臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
排放權核配涉及廠商發展權益，是排放交易制度中，最重要與最敏感的課題之一，本研究修正Böhringer and Lange (2005)與Rosendah (2007)排放權核配模型，納入先期減量績效獎勵機制，亦即將核配因子內生化(endogenous)，獲得兼具效率(成本有效性)與公平的排放權核配原則與公式，具有制度設計的優越性。本研究再依據該核配原則與公式，模擬四種效能標準，試行台灣六大能源密集產業排放配額核配。獲得本研究主要結論如下：
(1)納入先期減量獎勵於排放權核配機制中，可以有效激勵廠商的防制行為，且防制誘因彈性愈高(絕對值)，防制效果愈高。
(2)獎勵先期減量行動是促進成本有效性的必要條件，而 則是充分條件。
(3)透過比較靜態分析發現，排放權核配納入先期獎勵誘因機制下，防制誘因彈性足夠大(絕對值越大)，降低未來排放權的期望價值，抑或提高廠商防制的淨邊際效益，促進廠商增加防制與減少排放之誘因，達到激勵廠商即早減量的效果。
(4)比較各種核配方案可知，方案一的核配最高，約可獲得30,185,262噸排放權量，約占基線排放量的85%，衝擊最小；方案四的核配最低，約可獲得28,198,309噸排放權量，約占基線排放量的79%，衝擊最大。


關鍵字：溯往原則核配、更新原則核配、先期行動、自願性減量計畫

ABSTRACT
Allowance allocation is one of the most important and sensitive issues in emission trading scheme. In order to increase efficiency and equity of allowance allocation method, this research modifies updating allocation rule which were created by Böhringer and Lange (2005), and Rosendah (2007). This study sets up an endogenous updating allocation rule, which has an advantage that can encourage a firm’s early action activities. Furthermore, this study use the above allocation method to estimate how many allowances will be allocated to energy intensive industries. The main results are obtained as follows: (1)The endogenous allocation rule indeed can increase incentive of early action, and a higher elasticity of abatement incentive can encourage more abatement activities.(2)The endogenous allocation rule is the necessary condition to achieve cost effectiveness. (3)If the elasticity of abatement incentive is high enough, this can stimulate the implementation of early abatement action fast. (4)There are four allocation scenarios to this research. Scenario 1 has the most allowances, therefore, having the lowest impact to industries.

Key word：grandfathering rule、updating rule、early action、voluntary reduction plan

目錄
目錄.................................................... I
圖目錄.................................................. III
表目錄...................................................IV
第一章 緒論...............................................1-1
第一節 研究緣起............................................1-1
第二節 研究動機與目的.......................................1-4
第三節 研究內容與方法.......................................1-7
第四節 章節安排.............................................1-9
第二章 先進國家排放權核配與先期行動獎勵機制.....................2-1
第一節 奧地利排放權核配與先期減量行動獎勵措施...................2-2
第二節 丹麥排放權核配方案與先期減量行動獎勵措施.................2-11
第三節 瑞典排放權核配方案與先期減量行動獎勵措施.................2-21
第四節 愛爾蘭第二階段國家排放權核配方案........................2-27
第五節 荷蘭第二階段國家排放權核配方案..........................2-37
第六節 加拿大先期行動減量獎勵信用額度核配計畫...................2-52
第七節 本章小節.............................................2-59
第三章 台灣產業自願性減量行動與先期行動獎勵制度之規劃............3-1
第一節 先期減量信用與排放權核配之問卷調查......................3-1
第二節 產業先期行動減量信用獎勵原則制定........................3-9
第三節 本章小節.............................................3-18
第四章 排放權核配理論模型與相關議題之文獻回顧...................4-1
第一節　核配方法對交易制度有效性與部門影響評估..................4-2
第二節 內生化溫室氣體排放權核配法則之效率與公平性分析............4-5
第三節 最適溯往原則核配方法.................................4-8
第四節　更新式核配方法下的有效性與價格效果探討..................4-11
第五節　「十年法則」用於處理設備關廠與新設廠排放權核配問題.......4-16
第五章 台灣製造業排放權核配機制設計與試行核配...................5-1
第一節 溯往原則最適排放權核配模型..............................5-2
第二節 混合核配原則與核配率外生之排放權核配模型..................5-5
第三節 混合核配原則與核配率內生化之排放權核配模型................5-8
第四節 製造業排放配額模擬試行..................................5-15
第六章 結論與建議............................................6-1
第一節 結論................................................6-1
第二節 政策建議............................................6-4
第三節 研究限制與後續研究方向................................6-6
參考文獻 ...................................................R-1
附錄一：比較靜態分析..........................................A-1
附錄二：廠商邊際防治成本型態證明...............................A-5
附錄三：問卷調查表 ...........................................A-6

參考文獻
中文文獻
李堅明(2008)，內生化溫室氣體排放權核配法則之效率與公平性分析，農業與資源經濟期刊，民國97年，5：2 ，1–24。
李堅明(2008)，「經濟部產業溫室減量推動辦公室計畫之-權核配制度之研究分包計畫」，財團法人台灣產業服務基金會 民國97年。
英文文獻
Christoph B., and A. Lange, (2005), “On the design of optimal grandfathering schemesfor emission allowances”, European Economic Review, 49, 2041–2055.
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, environment and Water management (2007), National Allocation Plan for Austria 2008-2012.
Harrison D. Jr., Ph.D. Daniel B. Radov, (2002), “Evaluation of alternative initial allocation mechanisms in European union greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading scheme”, DG Environment European commission．
Ireland Environmental Protection Agency, (2008), “Ireland’s National Allocation Plan for Emission Trading 2008–2012.”
Karan C. and P. Ambrosi (2007), “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008”,World Bank Institute.
Karan C. and P. Ambrosi (2008), “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008”,World Bank Institute.
Karan C. and P. Ambrosi (2009), “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008”, World Bank Institute.
Knut E. R. (2007), “Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating” ,Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 56, 69–82.
M. Grubb,Regina Betz and Karsten N.(2006),’’ EU emissions trading:an analysis of national alloction plans for 2008-2012’’ Climate Policy,6, 389–394
Markus A˚., D. Burtraw, J. Kruger, L. Zetterberg, (2007), “A Ten-Year Rule to guide the allocation of EU emission allowances”, Energy Policy, 35, 1718–1730.
Ministry of Sustainable Development, (2006), “Sweden’s national allocation plan for emission allowances 2008-2012.”
Ministry of The Environment, (2007), “Demark’s National Allocation Plan 2008-2012.”
Schultze, C.L.,(1977) , The Public Use of Private Interest. Brookings, Washington,DC.
The Minister for Economic Affairs and the State Secretary for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, (2006),“Netherlands national allocation plan for greenhouse gas allowances 2008-2012.”
The Minister of Environment, (2008), “Turning the Corner: Canada's Credit for Early Action Program–Final Program Guide.”
Tietenberg, T.,(2001) , The tradable permits approach to protecting the commons：what have we learned? Nota di Lavoro 36.2002, Fondazione　ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM).