臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

有鑑於國內外企業弊案頻傳，我國於2006年修正證券交易法訂定獨立董事與審計委員會制度之規定，希望藉此來強化公司治理架構及董事會監督職能，進而提升財務報導的品質，降低財務報導舞弊之發生。學者發現，在美國SOX法案通過後，公司管理階層由以往的應計項目盈餘管理轉變為較不易察覺的實質盈餘管理。本研究以2007年至2013年間之上市櫃公司為研究對象，參考Roychowdhury (2006)之研究架構，以異常營運現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用來衡量實質盈餘管理，並探討審計委員會的設置與實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性以及審計委員會的特性是否可以有效抑制公司從事實質盈餘管理的行為。
實證結果顯示，設置審計委員會之公司較不會從事生產成本與裁決性費用的實質盈餘管理，而對異常營運現金流量並沒有顯著效果。審計委員會獨立性愈強，愈不會操弄營運現金流量；審計委員會專業性愈高，愈不會操弄生產成本；而審計委員會成員兼任公司家數僅在異常生產成本之下不具實質盈餘管理效果，其他方面則有較多的實質盈餘管理，支持兼任職務愈多，監督功能愈低之研究論點。本研究結果將有助於利害關係人利用審計委員會設置與否，以及審計委員會的特性，以判斷公司實質盈餘管理的發生。

Due to the frequent domestic and foreign enterprise scandals, Legislature amended the Securities and Exchange Act in 2006 and formulated Independent Director and Audit Committee System to strengthen the structure of enterprise management and to and the duties of the board of directors, to promote the quality of financial report, passing of reduce the occurrence of financial reporting fraud. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act researchers found company's management transfered the previous accruals earnings management to a more imperceptible real earnings management. In the study, I chose the listed company between years 2007 and 2013 as the research samples, While referring to the research structure of Roychowdhury (2006), using the abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to proxy the real earning management. And discussion of the relevance between audit committee establishment and real earning management and are the audit committee characteristies have the inhibitory effect to the enterprise execute real earning management or not.
The empirical results show, companies that established an audit committee will not execute the real earning management of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, but the abnormal operating cash flow does not have significantly effect. The more independent of the audit committee, the less a company will manipulate the operating cash flow; the more professional of the audit committee, the less a company will manipulate the production costs. And the audit committee members that serve a number of companies would not manipulate production costs, but there are more real earnings management in other respects, which is consistent with research thesis, more concurrently positions lower the supervision function. The study will help the stakeholders to judge a company’s real earning management by the establishment and characteristics of audit committee.

中文摘要....…………………………………………………………….…………...……I
英文摘要………………………………………………………..………………….....…II
致謝……………………………………………………………………………….……IV
目錄………………………………………………………………….…………….……V
表目錄………………………………………………………..……..…………….....…VI
圖目錄………………………………………………………..…………….…….....…VII
第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………….…………………1
第一節 研究背景………………………………………..……………..….…1
第二節 研究動機與目的………………………………………..……...……2
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………...………..……4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展………………………………………….…………6
第一節 審計委員會…………………………………………..………..…….6
第二節 盈餘管理………………………………………………...……........13
第三節 審計委員會與實質盈餘管理…………………………...……..…..16
第參章 資料來源與研究方法………………………………………..………….20
第一節 資料來源……………………………………………….........……..20
第二節 研究期間…………………………………………………...………20
第三節 樣本選取………………………………………………...……..…..20
第四節 實證模型與變數衡量………………………………….........……..24
第肆章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………..….30
第一節 敘述性統計分析…………………………………….…………..…30
第二節 相關性分析…………………………………………….........……..33
第三節 單變量檢定………………………………………………...……....36
第四節 實證分析結果…………………………………………….........…..37
第五節 敏感性分析………………………………………………….……..46
第伍章 研究結論與限制…………………………………………………..…….55
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………...……..…..55
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………….........…..56
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………….……57

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