臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

建立銀行往來關係是一種常見的信貸融資作法，尤其是在中國. 這樣的關係對於國有與私人企業來說是有益的，因為銀行是提供公司融資主要供給者. 然而，只有少數的研究探討在不同的金融體系下銀行往來關係，因此，本研究探討中國國有企業之銀行往來關係是否比私人企業更具有公司價值? 本文描述金融市場的借貸關係理論之運用. 然而近幾年，由於銀行商業模式的變化，企業與銀行的融資關係漸漸的消失，讓國有與私人企業邁向惡化的經濟環境. 為了延伸這個理論，本文探討銀行往來關係是否能增加公司價值. 因此使用1999-2008年中國國有與私人企業作為樣本，並加入公司特質做為控制變數， 結果表明中國國有企業相對於私人企業建立銀行往來關係並沒有增加其更多公司價值，並且發現銀行往來關係無論對於國有企業或私人企業都呈現負相關係. 另外，自從2005年股權改革後，國有與私人企業影響公司價值對銀行往來顯著增加

Establishing a banking relationship is a common practice in credit financing across the world, especially in China. This has been assumed to be particularly beneficial for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). The bank is the main supplier of credit to these firms. However, studies of the value of banking relationships in comparative financial systems are scarce. Therefore, our research focuses on whether banking relationships add more value to SOEs than they do for POEs in the Chinese context. This paper describes the theoretical role of lending relationships in financial markets. Over recent years, lending relationships have lost ground because of a change in banks’ business models, which can ultimately lead to a worsening of the business environment for POEs and SOEs. To extend the theory, this study examines whether firms add value to the banking relationship. As evidence, we use financial and accounting data relating to SOEs and POEs in China between 1999–2008. After controlling for corporate characteristics, we find that Chinese SOEs do not add more value to the banking relationships than POEs do and that there is a negative relationship between banking relationships and firm value for both SOEs and POEs. Also, after share privatization in 2005, firm value significantly increased after controlling for banking relationships for both SOEs and POEs. The results of this study thus have some implications for policy makers.

Contents
摘要………………………………………………………………………………I
Abstract………… ………………………………………………………………II
Contents…………………………………………………………………………III
List of Tables........................................................................................................IV
List of Charts…………………………………………………………………….V
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………1
2. Literature review………………………………………………………………4
2.1 The Value of Banking Relationships……………………………………..4
2.2 Ownership structures of Chinese firms and their banking relationships... 5
2.3 Changes in Banking Relationships after Bank Reforms…………………6
3. Data and Methodology………………………………………………………..7
3.1 Data sources……………………………………………………………..7
3.2 Models and Variables…………………………………………………….7
3.3 Variables in equations…………………………………………………...8
3.3.1 Corporate Performance (Tobin’s Q) Equation……………………...8
3.3.2 Banking Relationship Equation……………………………………..11
4. Results of empirical study…………………………………………………...13
5. Conclusions………………………………………………………………….18
Reference……………………………………………………………………….20
Appendix………………………………………………………………………..32

List of Tables

Table 1………………………………………………………………………..23
Panel A…………………………………………………………………23
Panel B…………………………………………………………………24
Panel C…………………………………………………………………24
Table 2…………………………………………………….………………….25
Table 3…………………………………………………….………………….26
Table 4……………………………………………………..…………………28
Table 5……………………………………………………...………………..28

List of Charts

Chart 1……………………………………………………………………….…….29
Chart 2……………………………………………………………………….…….29
Chart 3……………………………………………………………………….…….30
Chart 4……………………………………………………………………………..30
Chart 5………………………………………………………………………..……31

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