臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究首先延伸在資本市場跨期動態的群聚模型，以確認放款群聚存在於股份制商業銀行及城市商業銀行。藉由分析放款群聚是否主要源自於追隨相同型態的銀行，本研究證實聲譽及特徵群聚的動機被混合支持於股份制商業銀行及城市商業銀行配對樣本下的城市商業銀行、股份制商業銀行及國有商業銀行配對樣本下的股份制商業銀行與城市商業銀行及國有商業銀行配對樣本下的城市商業銀行。其次，本研究釐清股份制商業銀行放款群聚的動機源自於調查群聚，而城市商業銀行放款群聚的動機則源自於資訊串流。再者，本研究證實放款群聚會更顯著且負向影響城市商業銀行的經營績效而非股份制商業銀行的經營績效，尤其在管理能力及整體盈餘的構面。最後，考量銀行放款在景氣循環的多頭期間會顯著增加，本研究證實銀行放款群聚在景氣循環的多頭期間相較於空頭期間會更顯著惡化其績效。本研究實證結果有助於中國的銀行管理者制定企業放款的決策，並提供予金融主管機關管理銀行的放款群聚行為。

This study first extends the inter-temporal herding model in capital market to confirm that loan herding exists in Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) and City Commercial Banks (CCBs). Analyzing whether loan herding primarily results from following the same type of banks, I demonstrate that reputational and characteristic herding motivations are mixed to be supported in CCBs for the pair of JSCBs and CCBs, JSCBs for the pair of JSCBs and State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) and CCBs for the pair of CCBs and SOCBs. Next, I clarify that the motivation of loan herding by JSCBs results from investigative herding, while that by CCBs is due to informational cascades. Moreover, I demonstrate that loan herding more significantly and negatively affects operating performance of CCBs than that of JSCBs especially in the managerial capability and the entire earnings. Finally, considering that banks’ lending significantly increases during the bullish period, I demonstrate that bank loan herding during a bullish period of business cycle performs worse than during a bearish period. The empirical results in this study would help the bank supervisors in China to set up the policy of business loans and provide for financial authorities to manage banks’ loan herding behavior.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 10
第三節 研究設計 11
第貳章 文獻探討 12
第一節 群聚行為的背景因素 12
第二節 中國大陸銀行放款群聚的背景因素 14
第三節 中國各類型銀行的發展與改革 16
第四節 銀行放款群聚對銀行績效的影響 21
第五節 銀行放款群聚對其績效的影響在景氣多空頭的差異 23
第參章 研究方法 25
第一節 資料範圍及分析 25
第二節 檢測銀行的聲譽群聚及特徵群聚 33
第三節 檢測銀行的資訊串流及調查群聚 36
第四節 檢測銀行放款群聚對其績效的影響 37
第五節 檢測銀行放款群聚在景氣多頭期間是否會更顯著影響其績效 39
第肆章 實證結果 40
第一節 檢測聲譽群聚及特徵群聚 40
第二節 檢測資訊串流及調查群聚 43
第三節 檢測銀行放款群聚對其績效的影響 46
第四節 檢測銀行放款群聚在景氣多頭期間是否會更顯著影響其績效 53
第伍章 結論 59

表目錄
表1-1 2006-2012年中國大陸整體銀行資本適足率 6
表1-2 2006-2012年中國各類型銀行放款金額、家數及增幅 28
表1-3 2006年與2012年中國各類型銀行對產業平均放款百分比 29
表1-4 2006-2012年中國各類型銀行放款(含催收)餘額統計表 30
表2 檢測聲譽群聚及特徵群聚:股份制商銀(城市商銀)及城市商銀(股份制商銀) 41
表 3檢測聲譽群聚及特徵群聚:股份制商銀(國有商銀)及城市商銀(國有商銀) 42
表 4-1 檢測資訊串流及調查群聚:股份制商業銀行 44
表 4-2 檢測資訊串流及調查群聚:城市商業銀行 45
表5-1-1 股份制商業銀行的放款群聚對資本適足性之影響 48
表5-1-2 股份制商業銀行的放款群聚對資產品質之影響 48
表5-1-3 股份制商業銀行的放款群聚對管理能力之影響 49
表5-1-4 股份制商業銀行的放款群聚對獲利能力之影響 49
表5-1-5 股份制商業銀行的放款群聚對流動性之影響 50
表5-2-1 城市商業銀行的放款群聚對資本適足性之影響 50
表5-2-2 城市商業銀行的放款群聚對資產品質之影響 51
表5-2-3 城市商業銀行的放款群聚對管理能力之影響 51
表5-2-4 城市商業銀行的放款群聚對獲利能力之影響 52
表5-2-5 城市商業銀行的放款群聚對流動性之影響 52
表6-1 股份制及城市商業銀行的放款群聚在景氣多空頭下對資本適足性之影響 54
表6-2 股份制及城市商業銀行的放款群聚在景氣多空頭下對資產品質之影響 55
表6-3 股份制及城市商業銀行的放款群聚在景氣多空頭下對管理能力之影響 56
表6-4 股份制及城市商業銀行的放款群聚在景氣多空頭下對獲利能力的影響 57
表6-5 股份制及城市商業銀行的放款群聚在景氣多空頭下對流動性之影響 58
附錄一 2006-2012年中國大陸各類型銀行資產總額之比重 66
附錄二 2005-2012年中國大陸各類型銀行逾放比率 66


圖目錄
圖1-1 研究定位圖 2
圖1-2 2006-2012年中國大陸各類型銀行資產總額之比重 5
圖1-3 2005-2012中國大陸各類型銀行逾放比率 5
圖1-4 研究設計架構圖 11
圖3-1 國際經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)綜合領先指標 32

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