.3Framework........................6
2.Literature Review.................8
3.Methodology......................14
3.1.Theoretical Model..............14
Inspection of Moral hazard.....17
3.2.Variables Selection............18
3.3.Hypothesis Test................19
3.4.Empirical Model................19
4.Empirical Results and Analysis...21
4.1.Data...........................21
4.2.Estimation Method..............22
4.3.Results........................25
5.Conclusion ......................28
References ........................29
Appendix ......................... 33

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