臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

Schipper (1989)認為管理者不祇從事會計應計數的盈餘管理，亦從事實質活動的盈餘操弄(如：縮減研究發展或廣告支出、過度生產或以折扣調整現金流量等)，晚近，公司從事實質盈餘管理以影響盈餘報導之研究有增加的趨勢(如：Graham, et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010等)，然較少文獻探討公司的監理機制對實質盈餘管理的影響。公司盈餘報導決策受到內部治理的影響(Whittington, 1993)，本研究預期公司治理機制的強弱會顯著影響實質盈餘管理的程度。實證結果顯示：公司的治理機制佳之上市(櫃)公司，有顯著較低之實質盈餘管理程度，進一步將樣本區分為積極性實質盈餘管理與保守性實質盈餘管理兩組次樣本進行測試，顯示公司治理機制對實質盈餘管理的影響來自於公司管理當局從事保守性性盈餘報導，且國內的博達案事件對此關係的影響並不明顯。本研究提供公司管理當局從公司的監理機制對管理影響實質盈餘管理的重要證據。

Strategic earnings reporting can be implemented both through accounting accruals manipulation and real activities manipulation (i.e., reducing discretionary expenditures, cutting prices to boost sales in the current period, and overproducing to decrease cost of goods sold expense, etc.). Real activities manipulation occurs when managers undertake actions that deviate from the first best choice to increase reported earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). While more attention has been focused on the role of financial reporting process (i.eaccruals-based earnings management) to inflate current earnings, Schipper (1989) indicates that the earnings management could be readily extended to encompass real activities manipulation. Thus, this study is motivated to examine the role of corporate governance on managerial strategic real activities manipulation behaviors. The empirical results reveal that the better corporate governance is negatively associated with the managerial opportunism behaviors (large magnitude of positive real activities manipulation). Moreover, the negative association between higher corporate governance comprehensive index and negative real activities manipulation is unlikely influenced by the PROCOMP scandal event. In summary, this study finds that corporate governance mechanism plays an important role in managerial financial reporting and provide feedback for regulators with respect to the subsequent financial reporting requirement in equity market..

目 錄
中 文 摘 要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌 謝 v
目 錄 v
表 目 錄 vii
圖 表 目 錄 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 7
第一節 公司治理機制與相關文獻 7
一、 公司治理定義與架構 7
二、 公司治理的內部監理機制 8
三、 公司治理的外部監理機制 10
四、 博達案 11
第二節　實質盈餘管理與相關文獻 12
一、 盈餘管理 13
二、 實質盈餘管理 14
第三節　研究假說 17
第三章 研究設計 19
第一節　樣本選取與研究期間 19
第二節　變數定義 19
一、 應變數 19
二、 主要解釋變數 21
三、 控制變數 24
變數預期符號 28
第三節　實證模式 30
第四章 實證結果 32
第一節　敘述性統計 32
第二節　實證結果 38
第五章　敏感性測試 44
第一節 正/負實質盈餘之測試 44
第二節 RM變數以百分比排序衡量之測試 51
第六章 結論 56
參考文獻 58

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