臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

強健的公司治理和公司的激勵機制都將能降低代理問題。因此，本文探討審計委員會品質(公司治理)與管理當局薪酬(激勵機制)彼此之間的相互關係，是為替代還是互補關係，藉由跑兩階段回歸得知結果。進一步探討，當加入公司會計複雜度與營運風險因素，將會如何影響兩者間的關係。實證結果發現，審計委員會品質與管理當局薪酬互為替代效果，並且當考慮公司會計複雜度及營運風險後，將降低其兩者間的替代作用。

The paper provides evidence that audit committees play an importance role in the company because they are major factor in monitoring firms’ financial reports so as to reduce agency problem. I investigate whether audit committee quality (corporate governance) is associated with executives’ compensation (incentives). I examine the quality of audit committee and incentives are as substitutes or complementary by running simultaneous regressions to see their bidirectional relationship. Besides, I added factors of firms’ accounting complexity and business risk to see whether the result may change. Overall, my findings provide insight that audit committee quality and incentives are as substitutes. However, after considering firms’ accounting complexity and business risk, the effect of substitution would be weakened.

Title Page i
Letter of Approval ii
Letter of Authority iii
Abstract in Chinese iv
Abstract v
Acknowledgements vi
Contents vii
Contents of Table x

1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 5
2.1 The Quality of Audit Committee and Incentives 5
2.2 Accounting Complexity 9
2.3 Business Risk 11
3. Methodology 12
3.1 Sample Selection 12
3.2 Variables Definitions 12
3.2.1 Audit Committee Quality 12
3.2.2 Executives Compensation 14
3.2.2.1 TDC1 15
3.2.2.2 Incentive Ratio 15
3.2.2.3 Pay-For-Performance Sensitivity 16
3.2.3 Accounting Complexity 18
3.2.3.1 High Tech 18
3.2.3.2 Restatement 19
3.2.4 Business Risk 19
3.2.5 Control Variables 20
3.3 Statistics Descriptions – By Firm-Year 21
4. Empirical Results 21
4.1 Univariate Analysis 21
4.2 Audit Committee Quality and Executives Compensation 22
4.2.1 Inverse Mills Ratio (INVMR) 23
4.2.2 Two Stage 23
4.2.3 Results– H1 25
4.3 The effect of Accounting Complexity 26
4.3.1 Model– H2 27
4.3.2 Results – H2 27
4.3.2.1 High Tech 28
4.3.2.2 Revenue Restatement 29
4.3.2.3 All Restatement Item 30
4.4 The effect of Business Risk 31
4.4.1 Model – H3 31
4.4.2 Results – H3 32
5. Conclusion 33
Reference 35

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