臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文主要係探討董事與經理人之薪酬資訊在不同揭露透明度下的市場價值。在自我選擇的偏誤下，有較高董事獨立性的公司通常會傾向提供較完整的薪酬資訊揭露，進而降低代理問題，而台灣的主管機關提供了一個漸進執行的薪酬資訊揭露改革政策，所以針對是否要提供較高透明度之薪酬資訊的揭露要求，主管機關提供這些公司相當大的裁量選擇空間，因此，本研究可以利用此一自然實驗下的資料獨特性，來驗證不同薪酬揭露程度對公司價值的影響效果。

第一個研究議題係探討公司自願揭露完整的董事與經理人薪酬資訊是否會帶來較高的市場價值。實證結果指出，市場針對那些自願揭露完整薪酬資訊的公司反應出較高的市場價值，然而，對於那些使用大量權益為基礎之工具作為紅利發放的電子產業公司，其完整薪酬揭露的市場價值並不顯著，因為這樣以權益為基礎的紅利工具，外部投資人較無法衡量其真正的市場價值，進而難以判斷這樣的薪酬架構是否會帶來代理問題。此外，透過會計基礎評價模型、自我選擇模型、以及控制公司年紀效果與時間序列效果後的廻歸分析，對於完整薪酬揭露的市場價值亦得到相同的結論。

第二個延伸主題係欲探討的是，在控制住原本完整薪酬揭露所帶來的市場價值後，其他中等透明度的自願性薪酬揭露是否會帶來額外的市場價值提升效果。驗證結果指出，雖然中等透明度的薪酬揭露相較於強制要求揭露的資訊有較高的透明度，但是這樣仍然較不完整的揭露資訊內涵對於市場價值的提升幫助有限，然而，對那些通常會被認為是治理機制較差的非電子產業公司而言，中等透明程度的薪酬揭露，會因為被認為多揭露了一些相對的資訊斷層，而讓中等程度的薪酬揭露產生額外較高的市場價值。綜而觀之，本研究所提出的主張係認為，只有完整的揭露可以帶來較高的市場評價，而其他透明程度的薪酬資訊揭露對於公司市場價值的提升幫助有限。

The dissertation is set out to explore the market value of different transparency levels of disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives. Under the theory of self selection, firms with higher levels of board independence will tend to provide comprehensive disclosure of compensation, thereby leading to lower agency conflicts. Since the authorities in Taiwan adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure, firms are provided with discretion with regard to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. Such unique natural experimental setting is therefore exploited to examine the effects of different levels of transparency of compensation disclosure on market value.

The first essay is to answer the question of whether firms voluntarily providing comprehensive disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives have higher market values. The evidence indicates that the market provides a higher valuation to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices. However, the electronics firms using large proportion of stock-based bonus are not valued higher due the reason that the difficulty for valuing the stock-based bonus makes the outsiders hard to identify the agency problems. The robustness from the Ohlson model, the self-selection model and the regressions controlling firm-age and time-series effects provides the same results.

The second essay is to extend the compensation disclosure issue from previous evidence by suggesting that whether medium level of transparency on compensation disclosure provide additional market value after controlling the effects of comprehensive disclosure. The evidence finds that even where such disclosure is in excess of the minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of compensation practices are of very little help with regard to the creation of market value. However, for the non-electronics firms generally regarded as having relatively weak governance mechanisms, the effect of medium disclosure on market value is significantly positive because of the disclosure gap. The overall evidence suggests that only comprehensive disclosure on compensation provide higher market values, whilst other levels of transparency are of little for the market value creation.

Table of Contents

摘要 – i –
Abstract – ii –
Acknowledgement – iii –
Table of Contents – iv –
List of Tables – v –
1. Introduction – 1 –
2. Compensation Disclosure Policy Reforms – 5 –
3. Hypotheses Development and Research Design – 11 –
3.1 Compensation Disclosure and Corporate Governance – 11 –
3.2 The Effects of Comprehensive Disclosure – 14 –
3.3 Data – 16 –
4. Empirical Analyses – 23 –
4.1 Regression Analyses – 23 –
4.2 Accounting-based Valuation Model – 29 –
4.3 Sub-sample Analysis – 31 –
4.4 Endogeneity and Self-selection Bias – 35 –
4.5 Time-Series Effect – 45 –
4.6 The Effects of Non-comprehensive Disclosure – 48 –
4.7 The Effects of Firm Age – 54 –
5. Conclusions – 59 –
References – 63 –
Appendices – 75 –
Curriculum Vita – 77 –

