臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以1992年至2013年的美國併購案為樣本，探討公司避險決策與併購交易特徵之間的關係，包括併購時點、併購支付方式、併購難易程度、併購規模、併購後短期宣告效果和長期績效。實證結果顯示(1)有使用衍生性金融商品避險的公司比沒有避險的公司，較不會偏好在併購潮內進行併購、比較會全部使用現金支付併購、完成併購所需花費的時間較短、傾向併購規模較大的交易、併購後的長期營運績效較佳；(2)公司避險決策與併購潮交互作用的部分，實證結果顯示在併購潮內有做避險的主併公司，相較於併購潮外有做避險的主併公司，更偏好使用現金支付併購、但完成併購案所需花費的時間較長、傾向併購規模較小的併購交易。本研究進一步發現在併購潮內有做避險的主併公司比沒有做避險的主併公司，可以降低完成併購所需花費的天數，並且對於併購後長期績效的損害相對較小，發揮避險對併購公司帶來的好處，藉此降低在併購潮內進行併購所帶來的負面影響。

Using the data of U.S mergers over the period 1992 to 2013, this study examines the effects of corporate hedging policy on merger’s acquisition decisions, including the timing of merger, payment method, complexity of a deal, relative size, announcement return, and post-merger long-term performance. Empirical results indicate that (i) hedging firms are less likely to merge in the merger wave, make a cash offer, undertake larger deals, take less time to complete the deal, and lead to a better operating performance than non-hedging firms, (ii) hedging acquirers in the merger wave are more likely to make a cash offer, but undertake smaller deals, and take more time to complete the deal than those out of the merger wave. Further our evidence shows that hedging activities can reduce the time to complete the deal in the merger wave, and hedging acquirers have a better long-term performance than non-hedging acquirers in the merger wave. These results suggest that corporate hedging can bring some advantages in mergers to reduce the bad acquisition happens in the merger wave.

目 次
致謝詞 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目 次 iv
表目次 vi
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的與架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧與假說 4
2.1併購潮之文獻回顧 4
2.2公司避險決策之文獻回顧 6
2.3公司避險決策與併購潮的關係 7
2.4公司避險決策和併購潮之交互作用與併購交易特徵的關係 8
2.4.1 併購支付方式 8
2.4.2併購難易程度 9
2.4.3併購規模 10
2.4.4併購後短期宣告效果和長期績效 10
第三章 資料與實證方法 12
3.1樣本選擇與資料來源 12
3.2研究變數衡量 12
3.2.1併購潮之定義 12
3.2.2避險活動 13
3.2.3併購交易特徵之變數定義 14
3.3實證模型 15
3.3.1公司避險對併購時點之探討 15
3.3.2公司避險決策與併購潮之交互作用對併購交易特性之探討 16
3.3.2.1併購支付方式 16
3.3.2.2併購難易程度 17
3.3.2.3併購規模 18
3.3.2.4併購後短期宣告效果 20
3.3.2.5併購後長期績效 21
3.4 控制變數衡量 23
3.5基本統計分析 24
第四章 實證結果 26
4.1敘述統計分析 26
4.2迴歸分析 29
4.2.1公司避險對併購時點之探討 29
4.2.2併購支付方式 30
4.2.3併購難易程度 32
4.2.4併購規模 34
4.2.5併購後短期宣告效果 35
4.2.6併購後長期績效 36
4.3穩健性測試 38
第五章 結論 41
參考文獻 43

 
表目次
Table 1 Sample Distribution 48
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 50
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 51
Table 4 Difference Tests 52
Table 5 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Merger Timing 54
Table 6 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Merger Payment 55
Table 7 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Time to Complete 57
Table 8 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Relative Size 59
Table 9 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Merger Announcement Return 61
Table 10 The Impact of Corporate Hedging on Post-merger Performance 62
Table 11 Robustness Checks 64

