臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以Panel data model為實證模型，以六種不同的股利政策來探討公司治理對股利政策的影響，觀察哪一種股利政策對於公司治理與股利政策的關係，最具有解釋能力。本研究以台灣上市公司為研究樣本，樣本期間自1996年至2006年，共計180間上市公司。經實證後得到以下結論:
一、股份盈餘偏離差在六個股利政策下，雖然結果皆不顯著，但一致的支持替代模式，當公司治理不佳，代理問題越嚴重時，股利發放越多，即公司可運用現金股利的發放，來消除少數股東對控制股東剝奪公司資源之疑慮，有助於公司聲譽的建立。
二、現金股利率為六個股利政策中，最具有參考價值的，現金股利的發放有訊息效果，所以現金股利率為投資人在投資時一項重要的參考依據，也最能反公司未來盈餘成長的訊息。
三、股利殖利率乘上股價後更具有解釋能力，因為將股利殖利率的股票股利乘上股價後，使股票股利較為合理化，所以更具解釋能力。

In the past literatures, the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy can be concluded to outcome or substitution models, and we use six dividend policies to investigate the relationship between the corporate governance and dividend policies for the firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2006. We use panel data model to test which dividend policy is more explainable. Besides, in the past researches, they do not study the cross-section and time-series data at the same time, but we consider not only the cross-section data but also the time-series data. From the empirical results, we have the conclusions as follows:
First of all, although the empirical results show that the results of control rights to cash-flow rights are not significant under the six deviation policies, they all support the substitution model. This means firms would pay more dividends while the interest between minority and majority contains more conflicting.
Secondly, cash dividends payout is the most significant, because it could reflect actual situation of growth of company.
Finally, Stock dividend multiply price is more significant to explain the relationship between corporate governance and dividends policy.

目 錄
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………….........1
第一節 研究背景 ………………………………………………….1
第二節 研究問題與目的….………………………………………..3
第三節 研究架構….………………………………………………..4
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………….............................7
第一節 股利政策..………………………………………………….7
第二節 公司治理………….………………………………………..9
第三節 公司治理與股利政策.……………………………………10
第三章 研究方法……………………………………………………...13
第一節 Panel data model..…………………………………...........13
第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………...18
第一節 資料與樣本………………………………………….........18
第二節 變數選取………….………………………………………18
第三節 實證模型.…………………………………………............26
第四節 敘述統計分析..…………………………………………...30
第五節 實證分析………….………………………………………35
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………..42
第一節 結論………………………………………….....................43
參考文獻………………………………………………………………...45
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖…………………………………………………...5
圖4-1 1996-2006現金股利支付率、股票股利支付率、總股利支付率的走勢………………………………………………...34
圖4-2 1996-2006現金股利率、股利殖利率的走勢……………..35
表目錄
表4-1 自變數資料表…………………………………………………25
表4-2 各產業樣本家數統計表…………………………………….31
表4-3 全產業各變數之統計量分析表…………………………….33
表4-4 全產業公司治理對股利政策的影響………………………42

參考文獻
一、 中文文獻
王麗婷，2006，「公司治理、股利政策及應計品質與公司價值之關係」，輔仁大學會計學研究所碩士論文
洪翔詩，2003，「公司治理與股利政策」，台灣大學財務金融研究所。
許逸驥，2007，「公司治理與股利政策-長期驗證」，輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
連紘毅，2006，「公司治理與財務決策理論-以台灣電子業為例」，逢甲大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。
戴正雄，2006，「公司治理對股利政策與庫藏股決策之影響」，輔仁大學會計學系碩士在職專班。

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