臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去有許多都指出受查者之財務報表品質會影響會計師之某些行為，像是審計公費之多寡、審計契約之終止，以及會計師是否出具修正式無保留意見、保留意見等行為。事實上，財報品質最直接影響的應是會計師在查核程序上的選擇，面對不同財報品質的公司，會計師可能會選擇不同的查核程序或是選擇規劃更多額外的查核程序以確認受查者之財報品質，但在過去的制式的查核報告中，並無法檢視這些資訊。然而，在審計準則第58號的問世，使我們能檢驗財報品質是否會影響會計師於關鍵查核事項中所揭露之資訊量，進而了解財報品質是否會影響會計師決定查核程序之行為。
　　
本研究發現兩個現象，第一，在面對前期財報品質越差的公司，會計師確實會於關鍵查核事項揭露更多資訊；第二，只有向上操弄越多盈餘的公司才會造成會計師於關鍵查核事項揭露更多資訊。

In past, many researches indicated that the quality of financial statements would impact some of accountants’ behaviors, such as the volume of auditing fee, the termination of auditing contract, and whether presenting modified unqualified opinion or qualified opinion. Actually, the auditing procedure choice of accountant is the thing to be directly impacted by the quality of financial statements. However, the old standard auditing report did not provide the relevant information about auditing procedures. But, thanks to the existence of ROC SAS NO.58, we can examine whether the quality of financial statements would impact the volume of information disclosed by accountants in critical auditing matters to realize the relationship between the quality of financial statements and accountants’ behavior.

In our research, we find out three results. First, the worse the quality of financial statements is, the more information would be disclosed by accountants. Second, the worse the quality of financial statement was in last year, the more information would be disclosed by accountants. Finally, accountants would disclose more information in critical auditing matters when the audited company processed more seriously upward earning management.

目錄　　i
圖目錄 ii
表目錄 iii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的： 3
第二章 文獻探討 4
2.1 會計師專業判斷之資訊有用性 4
2.2 關鍵查核事項之介紹 5
2.3 財報品質對會計師行為之影響 8
第三章 研究設計 13
3.1 樣本選取與資料蒐集 13
3.1.1資料來源 13
3.1.2樣本選取 13
3.2 研究架構 14
3.3 實證模型與變數定義 15
3.3.1實證模型 15
3.3.2控制變數之選定 20
第四章 實證結果 25
4.1 敘述性統計 25
4.2 相關係數分析 27
4.3 多元迴歸分析 28
4.4 穩健性測試 32
第五章 研究結論、限制與建議 39
參考文獻 41
附錄一 不同產業之關鍵查核事項敘述性統計 45

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