臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

台灣證券交易所為了強化上市櫃公司的資訊揭露，在公開資訊觀測站的「公司治理專區」項目下，公布了2006年至2014年連續兩年虧損，但董監事酬金總額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加的上市櫃公司，將其認定唯有自利行為之公司。
本文以台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，使用台灣經濟新報及台灣證券交易所關於董監事自利公司之定義等資料，引用王元章與陳振傑 (2011) 的研究假說，加上投保董監事責任險進行研究，探討該公司在有投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險的保障下董監事的自利行為，以及在無投保董監事暨重要職員責任險的保障下董監事的自利行為將會如何，是否會因有投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險而減少董監事的自利行為，或是並不會減少董監事的自利行為。實證結果發現，公司在有投保D&O保險下，核心代理問題與董監事自利程度有關聯性，但核心代理問題與董監事自利機率無關聯性。

Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in order to strengthen the listing of the company's information disclosure, under the "Corporate Governance Center" project at the Market Observation Post System, the 2006-2004 loss was reported for two consecutive years, but the total amount of remuneration of directors and supervisors or the average increase in the remuneration of each supervisor of the board of directors, the company will only recognize the self-interest behavior of the company.
In this paper, the Taiwan listed cabinet company as a research object, the use of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation on the definition of directors and supervisors and other information, quoted Wang and Chen (2011) hypothesis, plus insured supervisor responsibility for risk research. To explore the company in the insured directors’ and officer’ liability insurance under the protection of the relationship between director and supervisor's self-interest behavior, and how the self-interest behavior of the director and supervisor's will be under the protection of the insured directors 'and officers' liability insurance? Whether it will be due to the insured directors 'and officers' liability insurance staff liability insurance and reduce the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors, or will not reduce the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors.The empirical results show that the core agent problem is related to the degree of self-interest of the supervisors under the directors' and officers' liability insurance, but the core agent problem is not related to the profitability of the supervisor.

目錄
第一章、 緒論 1
第一節、 研究背景與動機 1
第二節、 研究目的 2
第三節、 研究方法與流程 2
第二章、文獻探討 4
第一節、董監事事自利行為之相關文獻 4
第二節、董監事事暨重要職員責任保險之相關文獻 5
第三章、研究方法 8
第一節、研究假說 8
第二節、研究模型 10
第三節、樣本與配對樣本資料來源 12
第四章、實證結果 17
第一節、敘述性統計與相關係數檢定 17
第二節、迴歸分析實證結果與討論 21
第五章、結論 27
參考文獻 28
附表 36

表目錄
表3-1 變數定義 11
表3-2 以自利與非自利之年度區分的董監事總薪酬 13
表3-3 以產業別區分自利樣本 14
表3-4 自利變數主要變數敘述統計 15
表3-5 非自利變數主要變數敘述統計 16
表4-1 所有樣本數敘述統計 18
表4-2 董監事薪酬、董事會結構、股權結構、信用評等與核心代理問題之Pearson相關係數 19
表4-2(續) 董監事薪酬、董事會結構、股權結構、信用評等與核心代理問題之Pearson相關係數 20
表4-3 董監事自利程度的迴歸分析 23
表4-4 董監事自利機率的迴歸分析 26
附表4-1 董監事自利機率的迴歸分析(2008年至2009年) 36
附表4-2 董監事自利機率的迴歸分析(2010年至2011年) 37
附表4-3 董監事自利機率的迴歸分析(2012年至2013年) 38
附表4-4 董監事自利機率的迴歸分析(2014年至2015年) 39

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