1. Aboody, D. (1996), ‘Market Valuation of Employee Stock Options’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 22, Nos. 1-3, pp. 357-391.
2. Ade-Ajayi, F. (2004), ‘International Corporate Governance and the Responsibility of the Brand’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 184-190.
3. Akbar, S. and A. W. Stark (2003), ‘Deflators, Net Shareholder Cash Flows, Dividends, Capital Contributions and Estimated Models of Corporate Valuation’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 30, Nos. 9-10, pp. 1211-1233.
4. Akerlof, G. A. and W. T. Dickens (1982), ‘The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance’, American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 307-319.
5. Aksu, M. and A. Kosedag (2006), ‘Transparency and Disclosure Scores and Their Determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 277-296.
6. Andjelkovic, A., G. Boyle and W. McNoe (2002), ‘Public Disclosure of Executive Compensation: Do Shareholders Need to Know’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 97-117.
7. Balata, P. and G. Breton (2005), ‘Narrative vs Numbers in the Annual Report: Are They Giving the Same Message to the Investors?’, Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 5-25.
8. Bannister, J. W. and H. A. Newman (2006), ‘Disclosure Biases and in Proxy Performance Graphs: The Influence of Performance and Compensation Committee Composition’, Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 30-44.
9. Barako, D. G., P. Hancock and H. Y. Izan (2006), ‘Factors Influencing Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Kenya Companies’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 107-125.
10. Barry, C. B. and S. J. Brown (1986), ‘Limited Information as a Source of Risk’, Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 66-72.
11. Barth, M. E., M. B. Clement, G. Foster and R. Kasznik (1998), ‘Brand Values and Capital Market Valuation’, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 41-68.
12. Bebchuk, L. A. and J. M. Fried (2003), ‘Executive Compensation as an Agency Conflict’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 71-92.
13. Beekes, W. and P. Brown (2006), ‘Do Better Governed Australian Firms Make More Informative Disclosures’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 33, Nos. 3-4, pp. 422-450.
14. Blalock, H. M. Jr. (1964), Causal Inferences in Non-experimental Research. Chapel Hill: University of North.
15. Botosan, C. A. and M. A. Plumlee (2002), ‘A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 21-40.
16. Brick, I. E., O. Palmon and J. K. Wald (2006), ‘CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 403-423.
17. Bushee, B. J. and C. F. Noe (2000), ‘Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 171-202.
18. Bushee, B. J. and C. Leuz (2005), ‘Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 233-264.
19. Bushman, R. M. and A. J. Smith (2001), ‘Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 32, Nos. 1-3, pp. 237-333.
20. Byrd, J. W., M. F. Johnson and A. L. Porter (1998), ‘Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 25-52.
21. Cahan, S. F., S. M. Courtenay, P. L. Gronewoller and D. R. Upton (2000), ‘Value Relevance of Mandated Comprehensive Income Disclosures’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 27, Nos. 9-10, pp. 1273-1301.
22. Cerbioni F. and A. Parbonetti (2007), Exploring the Effects of Corporate Governance on Intellectual Capital Disclosure: An Analysis of European Biotechnology Companies, European Accounting Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 791-826.
23. Certo, S. T., C. M. Daily and D. R. Dalton (2001), ‘Signaling Firm Value through Board Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings’, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 33-50.
24. Chen, C. Y. (2003), ‘Investment Opportunities and the Relation between Equity Value and Employees’ Bonus’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 30, Nos. 7-8, pp. 941-973.
25. Chen, S., X. Chen and Q. Cheng (2008), ‘Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 499-536.
26. Chen, K. C., W. Z. Chen and K. C. J. Wei (2004), ‘Disclosure, Corporate Governance, and the Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Asia’s Emerging Markets’, Working Paper (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology).
27. Chen, S. M. L. DeFond and C. W. Park (2002), ‘Voluntary Disclosure of Balance Sheet Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements’, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 229-251.
28. Christensen, P. O. and G. A. Feltham (2000), ‘Market Performance Measures and Disclosure of Private Management Information in Capital Markets’, Review of Accounting Research, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 301-329.
29. Cohan, J. A. (2002), ‘“I Don’t Know” and “I Was Only Doing My Job”: Has Corporate Governance Careened Out of Control? A Case Study of Enron’s Information Myopia’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 275-299.
30. Coles, J. L. (2008), ‘Disclosure Policy: A Discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008), on “Going Dark”’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45, Nos. 2-3, pp. 1-12.
31. Collett, P. and S. Hrasky (2005), ‘Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Listed Australian Companies’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 188-196.
32. Conyon, M. J. (2001), ‘The Disclosure of UK Boardroom Pay: the March 2001 DTI Proposals’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 276-285.
