臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去研究對於企業租稅規避如何影響現金持有看法不一，為釐清企業租稅規避與現金持有關聯性，本文透過1996年到2014年台灣上市櫃公司資料實證研究之。預防動機認為租稅規避帶來補稅風險，故租稅規避程度較高企業，會持有較多現金存量。代理觀點認為租稅規避會使企業資訊不透明，使經理人進行利益榨取(rent extraction)，由於現金十分容易移轉，使現金快速消耗，導致較低的現金持有。本研究實證結果支持代理觀點，租稅規避程度較高企業持有較少現金。

若投資人認為租稅規避會增強經理人利益榨取，投資人會降低對現金持有的評價。本文實證結果指出租稅規避與現金價值沒有顯著關聯性，但租稅規避程度較高企業的超額現金價值較低。

較強的公司治理可能緩和租稅規避帶來的負面影響，故本文按公司治理強弱分組迴歸，實證結果指出公司治理強弱對於租稅規避與現金持有之關係沒有顯著影響，對於租稅規避與現金價值之關係亦沒有顯著影響，只有在租稅規避指標為五年期現金有效稅率時，較強的公司治理可以緩和租稅規避對超額現金價值的負面影響。

Prior studies have mixed evidence about the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and firm cash holdings. This study uses data of Taiwan listed corporations from 1996 to 2014. In the view of precautionary motive of cash holdings, firms that have higher levels of tax avoidance will encounter more tax risk so that these firms will hold more cash. In the view of agency theory, tax avoidance could have an adverse impact on firm’s information environment. Therefore, the adverse impact of tax avoidance can allow managers to undertake greater rent extraction. Because cash can be easily diverted, tax avoidance may lead to quicker dissipation of firm’s cash holdings and resultantly lower cash holdings. The results support the view of agency theory. Corporations with higher levels of tax avoidance have lower cash holdings.

If investors perceive tax avoidance as enabling managers’ rent extraction, they will lower valuation of firm cash holdings. The results suggest that there is no significant relation between valuation of firm cash holdings and corporate tax avoidance, but the valuation of firm excess cash holdings is lower for firms with higher levels of tax avoidance.

Stronger corporate governance might mitigate the adverse impact of tax avoidance. So this study conducts regression analyses on subsamples. The results show that corporate governance doesn’t affect the relation between corporate tax avoidance and firm cash holdings. Also, corporate governance doesn’t affect relationship between corporate tax avoidance and valuation of firm cash holdings. However, the adverse impact of corporate tax avoidance on valuation of excess cash holdings is mitigated for firms with stronger corporate governance when tax avoidance is measured using 5-year cash effective tax rate.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究方法 4
第三節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 6
第一節 現金持有 7
第二節 租稅規避 13
第三節 假說建立 16
第三章 研究方法 18
第一節 樣本篩選與資料來源 18
第二節 租稅規避指標 19
第三節 公司治理指標 21
第四節 研究模型 23
第四章 實證結果 31
第一節 租稅規避與現金持有 31
第二節 租稅規避與現金價值 41
第三節 租稅規避與超額現金價值 46
第四節 敏感性分析 51
第五章 結論與建議 56
第一節 結論與建議 56
第二節 研究限制 58
參考文獻 59

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