臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自1990年代開始，買回庫藏股在美國銀行業的股利政策中，重要性急劇的增加。因此探討美國銀行業實際買回庫藏股的動機，越顯重要。然而，過去大多數文獻僅專注於個別動機的探討以及非金融產業。因此，本研究將針對1994年至2006年美國380家金融控股公司為樣本，探討其是否實際買回庫藏股的因素，並以二項Logit 模型同時檢驗所有假說與動機。
根據我們的實證結果，發現當銀行業總資本適足率越高，被併購的威脅越大，自由現金流量越多，成長機會越少，以及面對未來經濟繁榮時，其實際買回庫藏股的機會越高。

At the beginning of 1990s, bank holding companies’ repurchase activities are at a torrid pace. Thus, it becomes increasingly essential to probe into what reasons motivate bank holding companies to engage in share repurchase activities. Prior literatures concentrate only on one or two motives and primarily focus on non-financial firms. Therefore, our study examines all possible motives for actual share repurchases, using a sample of 380 U.S. bank holding companies over the period from 1994 to 2006. All of the motives are simultaneously captured and analyzed by binary Logit regression.
We find that banks’ actual repurchase activities are obviously influenced by the greater total capital adequacy ratio they have; the greater potential takeover threats they face; the larger free cash flow they possess; the less growth opportunities they own, and the better future economic prospects they face.

誌謝.................................................. i
論文摘要.............................................. ii
Thesis Abstract....................................... iii
Contents.............................................. iv
Tables................................................ v
I.Introduction........................................ 1
II.Prior Literature and Hypotheses.................... 3
1.Dividend Substitution............................. 3
2.Signal of Undervaluation.......................... 4
3.Capital Adequacy Regulation....................... 5
4.Defending Potential Takeover...................... 6
5.Cash Flow Risk.................................... 6
6.Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow..................... 7
7.Business Cycle.................................... 8
8.Accounting Loan Default Variables................. 9
9.Loan Composition.................................. 10
III.Research Design................................... 12
IV.Data Source........................................ 17
V.Empirical Results................................... 19
1.Descriptive Statistics and Correlation............ 19
2.Regression Results................................ 20
3.Sensitivity Analysis.............................. 25
VI.Conclusions........................................ 26
VII.References........................................ 27

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