臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討銀行進入公司的董事會中，如何對公司的資金成本以及資訊透明度造成影響。在過去研究中，普遍認為銀行指派代表人在公司董事會可以提高公司治理，進而降低公司的資金成本。同時，也有研究指出資訊透明度與資金成本呈現負相關，本研究除了對以上論點加以檢測之外，另探討銀行加入公司董事會是否能提高資訊透明度，並對這三項因素的相互關係進行研究。另外，本研究也以較廣義的定義闡釋銀行董監事與放款銀行，此為與過去研究不同之處。本研究結果顯示，銀行董監事的存在顯著減少了公司的債務資金成本，若銀行董監事同時從事放款業務時，也會減少債務資金成本，此結果不支持利益衝突假說。公司的資訊透明度對次年債務資金成本呈顯著負相關，表示提高資訊透明度的確可以降低公司舉債成本。本研究也發現銀行董監事的存在確實提高了資訊透明度，證實銀行董監事存在提升監督效果，提供健全的公司治理。

This paper examines the impact of bankers on the board to cost of capital and information transparency. Past studies find that bankers on the board are positively relatived to corporate governance, and thus, reduce the cost of capital of the firm. Previous research also finds that information transparency is negatively related to cost of capital. This study not only examines the previous issues, but also analyzes the effect of backers to information transparency. This study differs from the past literature in which this study uses a broader definition of bankers and lending bankers on the board. The empirical results suggest that both bankers and lending bankers on the board significantly reduce the firm’s cost of debt. This study finds not support for the conflict of interest hypotheses by lenders on the board. This study also finds that information transparency negatively affects next year’s cost of debt. Furthermore, this study finds that bakers on the board improve the information transparency of the firm, suggesting that bankers on boards have monitoring effect to provide sound corporate governance.

第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………………5
第三節 研究架構………………………………………………………………6
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立…………………………………………………9
第一節 資金成本………………………………………………………………9
第二節 銀行董監事與資金成本………………………………………………11
第三節 資訊透明度與資金成本………………………………………………16
第四節 銀行董監事與資訊透明度的關聯……………………………………19
第三章 研究設計………………………………………………………………23
第一節 資料來源與研究期間…………………………………………………23
第二節 樣本選取………………………………………………………………23
第三節 實證迴歸模型與變數衡量……………………………………………26
第四章 實證結果分析…………………………………………………………35
第一節 敘述性統計與相關性分析……………………………………………35
第二節 相關性分析……………………………………………………………38
第三節 實證結果………………………………………………………………42
第四節 穩健性測試……………………………………………………………53
第五章 研究結論與建議………………………………………………………57
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………57
第二節 研究貢獻………………………………………………………………58
第三節 研究限制與建議………………………………………………………59
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………61

周建新、林宗得，2005，資訊透明度對企業價值增額解釋能力之研究，會計與公司治理，第2卷第2期：25-46。

張振山與包幸玉，2004，我國資訊公開制度之探討，證券暨期貨月刊，第22卷第4期：15-24。

陳書貞，2005，集團家族企業之股權結構、連結性放款與授信條件之關係，國立興大學企業管理學系未出版碩士論文。

陳瑞斌、許崇源，2008，資訊揭露對於權益資金成本之影響。東吳經濟商學學報，第61期：67-108。

蔡函芳，2008，放款銀行進入企業董監事會是否真的存有利益衝突？國立中興大學企業管理學系未出版碩士論文。

賴怡洵、陳家彬與何加政，2008，台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素：代理成本與放款者利益衝突假說，管理學報，第25卷第1期：1-30。

Alford, A. 1992. The effect of the set of comparable firms on the accuracy of the price-earnings valuation method. Journal of Accounting Research 30(1): 94-108.

Amihud, Y. and H. Mendelson. 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics 17: 223-249.

Anderson, R. C., S. Mansi and D. M. Reeb. 2004. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(3): 315-342.

Belkhir, M. 2008. Board of directors’ size and performance in the banking industry. Working Paper. UAE University.

Berlin M., K. John, and A. Saunders. 1996. Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress. Review of Financial Studies 9(3): 889–919.

Bhojraj, S. and P. Sengupta. 2003. The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on bond ratings and yields: the role of institutional investors and outside directors. The Journal of Business 76(3): 455-475.

