臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究使用1988到2005年間台灣地方政府支出，分別以：總支出、一般政務、教育科學文化、經濟發展及社會福利支出之預算數，探討台灣21縣市地方政府支出預算與選舉循環之議題。
過去採用追蹤資料模型分析選舉循環之國內實證文獻，大多忽略模型變數是否存在單根現象。本研究在進行實證分析前，首先針對所有變數進行追蹤資料單單根檢定，以檢定所有數列是否為定態。追蹤資料單根檢定結果顯示，所有模型變數除了失業率以外皆為定態，因此所有模型變數均採用於水準項資料而失業率則採一階差分資料進行實證分析。
根據追蹤資料模型結果發現：地方政府於選舉年著顯增加總支出、教育科學文化、社會福利支出之預算編列，顯示支持投機派理論。實證結果亦顯示政黨理念並非是政府支出種類之顯著的影響因素，不支持黨性派理論，顯示執政者仍以勝選為首要。此外，前一年度預算規模大小為執政者編列本年度預算之重要參考依據，隱含遽增主義預算理論。而全民健保施行後，社會福利支出預算數編列有顯著擴增情況。

This paper focuses on the issue of the electoral and ideological cycles in local government expenditures for 21 cities and counties in Taiwan. The data over the period 1988-2005, variables concerning local government expenditures in the empirical models include: total expenditures, expenditures for general administration, expenditures for education, science and culture, expenditures for economic development and expenditures for social security.
The former empirical literatures concerning political budget cycles in Taiwan using panel data model ignore the stantionarities of variables. Therefore, panel unit root test employed in this study before empirical analysis. The results of panel unit root tests show that all variables are stationary except unemployment rate variable. Thus, we use level data of all variables excluding unemployment rate that using first difference data to estimate the empirical models.
According to the results of the panel data models, we find that the local government expenditures including total expenditures, expenditures for education, science and culture, and expenditures for social security were increasing in electoral years. Empirical results support the opportunistic cycle theory, but little empirical results support the ideological cycles. Furthermore, the budgetary variables of local government expenditures were affected significantly by last level. This implies the incremental budgetary theory. The implementation of National Health Insurance caused expenditures for social security significantly increased.

摘 要 I
ABSTRACT II
圖 次 IV
表 次 V
附 表 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機 7
第三節 研究目的 9
第四節 研究限制 9
第五節 論文架構 10
第二章 文獻回顧 11
第一節 政治景氣循環理論 11
第二節 公共支出理論 15
第三節 國內外政治景氣循環實證文獻 18
第三章 研究方法 23
第一節 PANEL單根檢定 23
第二節 追蹤資料模型 25
第四章 實證研究 29
第一節 變數選取與資料處理 29
第二節 實證模型 39
第三節 實證結果 41
第五章 結論與建議 55
參考文獻 57

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