33. Conyon, M. J. and G. V. Sadler (2001), ‘CEO Compensation, Option Incentives, and Information Disclosure’, Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 251-277.
34. Cooper, D. W. and B. Grinder (1996), ‘Voluntary Information Disclosure during Periods of Stock Price Vulnerability’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 461-472.
35. Core, J. E. (2001), ‘A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, Nos. 1-3, pp. 441-456.
36. Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker (1999), ‘Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 371-406.
37. Craighead, J., M. Magnan and L. Thorne (2000), ‘An Investigation of Mandated Compensation Disclosure as a Corporate Governance Mechanism’, Working Paper (McGill University).
38. Cubbin, J. and D. Leech (1983), ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement’, Economic Journal, Vol. 93, No. 370, pp. 351-369.
39. Dalton, D. R., J. L. Johnson and A. E. Ellstrand (1999), ‘Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp. 674-686.
40. Diekmann, K. A. (1997), ‘Implicit Justifications’ and Self-serving Group Allocations’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 3-16.
41. Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi and R. M. Stulz (2004), ‘Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 205-238.
42. Durnev, A. and E. H. Kim (2005), ‘To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 1461-1493.
43. Easley D. and M. O’hara (2004), Information and Cost of Capital, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 1553-1583.
44. Elliott, R. K. and P. D. Jacobson (1994), ‘Costs and Benefits of Business Information Disclosure’, Business Horizons, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 80-96.
45. Fox, M. B. (1999), ‘Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 113-127.
46. Frantz, P. and N. Instefjord (2006), ‘Voluntary Disclosure of Information in a Setting in which Endowment of Information has Productive Value’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 33, Nos. 5-6, pp. 793-815.
47. Gelb, D. S. and P. Zarowin (2002), ‘Corporate Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices’, Review of Accounting Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 33-52.
48. Gordon, J. N. (2005), ‘Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for Compensation Disclosure and Analysis’, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 675-702.
49. Gordon, J. N., T., M. Fischer, D. Malone and G. Tower (2002), ‘A Comparative Empirical Examination of Extent of Disclosure by Private and Public Colleges and Universities in the United States’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 235-275.
50. Green, J. P., A. W. Stark and H. M. Thomas (1996), ‘UK Evidence on the Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 191-216.
51. Guo, R. J., B. Lev and N. Zhou (2004), ‘Competitive Costs of Disclosure by Biotech IPOs’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 319-355.
52. Hallock, K. F. (1997), ‘Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 331-344.
53. Healy, P. M., A. P. Hutton and K. G. Palepu (1999), ‘Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 485-520.
54. Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (2001), ‘Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Literature’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, Nos. 1-3, pp. 405-440.
55. Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (2003), ‘The Fall of Enron’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 3-26.
56. Heckman, J. J. (1979), ‘Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error’, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 153-161.
57. Henry, D. (2008), ‘Corporate Governance Structure and the Valuation of Australian Firms: Is There Value in Ticking the Boxes’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 35, Nos. 7-8, pp. 912-942.
58. Hill, J. (1997), ‘Remuneration Disclosure in Australia and the United States’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 60-66.
59. Ho, S. S. M. and K. S. Wang (2001), ‘A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 139-156.
60. Holland, J. (1998), ‘Private Voluntary Disclosure, Financial Intermediation and Market Efficiency’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 25, Nos. 1-2, pp. 29-68.
61. Hossain, M., K. Ahmed and J. M. Godfrey (2005), ‘Investment Opportunity Set and Voluntary Disclosure of Prospective Information: A Simultaneous Equations Approach’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32, Nos. 5-6, pp. 871-907.
62. Hosseini H. (1997), ‘Cognitive Dissonance as a Means of Explaining Economics of Irrationality and Uncertainty’, Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 181-189.
63. Hribar, P. (2004), ‘Discussion of Competitive Costs of Disclosure by Biotech IPOs’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 357-364.
64. Huddart, S., J. S. Hughes and M. Brunnermeier (1999), ‘Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-3, pp. 237-269.
65. Jensen, M. C. (1993), ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 831-880.
66. Jensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 225-264.
67. Karamanou, I. and G. P. Nishiotis (2009), ‘Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from the Market's Reaction to Firm Voluntary Adoption of IAS’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 36, No. 7-8, pp. 793-821.
