一、中文部分
李佳玲，2006，不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關聯性：競賽理論之驗證，會計評論，第42期：23-53。李啟華及郭翠菱，2014，獎酬契約與盈餘管理，輔仁管理評論，第21卷第3期：23-48。
李淑華，簡雪芳，蔡彥卿及張玲玲，2015，以利害關係人觀點分析公司零盈餘門檻操控，交大管理學報，第35卷第2期：31–79。
林欣美，郭麗華及蘇迺惠，2008，國際化程度、董事會結構、精練法人監督對盈餘管理之影響：以台灣資訊電子業爲率，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第1期：157–186。林靜香及王萬成，2010，員工獎酬資訊揭露對公司治理結構的影響，交大管理學報，第30卷1期：81-119。
洪玉舜及王泰昌，2008，績效衡量指標在總經理股票誘因薪酬之相對重要性分析，會計評論，第46期：1–29。
范宏書，林彥廷及陳慶隆，2015，實質盈餘管理對會計資訊價值攸關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第25卷第3期：163-196。張森河，黃劭彥，王登仕及康照宗，2016，產業競爭與盈餘管理，管理與系統，第23卷第1期:107 – 135。張瑞當，方俊儒及曾玉琦，2007，核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報，第24卷第1期:17-39。張瑞當、林國欽、沈文華及侯佩秀，2007，高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發布之影響，會計與公司治理，第4卷第1期：57-84。許永聲， 陳信吉及陳琬菁，2013，董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為，會計評論，第57期：39 – 72。陳玉麟，2012，企業策略、非財務績效衡量與總經理薪酬：電子業證據，會計評論，第54期：117–150。陳家偉，王凱立，吳安琪及吳振宇，2015，董事責任險於股權結構廣度及企業價值之研究管理評論；第34卷第1期：23–45。
陳軒晟，2014，實質與應計基礎盈餘管理 : 權益性薪酬與市場評價的影響，國立成功大學。
陳慶隆及林品妤，2015，實質盈餘管理與後續會計績效之探討–公司治理調解角色之檢測，會計評論，第61期：1-36。
黃俊閎，林鳳儀，吳勝富及黃仁伯，2014，公司治理是否有效減少亞洲新興市場公司之盈餘管理？交大管理學報，第34卷第2期：87-111。
黃家齊，2000，績效資訊特性與控制、薪資設計－組織控制觀點與代理理論觀點之整合，臺大管理論叢，第10卷第2期：227-255。楊朝旭，蔡柳卿，陳家慧及廖思婷，2012，董事會特性與實質盈餘管理，臺大管理論叢，第23卷第1期：363-400。
楊朝旭及吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期：55-87。
跨國人力資源公司，2015全球薪酬趨勢調查報告。
蔡柳卿，2007，依會計盈餘時效性設計高階主管薪酬契約：董事會所扮演的角色，會計評論，第44期： P61–94。蔡柳卿及楊怡芳，2006，公司治理與符合績效門檻盈餘管理行為之關聯性研究，東吳經濟商業學報，第53期：33-72。
韜睿惠悅及英國牛津研究機構，全球人才2021（Global Talent 2021）報告
韜睿惠悅企管顧問公司，2014整體獎酬市場調查報告。
二、英文部分
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