臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

經濟發展的好壞已成為國家競爭性的代表，有鑑於公司舞弊的發生造成經濟衰退、社會動盪不安、打擊投資人對市場的信心、使得股市重挫，並且嚴重打亂金融市場的秩序。近年來中國市場備受全球的關注，本研究將探討中國獨立董事是否有發揮其自身的功能，且對於公司舞弊的關聯性。以2008年至2014年為研究期間，實證結果顯示中國上市公司在監督密集的情況之下，能降低公司舞弊的發生。雖然審計委員會也有相同效果，卻沒有預期的顯著。由此可知，中國雖逐漸成為全球的焦點，但在委員會的監督功能、獨立性和可靠性方面仍須加強，本文建議非任何決策都必須由董事會的通過才可，應讓委員會發揮實質的權力。

Global economic growth and environmental changes can promote national developments but also come with corporate frauds. Therefore, independent directors play an important role in corporate governance. Based on Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, this paper examines whether company committees and independent directors have an effect on corporate frauds in China Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period 2008-2014.
This paper studies the efficiency of audit, compensation committee and independent directors’ monitoring in listed companies. The empirical results that monitoring-intensive can decrease the likelihood of corporate frauds, when a majority of independent directors serve on at least two of monitoring committees. However, in this paper also find that a negative effect but not significant relationship between audit committee and incidence of corporate fraud.

目錄
摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 8
第三節　研究架構與流程 9
第貳章　文獻探討 11
第一節　舞弊 11
第二節　委員會與其重要性 12
第三節　委員會、監督密集與舞弊 14
第參章　研究方法 19
第一節　資料來源與樣本選取 19
第二節　變數衡量 21
第三節　實證模型 24
第肆章　實證結果與分析 26
第一節　敘述性統計 26
第二節　相關性分析 31
第三節　實證結果 33
第伍章　結論 40
參考文獻 41
附錄 47

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