參考文獻
Aldrich, H., & Auster, E. R. (1986). Even dwarfs started small: Liabilities ofage and size and their strategic implications. Research in organizational behavior, 8, 165-186.
Allayannis, G., & Weston, J. P. (2001). The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value. Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 243-276.
Andre, P., Kooli, M., & L'her, J.-F. (2004). The long-run performance of mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from the Canadian stock market. Financial Management, 33(4).
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783-827.
Bessembinder, H. (1991). Forward contracts and firm value: Investment incentive and contracting effects. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(4), 519-532.
Bouwman, C. H. S., Fuller, K., & Nain, A. S. (2009). Market valuation and acquisition quality: Empirical evidence. Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 633-679.
Campbell, T. S., & Kracaw, W. A. (1990). Corporate risk management and the incentive effects of debt. The Journal of Finance, 45(5), 1673-1686.
Campello, M., Lin, C., Ma, Y., & Zou, H. (2011). The real and financial implications of corporate hedging. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1615-1647.
Carow, K., Heron, R., & Saxton, T. (2004). Do early birds get the returns? An empirical investigation of early-mover advantages in acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 25(6), 563-585.
Carter, D. A., Rogers, D. A., & Simkins, B. J. (2006). Does hedging affect firm value? Evidence from the US airline industry. Financial Management, 35(1), 53-86.
Chen, J., & King, T.-H. D. (2014). Corporate hedging and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 221-245.
Chen, M.-J., & Hambrick, D. C. (1995). Speed, stealth, and selective attack: How small firms differ from large firms in competitive behavior. Academy of management journal, 38(2), 453-482.
Chen, X., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2007). Monitoring: Which institutions matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 279-305.
Datta, D. K., Pinches, G. E., & Narayanan, V. K. (1992). Factors influencing wealth creation from mergers and acquisitions: A meta-analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 13(1), 67-84.
DeMarzo, P. M., & Duffie, D. (1991). Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information. Journal of Economic Theory, 53(2), 261-286.
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 709-737.
Duchin, R., & Schmidt, B. (2013). Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced monitoring, and bad acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(1), 69-88.
Easley, D., & O'Hara, M. (2004). Information and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1553-1583.
Eckbo, B. E., Giammarino, R. M., & Heinkel, R. L. (1990). Asymmetric information and the medium of exchange in takeovers: Theory and tests. Review of Financial Studies, 3(4), 651-675.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1996). Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 55-84.
Fishman, M. J. (1989). Preemptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange in acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 44(1), 41-57.
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1993). Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. The Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1629-1658.
Fu, X., & Tang, T. (2015). Corporate debt maturity and acquisition decisions. Financial Management.
Géczy, C., Minton, B. A., & Schrand, C. (1997). Why firms use currency derivatives. The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1323-1354.
Garfinkel, J. A., & Hankins, K. W. (2011). The role of risk management in mergers and merger waves. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 515-532.
Gay, G. D., Lin, C.-M., & Smith, S. D. (2011). Corporate derivatives use and the cost of equity. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(6), 1491-1506.
Golder, P. N., & Tellis, G. J. (1993). Pioneer advantage: Marketing logic or marketing legend? Journal of Marketing Research, 30(2), 158-170.
Grinstein, Y., & Hribar, P. (2004). CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(1), 119-143.
Haleblian, J., McNamara, G., Kolev, K., & Dykes, B. J. (2012). Exploring firm characteristics that differentiate leaders from followers in industry merger waves: a competitive dynamics perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 33(9), 1037-1052.
Harford, J. (2005). What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 529-560.
He, Z., & Xiong, W. (2013). Delegated asset management, investment mandates, and capital immobility. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 239-258.
Jin, Y., & Jorion, P. (2006). Firm value and hedging: Evidence from U.S. oil and gas producers. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 893-919.
Kim, Y. S., Mathur, I., & Nam, J. (2006). Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 834-853.
Lai, Y.-H., Tai, V. W., & Lin, L. (2014). The impact of institutional ownership on corporate hedging. Review of Securities and Futures Markets, 26(4), 155-212.
Lambrecht, B. M. (2004). The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale. Journal of Financial Economics, 72(1), 41-62.
Lehn, K. M., & Zhao, M. (2006). CEO turnover after acquisitions: Are bad bidders fired? The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1759-1811.
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. (1988). First-mover advantages. Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), 41-58.
Lyon, J. D., Barber, B. M., & Tsai, C.-L. (1999). Improved methods for tests of long-run abnormal stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 54(1), 165-201.
Mackay, P., & Moeller, S. B. (2007). The value of corporate risk management. The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 1379-1419.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 20-43.
Mansfield, E. (1985). How rapidly does new industrial technology leak out? The Journal of Industrial Economics, 34(2), 217-223.
Mitchell, M. L., & Mulherin, J. H. (1996). The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), 193-229.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.
Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). Capital structure decisions: Evidence from deregulated industries. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(2), 249-274.
Rawls, S. W., & Smithson, C. W. (1990). Strategic risk management Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2(4), 6-18.
Rhodes–Kropf, M., Robinson, D. T., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 561-603.
Shankar, V., Carpenter, G. S., & Krishnamurthi, L. (1998). Late mover advantage: How innovative late entrants outsell pioneers. Journal of Marketing Research, 35(1), 54-70.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(3), 295-311.
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-405.
VanderWerf, P. A., & Mahon, J. F. (1997). Meta-analysis of the impact of research methods on findings of first-mover advantage. Management Science, 43(11), 1510-1519.
Vassalou, M., & Xing, Y. (2004). Default risk in equity returns. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 831-868.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic intstitutions of capitalism: Simon and Schuster.