臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文研究是否短視近利的機構投資者的投資阻礙企業的創新活動。透過檢驗不同投資目標的機構投資人，我發現短暫型與類指數型的大股東很容易阻礙專利和專利引用方面的創新活動。進一步地，機構投資人與標的公司可能存在或潛在的業務關係。為了去檢查獨立且專注型態的投資者的存在是否會削弱短暫型與類指數型大股東帶來的影響，我將樣本分為獨立的和非獨立的投資人。實證結果顯示獨立且專注型態的投資人會降低管理者短視近利的行為決策

This paper studies whether institutional investors with short-term earnings goals impede a firm’s innovative activities. By examining institutional investors with different investment objectives, I find that transient and quasi-indexer blockholders are prone to deter innovative activities as measured by patents and citations. Further, the institutional investors would have a potential or existence business relationship with target companies. To test whether the existence of dedicated investors with independent type would weaken the effect from the transient and quasi-indexer blockholders, I divide the sample into independent and grey investor groups. The results suggest that independent and dedicated investors can mitigate managerial myopic investment decisions.

Table of Content
摘要 I
Abstract II
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 6
A. The Data 6
B. Summary Statistics 10
Chapter 3 Empirical Findings 13
A. Main results 13
B. Robustness 15
C. Extension 18
Chapter 4 Conclusion 21
Appendix 22
Reference 23

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