臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

We present a world with a large population and random matching rule in trade and investigate the investment incentives under different court rules. The transparency of the decision made by the court is not able to implement the social optimal investment level; even the function improvement of investment efficiency by securing the property rights is doubted. Only under the circumstances the court is available to the information of the production, it is possible for the court to secure property rights to accelerate investment efficiency. We also confirm the solution provided by Coase (1960), which results in the social optimality.

1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 3
3 Baseline Model 5
3.1 State of the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Matching Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Probability of “Completing” a Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4 Optimal Contract Price and Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5 Social Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6 Court System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.8 Long Term Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions 16
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2 Legal Cost Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 Court Parameters - Variation of Decision Rule . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Court Parameters - Information Suciency . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5 Coase Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Concluding Remarks and Further Extensions 27
5.1 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Further Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson (2005). “Unbundling Institutions,”The Journal of Political Economy , 113(5): 949–995.
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1973). “The Property Right Paradigm,”The Journal of Economic History , 33(1): 16–27.
Besley, Timothy (1995). “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,” The Journal of Political Economy , 103(5): 903–937.
Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky (1986). “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling,” The RAND Journal of Economics , 17(2): 176–188.
Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey, and Steen Huck (2001). “More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding,” The American Political Science Review , 95(1): 131–144.
Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics , 3: 1–44.
Demsetz, Harold (1967). “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , 57(2): 347–359.
Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983). “Separate Ownership and Control,” The Journal of Law and Economics , 26(2): 301–325.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” The Journal of Political Economy , 98(6): 1119–1158.
Laeven, Luc A. andWoodru, Christopher M (2007). “The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size,” The Review of Economics and Statistics , 98(6): 1119–1158.