臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　This paper examines how the security research affects the trader''s investment decision in the financial market and whether the equilibrium is the stability of the equilibrium in dynamic security research model. We find that (a) an increase in precision of private information will lead to increase in precision of individual total information and individual assessment of the risky asset return; (b) individual demand for risky asset is positively correlated with the precision of individual total information, individual assessment of the risky return and precision of individual private information; (c) an increase in the precision of individual private information leads to traders increasing their wealth at date 2. (d) If the equilibrium is stable in dynamic security research model; it means no trader is at least as strong as the others combined in chance of earning the profit from security research activity.

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Financial Markets Microstructure 1
1.2 Asymmetric Information 2
1.3 The Role Security Research Plays in the market 8
1.4 Endogenous Security Research Cost 9
1.5 Summary 10
　
Chapter 2 Model 12
2.1 Framework of the Model 12
2.2 Individual Trade Decision at Date 1 13
2.3 Trader Choice Security Research Decision 16
　
Chapter 3 The Stability of Dynamic Test 19
3.1 The Mathematical Model 19
3.2 Dynamic Model and Stability Under Continuous Times Scales 20
3.3 Dynamic Model and Stability Under Discrete Times Scales 22
　
Chapter 4 Conclusion 25
　
Appendix 26
　
References 27
　

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