臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去公司治理的研究專注於公司績效，鮮少專注於公司績效波動程度。本文的研究目的在探討公司治理機制對於公司績效及公司績效波動程度的影響。本研究以資產報酬率、股票報酬率及Tobin’s Q衡量公司績效且以其標準差衡量公司績效波動程度。實證結果顯示董事會規模越大、董事長兼任總經理時、董監事質押比率越高或控制權偏離程度越大則公司績效越差；董事會獨立性越高或內部人持股比率越高則公司績效越好。進一步分析上述變數對公司績效波動程度的影響，實證結果顯示董事長兼任總經時、董監事質押比率越高或控制權偏離程度越大則公司績效波動程度越大；董事會規模越大或內部人持股比率越高則公司績效波動程度越小；董事會獨立性與公司績效波動程度無顯著關係。

Prior studies most focus on the corporate performance and pay little attention to the variability of corporate performance. The main purpose of this study tries to fill this gap and focuses on the impact of the corporate governance mechanism on corporate performance and the variability of corporate performance. The variables used in this study includes return on assets, stock return and Tobin’s Q to measure corporate performance and the standard deviation of the variables to measure the variability of corporate performance. The empirical results indicate that the larger of board size, the chairman who is also the CEO, the higher percentage of directors and supervisors pledging or the higher deviation of control right with the worse corporate performance; the higher independence of board or the higher insider ownership with the well corporate performance. Further analysis the variables impact on the variability of corporate performance. The empirical results indicate that the chairman who is also the CEO, the higher percentage of directors and supervisors pledging or the higher deviation of control right with the higher variability of corporate performance; the larger of board size or the higher insider ownership with the lower variability of corporate performance; the independence of board is insignificantly with the variability of corporate performance.

目錄
第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究架構與流程 6
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 公司治理機制對公司經營績效之影響性 8
第二節 公司治理機制對公司經營績效波動程度之影響性 15
第参章 研究方法
第一節 假說發展 19
第二節 研究設計 24
第三節 研究樣本與資料來源 30
第四節 研究方法 31
第肆章 實證結果分析
第一節 樣本之敘述性統計 33
第二節 相關係數分析 35
第三節 公司治理機制與公司經營績效之關聯性 38
第四節 公司治理機制與公司經營績效波動程度之關聯性 41
第五節 穩健性檢定 46
第伍章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論 50
第二節 研究限制與研究建議 54
參考文獻 55

圖表目錄
圖 1-1 研究流程圖 7
表 2-1 公司治理機制與公司績效關聯性之實證文獻彙總 14
表 2-2 公司治理機制與公司績效波動程度關聯性之實證文獻彙總 18
表 3-1 變數之操作性定義 29
表 3-2 固定效果與隨機效果模型檢定 32
表 4-1 變數之敘述統計 34
表 4-2 實證模型相關係數矩陣 36
表 4-3 模型共線性檢定 37
表 4-4 公司治理機制與公司績效之關聯性 40
表 4-5 公司治理機制與公司績效波動程度之關聯性 44
表 4-6 公司治理機制與公司風險之關聯性 48
表 5-1 公司治理機制與公司績效關聯性之實證結果彙總 53
表 5-2 公司治理機制與公司績效波動程度關聯性之實證結果彙總 53

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