臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要

本論文主要目的在於探討當公司有新的融資需求時，哪些因素會影響公司設計不同贖回條款或贖回保障期間的可轉換公司債。本論文可分為三部分：首先，根據1999和2000年美國公司所發行的新債來探討影響公司選擇可轉債或普通債的決定因素。實證結果顯示，規模小、高成長性，以及高投資成長的公司傾向發行可轉債，此結果與資訊不對稱及代理成本理論一致。另外，根據財務健全的觀點來看，發行普通債的公司往往較發行可轉債的公司具有較佳的財務能力。由於本論文主要的重心為影響可轉債贖回條款之因素，因此，在第二及第三部分，我們不考慮可贖回之普通債，僅將可轉債單獨抽離研究，利用1989年至2000年公司發行的可轉債作為研究樣本，根據結果發現，發行具有可贖回條款之可轉債的公司較發行不可贖回可轉債的公司在發行後有比較好的獲利表現，此結論也支持資訊不對稱理論所提出的，經理人透過贖回的權利作為顯示對公司未來前景看好的訊號。最後，延續第二部分的研究樣本，進一步探討不可行使贖回權的保障期間長短與公司特性之間的關係。根據實證結果也顯示，大公司因較擔心盈餘稀釋的問題而傾向發行具較長保障期間的可轉債，而未來成長機會較高的公司也會傾向發行保障期間較長的可轉債。

Abstract

The main purpose is to identify the determinants of convertible debt’s call provision design. We divide our study into three parts. First, we use a sample of new debt financings in 1999 and 2000 to examine the choice between convertible debt and straight debt. Our results indicate that the likelihood of issuing convertible debt compared to straight debt is higher for small firms, high technology firms, high growth firms, and high investment growth firms, which is consistent with information asymmetry and the agency costs theories. Also, consistent with financial health theory, we find that firms with poor financial slack and profitability are more likely to issue convertible debts than straight debts. Because the main object of this study is convertible debt, we don’t consider callable straight debt but only focus on convertible debt. Next, we document the determinants of call provision of new convertible debts issued between 1989 and 2000. Our main finding is that callable convertible debt issuers have better performance after issuance than noncallable debt issuers. This result is consistent with information asymmetry theory. Finally, we provide an empirical examination of determinants of convertible debt’s call protection period. We find that firms are more likely to issue convertible debt with longer call protection if they are large or high growth firms. This result is consistent with information asymmetry and earnings dilution theory that large firms issue convertible debt with longer call protection period in order to avoid earnings dilution.

Contents

I.Introduction…………………………………………………1
II.Theory, prior evidence, and empirical predictions…… 3
i.Convertible vs. straight debt……………………… 3
ii.Convertible debt’s call protection period………… 5
III.Sample description…………………………… 10
IV.Primary results………………………………………… 18
i.Analysis of the choice between convertible and straight debt…………………18
ii.Analysis of convertible debt with or without call provision……………………22
iii.The determinants of convertible debt’s call protection period…. 26
V.Conclusions…………………………………………… 30
Reference…………………………………………………………. 32

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