臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本文以2008年至2012年在臺灣證券交易所及櫃檯買賣中心交易之上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，旨在探討我國企業投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險(directors’ and officers’ liability insurance；以下簡稱D&O責任保險)與公司價值之關聯性，篩選後研究樣本共計5,342筆觀察值，其中有投保D&O責任保險之觀察值為2,926筆。本文分兩個角度探討公司投保D&O責任保險與公司價值之關聯性，首先採用EBTM 模型控制樣本自我選擇偏誤，檢驗D&O責任保險的投保與否和公司價值之關聯性；其次針對公司D&O責任保險投保金額深入研究，以有投保D&O責任保險之公司為樣本，探討公司投保金額超出(低於)其公司風險應有的保險金額水準時對公司價值帶來的影響。

　　整體而言，本文之實證結果說明相較於未投保D&O責任保險的公司，有投保D&O責任保險之公司，其公司價值較高；進一步深入研究公司投保金額，以有投保D&O責任保險之公司為樣本，測試D&O責任保險投保金額與公司價值之關聯性，實證結果發現當公司按其公司特性及所面臨之風險投保適度的保險金額時(即正常D&O責任保險投保金額)，市場給予正面評價；反觀當公司未依其公司特性及所面臨之風險投保適度的保險金額時(即異常D&O責任保險投保金額)，市場給予負面評價，異常D&O責任保險投保金額程度越大，公司價值越低。

　　Using data on directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance heareafter) policies gathered from a sample of Taiwan firms, this article examines the relationship between D&O insurance and firm value. The proxy variable of firm value in the article is Tobin’s Q. We provide consistent evidence that firms with D&O insurance protection have higher firm value than that without D&O insurance protection. Moreover, further results show that insurance coverage of firms have a different impact on firm values. Firms with insurance coverage according to their specific characteristics and risk would have higher firm values. By contrast, firms with insurance coverage less than their needs would have lower firm values. The data do not support the hypothesis that firms with insurance coverage more than their needs would have lower firm values.

目錄　iv
表目錄　v
第壹章　前言　1
第貳章　臺灣D&O責任保險之發展與相關文獻回顧　5
　第一節　臺灣D&O責任保險之發展　5
　第二節　相關文獻回顧　6
第參章　研究設計　20
　第一節　研究假說之建立　20
　第二節　實證分析方法　24
　第三節　變數衡量　29
　第四節　樣本選取與資料來源　43
第肆章　實證結果　47
　第一節　敘述性統計　47
　第二節　相關係數分析　50
　第三節　單變量分析　55
　第四節　多元迴歸分析　56
　第五節　敏感性測試　64
第伍章　結論　67
參考文獻　70

一、中文參考文獻：
李建然、廖秀梅與張卉諭，2012，審計委員會設置與審計委員會品質對公司價值的影響，期刊待審論文。
李建然與廖秀梅，2014，董監事責任保險對公司信用評等之影響，期刊待審論文。
林宛瑩、汪瑞芝與游順合，2012，研發支出、內部董事與經營績效，會計審計論叢，第2卷第2期：55-69
陳彩稚與龐嘉慧，2008，董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期：171-196
張瑞益，2009，董監事暨重要職員責任保險與公司行為分析，國立政治大學風險管理與保險研究所未出版博士論文
韓愷時，2010，董監事與重要職員責任保險需求之決定因素，國立臺北大學未出版碩士論文

