臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文研究2000年至2009年之臺灣上市與上櫃企業，探討家族企業與避稅之關聯與傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對企業避稅活動之影響。將家族企業分成三種不同的定義，並利用Frank, Lynch and Rego(2009)發展出的避稅模型進行分析。研究發現(1)在三種不同家族企業定義下，相較於非家族企業，家族企業較不易避稅。(2)有傳統代理問題的企業比起不具任何代理問題的企業，其避稅活動並無顯著差異。有核心代理問題的企業比起不具任何代理問題的企業，其避稅活動具顯著差異。以及相較於同時存在兩種代理問題的企業，具核心問題之企業，其避稅活動有顯著差異。

The paper investigates a sample of Taiwan public traded companies in the period of 2000-2009. This paper studies the relation between family firms and avoidance, and further examines the effects of two agency problems (conflict between owner and manager, and conflict between controller shareholder and minority shareholder) on tax avoidance. I use three different definitions of family firms and tax avoidance model developed by Frank, Lynch and Rego(2009) to analyze those relations.
The results are as follow : (1) relative to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to participate tax avoidance activities. The result holds under three definitions of family firms. (2) Compared to firms with no agency problems, the tax avoidance activity is significantly different when firms face conflict between controller shareholder and minority shareholder. And the tax avoidance activity is also significantly different when firms with two agency problems relative to firms face conflict between controller shareholder and minority shareholder. But the result is significant only under definition1 and definition2 of family firms.

圖表目錄 I
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機與目的 1
1.2 研究問題 6
1.3 研究架構 6
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 8
2.1 家族企業的定義 8
2.2 家族企業相關文獻 12
2.2.1 家族企業與經營績效、價值 12
2.2.2 家族企業與盈餘品質 13
2.2.3 家族企業與負債融資決策 15
2.2.4 家族企業與公司治理、舞弊 16
2.3 避稅相關文獻 17
2.3.1 財稅差異與盈餘管理 17
2.3.2 財稅差異與避稅 21
2.4 傳統代理問題與核心代理問題相關文獻 26
2.5 研究假說 32
第三章 研究方法 35
3.1 樣本選取與資料收集 35
3.2 研究變數定義 36
3.2.1 自變數 36
3.2.2 應變數(避稅，TAX) 36
3.2.3 其他變數 38
3.3 研究模型 41
第四章 實證結果與分析 43
4.1 研究模型 43
4.1.1 樣本資料篩選過程 43
4.1.2 敘述性統計 44
4.1.3 相關性分析 46
4.2 實證分析 50
4.2.1 假說一結果分析 50
4.2.2 假說二結果分析 50
第五章 研究結論與建議 56
參考文獻 60

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