Boot, A. W. A. 2000. Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial Intermediation 9: 7-25.

Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review (July): 323-349.

Botosan, C. A. and M. Plumlee. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1): 21-40.

Cai, J., Y. L. Cheung, V. K. Goyal. 1999. Bank monitoring and the maturity structure of Japanese corporate debt issues. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7: 229-250.

Charumilind C., R. Kali, and Y. Wiwattanakantang. 2006. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79(1): 181-218.

Chen, K. C. W., Z. H. Chen, and J. K. C. Wei. 2003. Disclosure, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from Asia’s emerging markets. Working Paper. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Cheng, C. A., D. Collins, and H. Huang 2006. Shareholder rights, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 27(2): 175-204.

Chiang, H. T., and L. J. He. 2010. Board supervision capability and information transparency. Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(1): 18-31.

Claessens, S., S. Djankov ,and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporation . Journal of Financial Economics. Vol 58: 81-112.

Dechow, P. and I. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77: 35-59.

Diamond, D. W. 1991. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99: 689-751.

Fama, E. 1985. What’s different about banks? Journal of Monetary Economics 15: 29-39.

Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301–325.

Francis, J., I. Khurana, and R. Pereira. 2005. Disclosure incentives and Effects on cost of capital around the world. The Accounting Review, 80(4): 1125-1162.

Hail, L. 2002. The impact of voluntary corporate disclosure on the ex-ante cost of capital for Swiss firms. The European Accounting Review, 11(4): 741-73.

Healy, P. M., A. P. Hutton, and K. G. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16(3): 485-520.

Ho, S.S.M., and K.S. Wong. 2001. A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosures. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 10(2): 139-156.

Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1990. The role of banking in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 67-88.

Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1991. Corporate structure, liquidity and investment: evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 33-60.

Hunton, J., R. Libby, and C. Mazza. 2006. Financial reporting transparency and earnings management. The Accounting Review 81(1): 135-157.

Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics: 305-360.

Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free-cash-flow, coporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-329.

Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance 48(3): 831–880.

Jo H., and Y. Kim. 2007. Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 84 (2): 561-590.

Kracaw, W., and M. Zenner. 1998. Bankers in the boardroom: Good news or bad news? Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University.

Kroszner, R. S., and P. E., Strahan. 2001. Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Finance Economics 62: 415-452.

La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, and G. Zamarripa. 2003. Related lending. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1): 231-268.

Leland, H., and D. Pyle. 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32: 371-387.

Liu, J., D. Nissim, and J. Thomas. 2002. Equity valuation using multiples. Journal of Accounting Research 40: 135-172.

Lobo, G., and J. Zhou. 2001. Disclosure quality and earnings management. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 8 (1): 1-20.

Mallin, C. 2002. The relationship between corporate governance, transparency and financial disclosure. Corporate Governance: An International Review 10(4): 253-255.

Morck, R., M. Nakamura, and A. Shivdasani. 2000. Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan. Journal of Business, 73: 539-567.

Park, C. 2000. Monitoring and structure of debt contracts. Journal of Finance 55: 2157-2196.

Pittman, J. A. and S. Fortin. 2004. Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 No.2: 113-136.

Prowse, S. D. 1990. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 27: 43-66.

Rajan, R. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s length debt. Journal of Finance 47: 1367-1400.

Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 73 (October): 459-474.

Sharpe, S. 1990. Asymmetric information, banking lending, and implicit contracts: A stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance, 45: 1069-1087.

Sheard, P. 1994. Reciprocal delegated monitoring in the Japanese main bank system. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 8: 1-21.

Trabelsi, S., R. Labelle, and P. Dumontier. 2008. Incremental voluntary disclosure on corporate websites, determinants and consequences. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 4(2): 120-155.

Velury, U., and D. S. Jenkins. 2006. Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings. Journal of Business Research 59(9): 1043-1051.

Williamson, O. E. 1988. Corporate finance and corporate governance. Journal of Finance 63: 567-591.

Yeh Y. H., T.S. Lee, and T. Woidtke. 2001. Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. Internal Review of Finance. Vol 2: 21-48.

Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrated model. Journal of Management 15: 291-334.