二、英文參考文獻：
Baker, T., and Griffith, S. J. 2007. The missing monitor in corporate governance : The D&O liability insurer. Geogetown Law Journal, 95: 1795-1842
Bhagat, S., Brickley, J., Coles, J. 1987, Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 54(3):721-736。
Brook Yaron and Ramesh K. S. Rao. 1994. Shareholder wealth effects of directors' liability limitation provisions.The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29(3):481-497
Cadbury, J., J., 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business Research 22(86):111-124
Chan, K. C. and J. Li. 2008. Audit committee and firm value: Evidence on outside top excutives as expert-independent directors. Corporate Governance:An International Review 16(1) :16-31
Chen Tsai-Jyh and Li Shu-Hsing. 2010. Directors’ and officers’ insurance, corporate governance and firm performance. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 7(3):244–261
Chung, H. H. and Wynn, J. P. 2008. Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism.Journal of Accounting & Economic 46(1):135-153
Chung, Kee H. and Pruitt, Stephen W., 1994. A simple approximation of tobin's q. Financial Management 23(3):70-74
Core, John E. 1997. On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance.The Journal of Risk and Insurance 64(1):63-87
Core, John E. 2000. The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance. Journal of Law Economics
and Organization 16(2):449-477
Core, John E. and Holthausen, Robert W. and Larcker, David F. 1997. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51(3):371-406
Core, John E. and Holthausen, Robert W. and Larcker, David F., 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief ExecutiveOfficer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51:3, 371-406
Daily,C. M. and D. R. Dalton. 1993. Boards of directors, leadership and structure: control and performance implications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 17(3): 65-81.
Daniels Ronald J. and Susan Hutton. 1993. The capricious cushion: the implications of the directors and insurance liability crisis on Canadian corporate governance, Canadian Business Law Journal 22:182-230.
Demsetz H. and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy 93(6):1155-1177
Eberhart, R. 2012. Corporate governance systems and firm value: Empirical evidence from Japan’s natural experiment. Journal of Asia Business Studies 6(2); Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper (94).
Eckbo, B. Espen and Verma, Savita. 1994. Managerial shareownership, voting power, and cash dividend policy. Journal of Corporate Finance1:33-62
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M. T.1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms.Journal of Financial Economics 48(1):35–54
Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C.1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2):301-324.
Gutierrez, M. 2003. An economic analysis of corporate directors’ fiduciary duties. RAND Journal of Economics, 34:516-535
Hampel, R. 1998. Committee on corporate governance. London, UK: Gee and Co. Ltd.
Heckman James J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1):153-161.
Holderness, O. G.1990. Liability insurers as corporate monitors.International Review of Law and Economics10(2):115-129。
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, Richard S. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics11:5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and
takeovers.The American Economic Review 76(2):323-329
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems.The Journal of Finance 48(3):831–880,
La Porta, R., F Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation.The Journal of Finance 57(3):1147-1170
Lang L. H. P. and René M. Stulz. 1994. Tobin's q, corporate diversification, and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy 102:1248-1280
Lennox Clive S., Jere R. Francis, and Zitian Wang. 2012. Selection models in accounting research. The Accounting Review 87(2):589-616.
Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr.1982. On the corporate demand for insurance, Journal of Business 55:281-296.
Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr. 1987. Corporate insurance and the underinvestment problem, Journal of Insurance 54:45-54
Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr. 1990. On the corporate demand for insurance: Evidence from the reinsurance market.Journal of Business 63:19-40
Menon, K. and D. D. Williams. 1994. The insurance hypothesis and market prices.The Accounting Review 69(2):327-342
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20(1-2): 293-315.
O'Sullivan N., 1997. Insuring the agents: The role of directors' and officers' insurance in corporate governance.The Journal of Risk and Insurance 64(3):545-556
O'Sullivan N., 2002.The demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance by large UK companies.European Management Journal 20(5):574-583
Parry, Mark. E. and Arthur E. Parry. 1991. The purchase of insurance by a risk-neutral firm for a risk-averse agent.Journal of Risk and Insurance 58(1):31-46
Priest, G. L.1987. The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, Yale Law Journal 96(7):1521-1590
Wallace, Wanda A. 1987. The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets: Areview. Research in Accounting Regulation 1:7-34.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40(2):185–211
Zou, H., Wong, S., Shum, C., Xiong, J., and Yan, J. 2008. Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: evidence from China.Journal of Banking and Finance 32(12):2636-2645