臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

針對經營不佳上市櫃公司之買回庫藏股行為，觀察相關公司治理因素，以推論公司買回庫藏股之行為對審計品質的影響，提供投資人制定相關決策之參考。因資訊不對稱問題，從以往文獻發現公司買回庫藏股視為好消息，常存在超額盈餘，投資者認為有利可圖，會將其列為投資參考指標。本研究考量市值於高低估情形下，搭配觀察會計師出具的查核意見書，就略可看出端倪，乃因會計人員面對生存壓力之同業競爭，可能犧牲獨立性降低審計品質，對繼續經營有疑慮公司，卻無被簽發保留意見或修正式無保留意見，進而推論管理者買回庫藏股是基於防禦性或自利性之動機。如果公司股權結構與內部治理存有問題，管理當局為增加其自身利益，可能對審計品質產生負面效果，故本研究試圖在控制其他影響查核意見因素後，以會計師簽發對繼續經營有重大疑慮審計意見之查核報告的可能性，作為審計品質之代理變數，檢測公司治理之相關因素，包含獨立董事人數、董監事質押比率、經理人兼董事持股比率及法人機構持股比率等實驗變數，於公司買回庫藏股時，對審計品質可能造成之影響來進行分析，以驗證公司買回庫藏股之動機。
實證結果發現當公司因防禦動機而買回庫藏股時，則不會損害審計品質；當公司之治理機制不佳時，董監事質押比率高會損害審計品質，經理人兼董事持股比率越高在市值低估時購回庫藏股則有損審計品質，但公司法人機構持股比率較高時則是在市值高估情況下有損審計品質，而買回庫藏股且又損害審計品質時，則可推知公司仍因自利動機之目的，而採行買回庫藏股政策。關於公司獨立董事之設立，目前在國內乃是形同配合政令，其監督效果不彰，故設立獨立董事不論有無購回庫藏股對審計品質皆不受影響。本研究發現可提供主管機關以及相關利害關係人參考。

By observing the corporate governance relevant factors to infer company for buying back treasury stock acts impacts on audit quality which provides investors develop the reference of the relevant decision-making behavior of the poor management of listed companies. Due to asymmetric information from the previous literature found that the company buying back treasury stock seem like the Good News to investors. Often it is excess and surplus profit which they thought it will be classified as investment reference. It is obviously the market value has been over underestimated by studying audit submissions of the certified public accountants.Referred to the accounting staff face the pressure to survive in the competition industry that it may sacrifice the independence of the lower audit quality. If the company has doubts about keep operating ,had gotten no the issue of reservations or modified an unqualified opinion on audit submissions which infer the managers based on the defensive or self-serving motives to buy back treasury shares .If the company''s ownership structure and internal governance have problems, the management authorities increase their self-interest and the audit quality may have a negative effect on it . Therefore, this study attempts to continue to operate significant doubts about the audit opinions of the possibility of the audit report as audit quality proxy variables after controlling for other factors affecting the audit opinions issued to accountants. To detect corporate governance-related factors, including the number of independent directors, directors and supervisors pledge ratio, manager and director ownership and ownership of legal entities and other experimental variables, Treasury shares, on the possible impact of audit quality analyzes and verifies that the company buy back treasury shares of motivation.
Empirical results the defense motivation to buy back treasury shares will not harm audit quality. When poor governance mechanisms of the Company, the directors and supervisors pledged the higher rate of damage audit quality, the manager and director ownership holding higher rates of corporate bodies in the underestimate of the market value of the repurchase of treasury shares are detrimental to audit quality. But circumstances of the market value are overestimated, Treasury shares damage audit quality. we can infer that it is ineffective when the company is still due to the purpose of self-serving motives, and adopted the policy of treasury stock, the establishment of the independent directors, just like with the decree in the country, because of its oversight, so regardless of whether the repurchase of treasury shares of audit quality are not affected. This study found that the competent authorities and relevant stakeholders reference.

第一章 緒論..............................................................................................................1
第一節 研究背景動機......................................................................................1
第二節 研究目的...................................................................................3
第三節 研究範圍...................................................................................4
第四節 研究貢獻...................................................................................5
第五節 論文架構與研究流程………………………………………...6
第二章 文獻探討.........................................................................................8
第一節 庫藏股定義...............................................................................8
第二節 我國庫藏股制度介紹及相關法律規定……...........................10
第三節 庫藏股買回動機...................................................................... 15
第四節 庫藏股相關文獻回顧...............................................................17
第五節 審計品質相關文獻回顧...........................................................20
第六節 庫藏股買回動機與審計品質...................................................23
第三章 研究方法.........................................................................................25
第一節 觀念性架構圖.................................................. ........................25
第二節 研究假說................................................................................. .26
第三節 實證模型................................................................................. .29
第四節 變數之操作性定義...................................................................33
第五節 資料來源與樣本選取...............................................................38
第四章 實證結果. .......................................................................................42
第一節 敘述性統計分析..................................................................42
第二節 相關係數分析......................................................................45
第三節 實證結果與分析..................................................................46
第四節 敏感性分析.........................................................................69
第五章 結論與建議...............................................................................71
第一節 研究結論.............................................................................71
第二節 實務意涵.............................................................................72
第三節 研究限制與建議………......................................................74
參考文獻...................................................................................................75
中文文獻...........................................................................................75
英文文獻.................................................................................................76

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