68. Khanna, T., K. Palepu and S. Srinivasan (2004), ‘Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies Interacting with US Markets’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 475-508.
69. Korn, E. and U. Schiller (2003), ‘Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 30, No. 9-10, pp. 1327-1339.
70. Laksmana, I. (2008), ‘Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Compensation Practices’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 1147-1182.
71. Lang, M. and R. Lundholm (2000), ‘Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 623-663.
72. Lapointe-Antunes, P., D. Cormier, M. Magnan and S. Gay-Angers (2006), ‘On the Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Smoothing and the Value-Relevance of Earnings: The Case of Switzerland’, European Accounting Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 465-505.
73. Leftwich, R. (1980), ‘Market Failure Fallacies and Accounting Information’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 193-211.
74. Leuz, C. and R. E. Verrecchia (2000), ‘The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 91-124.
75. Lo, K. (2003), ‘Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The Case of Executive Compensation’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 285-314.
76. Lundholm R. and L. A. Myers (2002), ‘Bringing the Future Forward: The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-earnings Relation’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 809-839.
77. Makhija, A. K. and J. M. Patton (2004), ‘The Impact of Firm Ownership Structure on Voluntary Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from Czech Annual Reports’, Journal of Business, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 457-491.
78. Mallin, C. (2002), ‘The Relationship between Corporate Governance, Transparency and Financial Disclosure’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 253-255.
79. Morse, A., V. Nanda and A. Seru (2010), ‘Are Incentive Contracts Rigged By Powerful CEOs’, Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
80. Murphy, K. J. (1996), ‘Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure Rules’, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 497-515.
81. Murphy, K. J. (1999), ‘Executive Compensation’, In: Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3b, pp. 2485-2563. (Elsevier Science North Holland).
82. Muslu, V. (2009), ‘Executive Directors, Pay Disclosures and Incentive Compensation in Europe’, Working Paper, University of Texas at Dallas.
83. Nagar, V., D. Nanda and P. Wysocki (2003), ‘Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 34, Nos. 1-3, pp. 283-309.
84. Noe, C. F. (1999), ‘Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 305-326.
85. Ohlson, J. A. (1995), ‘Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 661-687.
86. Pagano, M., F. Panetta and L. Zingales (1998), Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 27-64.
87. Parum, E. (2005), ‘Does Disclosure on Corporate Governance Lead to Openness and Transparency in How Companies are Managed’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 702-709.
88. Perotti, E. C. and E. L. Von Thadden (2003), ‘Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 61-85.
89. Rees, W. P. (1997), ‘The Impact of Dividends, Debt and Investment on Valuation Models’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 24, Nos. 7-8, pp. 1111-1140.
90. Richardson, A. J. and M. Welker (2001), ‘Social Disclosure, Financial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 597-616.
91. Ryan Jr., H. E. and R. A. Wiggins (2004), ‘Who is in Whose Pocket? Director Compensation, Board Independence, and Barriers to Effective Monitoring’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 497-524.
92. Semykina, A. and J. M. Wooldridge (2005), ‘Estimating Panel Data Models in the Presence of Endogeneity and Selection: Theory and Application’, Working Paper, Michigan State University.
93. Sengupta, P. (1998), ‘Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt’, Accounting Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 459-474.
94. Setia-Atmaja, L., G. A. Tanewski and M. Skully (2007), ‘How do Family Ownership and Control Affect Board Structure, Dividends and Debt? Australian Evidence’, Working Paper (Monash University).
95. Soffer, L. C. (1998), ‘Discussion of “Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs”’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 53-56.
96. Strong, N. (2000), ‘Discussion of Restructuring and Firm Value: The Effects of Profitability and Restructuring Purpose’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 27, No. 9-10, pp. 1131-1137.
97. Suijs, J. (2005), ‘Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32, No. 7-8, pp. 1423-1435.
98. Vafeas, N. (2000), ‘Board Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 139-160.
99. Van den Berghe, L. A. A. and A. Levrau (2004), ‘Evaluating Boards of Directors: What Constitutes a Good Corporate Board’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 461-478.
100. Verrecchia, R. E. (1983), ‘Discretionary Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 179-194.
101. Ward, M. (1998), ‘Director Remuneration: A Gap in the Disclosure Rules’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 48-51.
102. Wagenhofer, A. (1990), ‘Voluntary Disclosure with a Strategic Opponent’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 341-363.
103. Zhou, X. (1999), ‘Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives: A Comparison between Canada and the United States’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 277-301.