臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

A search-theoretic model is used to study how the informational imperfection regarding the types of investment projects and the competition between the two trading sectors: search sector and banking sector influence the welfare and the equilibrium price of the economy. We find that lenders can unravel the asymmetric information by a set of financial contracts. The weighted average welfare is lower in the economy with asymmetric information than in the economy with full information. The reduction in welfare of the economy with asymmetric information mainly comes from the screening cost incurred by lenders. The competitions between search sector and banking sector have influence on the equilibrium price and the set of parameters for the equilibrium to exist. When entrepreneurs have higher value, producers will be less willing to trade with money holders. Thus money holders have to offer a better price, which may not be sustained in equilibrium. We also find that, through numerical experiments, asymmetric information problem does not necessarily narrow down the set of parameters for the equilibrium to exist. If we consider the parameter “initial investment cost”, then the range of parameter for the equilibrium to exist is larger in the economy with asymmetric information than in the economy with full information. This is because of the competition between the two sectors in the economy and how the competition affects the expected utility of all types of agents.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement i

Abstract ii

1 Introduction 1

2 The Economy with Full Information 4
2.1 Equilibrium in the Economy with Full Information…..……………………….17

3 The Economy with Asymmetric Information 30
3.1 Equilibrium in the Economy with Asymmetric Information….…………….....36

4 Comparisons of the Equilibria 45

5 Conclusions 48

Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Interest Rate in Section 3 50

Appendix B: Results of Numerical Experiments 54

Reference 62











Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Sequence of Events in the Full Information Economy 12

Figure 2: Effort Level in Screening Activity and the Corresponding Probability of Discovering 33

Table 1-15: Results of Numerical Experiments 53

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