臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

我們建立兩階段賽局模型分析員工分紅比率影響廠商和員工的行為，以及員工分紅費用化前後之分紅比率對台灣高科技產業的影響。我們發現員工分紅率在費用化後會較費用化前高，然而，如果管理階層考量自身利益或者員工比較同業之間的分紅比率，則分紅比率會較費用化前低，與一般情況下的分析結果不同。我們更進一步以Cournot分析方式討論兩個相同競爭廠商的互動行為，發現兩廠商的最適分紅比率在費用化前後都會相等，且費用化後分紅比率較高。此文章可助於瞭解員工分紅費用化的本質及其影響高科技產業的情形。

We construct a two-stage game to analyze how the rate of profit sharing affects behaviors of firms and employees. We explore such impact under situations that before and after new policy of expensing employees’ profit sharing in Taiwan respectively. We find that the rate of profit sharing after expensing will be higher than before. However, if management echelon takes self-interests into account or employees care about the relative profit sharing rate to those in the other firms, the rate could be lower, under some situations, contrast with common impression that the policy of expensing employee profit sharing will raise the rate of profit sharing. We further discuss two-firm competition with Cournot analysis, showing that the optimal rate of profit sharing would be the same. Also, the rate after expensing will be higher than before and still the same. This article helps addressing that the essence of profit sharing program and elaborating how the policy of ESOPs expense affects high-tech firms in Taiwan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents I
1. Introduction 1
2. Basic Model 5
3. Model Structure: Before Expensing 5
3.1. Employee 5
3.2. Firm 7
3.3. Derivation 7
4. Model Structure: After Expensing 9
4.1. Employee 9
4.2. Firm 9
4.3. Derivation 10
5. Results 11
6. Analysis 12
6.1. Stock Price 12
6.2. Efficiency 13
6.3. Management Echelon 15
6.4. The Relative- Level of Competing Firms 17
6.5. Two-Firms Competition 20
6.6. Combine Management Echelon and the Relative- Level of Competing Firms 21
6.7. Shareholders’Profits 22
7. Conclusion 23
Appendix 26
References 36

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