臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究目的在探討控制股東超額獎酬對財務報表重編的影響。由於控制股東通常藉由交叉持股或金字塔持股的方式有效控制公司，造成控制股東可以較小的現金流量權獲得較高的控制權，此種情況將給予控制股東動機剝奪公司資源，侵佔小股東權益，並且亦可藉由其控制力操縱財務報表的數字來掩飾侵佔效果。因此本研究預期控制股東為了獲取超額獎酬，會對財務報表進行操縱，使財務報表不實表達，並造成日後的財務報表重編。

本研究使用民國87年至92年的控制股東獎酬資料來計算超額獎酬，並探討t-1期及t期控制股東超額獎酬對t+1期財務報表重編的影響。實證結果顯示t-1期控制股東為領取超額獎酬，會對財務報表進行操縱，使財報不實表達，進而造成t+1期財務報表的重編。

This research examines the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation on financial restatements. When ultimate owners control corporation effectively through pyramid structures, and cross-holdings among firms, they can get low cash flow right and high control right . This situation is provide the incentive to denationalize corporation resources and to extort minority shareholder by ultimate owners, and ultimate owners can use their control power to manipulate the number of financial statements for camouflage the encroachment。Therefore, this research expects that ultimate owners would manipulate the number of financial statements for getting excess compensation. So The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the future.

This research uses ultimate owners compensation data from 1998-2003 to compute excess ultimate owners compensation and discusses the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation in the current year and last year on financial restatements in the next year. The primary result is found that ultimate owners in last year would manipulate financial statements for getting excess compensation. The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the next year.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第四節 論文架構 5
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 控制股東與代理問題相關的文獻 6
第二節 高階經理人獎酬文獻 12
第三節 財務報表重編相關的文獻 21
第參章 研究方法 29
第一節 研究架構 29
第二節 假說發展 31
第三節 實證模型 33
第四節 變數衡量 36
第五節 樣本選取與資料蒐集 41
第肆章 實證結果與分析 44
第一節 獎酬經濟決定因素參數之敘述性統計 44
第二節 財務報表重編迴歸之敘述性統計分析 46
第三節 t檢定與Mann-Whitney檢定 48
第四節 相關性分析 50
第五節 實證結果 51
第伍章 結論與建議 53
第一節 研究結論 53
第二節 研究限制 53
第三節 研究貢獻與後續研究建議 54
參考文獻
中文文獻 55
英文文獻 56
附錄 60

中文文獻
李佳玲，民95。不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關連性：競賽理論之驗證，會計評論，第四十二期，22-53
李宛臻，民94。財務報表重編類型、特性與盈餘管理誘因及治理環境特性之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學係碩士班碩士論文
徐欣怡，民92。股權結構、高階管理者薪酬與公司價值之研究，國立中興大學企業管理學系碩士班碩士論文
翁淑育，民89。台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文
許美滿、吳壽山、鐘惠民、林怡群，民93。控制股東代理問題對公司價值之影響與舉債之監督效果分析，會計與公司治理，第一卷，第二期，67-90頁。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙，民92a。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)，貨幣觀測與信用評等雙月刊，第42期，15-31頁。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙，民92b。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下)，貨幣觀測與信用評等雙月刊，第43期，11-26頁。
許慧雯，民94。最終所有權對財務報表重編之影響—重編科目蔓延性與金額嚴重性分析，國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文
陳牡丹，民88。上市公司財務報表重編次數、重編影響方向與操縱盈餘動機之關聯性研究，台中商專學報，第31期，193-214。
陳明園、石雅慧，民93。高階經理人薪酬—代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究，臺大管理論叢，第十五卷，第一期，131-166
單驥、吳玉瑩，民92年。台灣管理階層薪資結構：Tournament Theory之實證研究，管理評論，第二十三卷，第二期，45-68
楊朝旭，民93。產品市場競爭可否降低公司內部治理機制不佳所導制的代理成本，管理學報，第二十一卷，第二期，153-173
葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩與李德冠，民92。公司治理機制對於關係人交易之影響，證券市場發展季刊，第十五卷，第四期，69－106。
蔡信夫、鐘惠民、林詩韻，民92。控制股東代理問題與盈餘資訊內涵之關聯性研究－以台灣上市公司為例，當代會計，第四卷，第二期，143-168頁。
盧鈺欣，民94。集團企業最終股權結構對會計師選擇之影響，國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文

英文文獻
Abbott, L. J., F. Parker and G. F. Peters. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing：A Journal of Practice and Theory 23 (March): 69-87.
Aier, J. k., J. Comprix, M. T. Gunlock and D. Lee. 2005. The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons. 19. (3): 123-135.
Akhigbe, A., R. Kudla and J. Madura. 2005. Why are some corporate earnings restatements more damaging? Applied Financial Economics 15 (5)
: 327-336.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of directors composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71: 443-465.
Bergstresser, D. and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 80 (3): 511-529.
Carcello, J. V. and A. L. Nagy. 2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing：A Journal of Practice and Theory 23 (September): 55-69.
Chen, Y. C. 2002. Additional evidence on the association between director stock ownership and incentive compensation. Review of Quantitiative Finance and Accounting 19 (1): 21-44.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Lacker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Ecomics 51: 371-406.
Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan and A. Sweeny. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13: 1-36.
Dunn, P. 2004. The impact of insider power on fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Management 30: 397-410
Fama, E. R. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.
Fan, J. P. H. and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings. Jounal of Accounting and Economics 33: 401-425.
Finkelstein, S. and D. Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal 10: 121-134.
Gaver, J. J. and K. M. Gaver. 1998. The relation between nonrecurring accounting transactions and CEO cash compensation. The Accounting Review 73 (2): 235-253.
Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324-340.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance 48 (July): 831-880.
Joh, S. W. 2003. Corporate governance and firm profitability: Evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (May): 287-322.
Kwon, S. S. and Q. J. Yin. 2006. Executive compensation, investment opportunities, and earnings management: higt-tech firms versus low-tech firms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 21(2): 119-148
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. The Journal of Finance 57 (June): 1147-1170.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance 54: 47-517.
Loebbecke, J. K., M. M. Einging and J. J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors experience with material irregularities: Frequency, nature, and etectability. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 9: 1-27
Oviatt, B. M., 1988. Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the management-shareholder relationship: Incentive for congruent internet Academy of Management Review 13 (2): 214-225.
Sloan, R. G., 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 55-100
Smith, C., R. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 262-292.
Srinivasan, S. 2004. Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of Accounting Research. 43 (2): 291-334.
William, R., JR. Kinney., Z. V. Palmrose and S. Scholz. 2004. Auditor independence, non-audit services, and restatements: Was the U.S. government right? Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 561-588.
Yeh, Y. H., C. E. Ko and Y. H. Su. 2003. Ultimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders: New evidence from Taiwan. Academia Economic Papers 31 (September): 263-299.