臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本研究主要探討經理人（CEO）持股水準對投資決策之影響，並進一步探討經理人持股水準影響投資決策之敏感度是否受到股權結構差異或者是否為家族企業所影響。研究方法採用OLS多元迴歸和分量迴歸進行研究，研究樣本來自台灣經濟新報資料庫2001至2012年之台灣上市櫃公司。研究結果發現，經理人持股水準顯著負向影響投資決策，支持經理人個人風險趨避的態度會減少在公司的投資。此外，發現經理人同時兼任董事長、公司為家族企業時以及機構法人持股比率較多時，經理人因個人風險趨避態度而減少投資的現象將減緩。此結果支持文獻上的發現，當所有權與控制權越一致時，總經理的代理問題越小，機構法人相較個人是較好的監督者。有趣的是，本研究也發現公司有設立獨立董事並無法減緩反而增加總經理因個人風險趨避態度而減少在公司的投資的敏感度，這個結果與國外文獻發現一致，獨立董事並不獨立。

In this paper we examine the relationship between managerial ownership and investment decisions. We also consider the ownership and family characteristics to see whether the relationship between managerial ownership and investment decisions are impact. Our sample is made up of companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market which are including in the Taiwan Economic Journal database (TEJ). We collect the items required in this study from yearly financial statements covering the period from 2001 to 2012. As a whole, this study shows that CEO stock ownership is negatively associated with investment decisions－supporting that CEO risk aversion will significantly decrease the firm-level investment. We also find that institutional ownership and family characteristics can positively affect the relationship between managerial ownership and investment decisions. These findings support the negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated when the managers are also the owners or the firms are family firms. Finally, our results are also consistent with the notion that institution shareholders are more effective monitors than individual shareholders.

目錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機與目的 1
第二節　論文架構與流程 3
第二章　文獻探討與研究假說 4
第一節　經理人持股水準對投資決策之敏感度關係 4
第二節　經理人兼任董事長與否對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度之影響關係 5
第三節　股權結構對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度之影響關係 5
第四節　家族企業對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度之影響關係 6
第三章　研究設計 8
第一節　研究期間與樣本之選取 8
第二節　變數定義 10
第三節　研究方法 14
第四節　實證模型 15
第四章　實證結果與分析 19
第一節　敘述統計 19
第二節　實證結果 21
第三節　穩健性測試 29
第五章　結論與建議 31
第一節　結論 31
第二節　對後續研究者之建議 32
參考文獻 34

表目錄
表3.1　產業別樣本統計 9
表3.2　變數之操作型定義 13
表4.1　各變數之敘述統計量 20
表4.2　虛擬變數之次數分配 20
表4.3　變數間之相關係數 21
表4.4　經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度之迴歸分析 22
表4.5　經理人兼任董事長對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之迴歸分析 23
表4.6　機構法人持股對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之迴歸分析 24
表4.7　外部董事持股對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之迴歸分析 25
表4.8　設有獨立董監事對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之迴歸分析 27
表4.9　家族企業對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之迴歸分析 28
表4.10　家族企業對經理人持股水準與投資決策敏感度影響之穩健性分析 29

圖目錄
圖1.1　研究流程圖 3

一、中文部份
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2.俞海琴、周本鄂（民83）。臺灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q關係之研究。管理評論，第13卷第1期，頁79-98。
3.洪榮華、郭怡萍、蔡盈如、江佳妮（民102）。經理人樂觀傾向、家族企業特性對投資現金流量敏感度之研究。管理與系統，第20卷第1期，頁89-117。
4.馬黛、李永全（民97）。家族控制對負債融資決策的影響－以臺灣爲例。臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期，頁133-170。
5.張力、蔡函芳、林翠蓉、王禹軒、洪榮華（民102）。家族企業特性與經理人過度自信對其舉債決策之影響。中山管理評論，第21卷第1期，頁123-163。
6.葉銀華（民88）。家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究－台灣與香港證券市場之比較。管理評論，第18卷第2期，頁59-86。

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