臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

從傳統的觀點來看，由於地方政府往往會忽略其行為對其他地區的影響，因此分權制度下的政策實施可能會造成不效率的結果。在這方面的討論很多，本文係著重於其中的租稅競爭(tax competition)以及所得重分配政策的不效率問題。
租稅競爭的相關文獻提到地方政府間的競爭往往會使得地方公共財提供較效率水準為低，但若是加入了人口也可以移動的情形則可能改善不效率的情況。另一方面，在考慮共同勞動市場的情形下，地方政府的所得重分配政策似乎也有過低的現象。在這樣的情況下，本文在一般租稅競爭的模型裡加入地方政府所得重分配的政策，嘗試討論在地方分權下租稅競爭與所得重分配政策兩者並存的情況。得到的結論為不管是地方政府提供的公共財或是重分配移轉，不再是一定較效率水準不足，也有可能過高或甚至相同，之所以造成這種結果是因為資本及勞動受租稅移轉政策影響，進而在各地區間移動所帶來的交互作用所致。接著，本文也探討了均衡下地區數目的變動對社會福利的影響，於是發現在某些情況下，地區數目的減少會使得社會福利增加。最後，由於地方政府間的競爭結果可能帶來過高或不足的無效率，於是本文考慮了中央政府的間接干預措施，發現只要中央政府採取適當的租稅或補貼機制，若是地方政策不足給予補貼，反之則予以課稅，則地方公共財及重分配政策可以達到效率境界。

The traditional view reveals that the competition between decentralized governments, which ignore the spillover effects of their activities, leads to inefficient outcomes. The literature about tax competition concludes that regional governments may choose the inefficiently low level of public goods, but introducing labor mobility into the model may improve the inefficient condition. Considering the common labor market, as far as its’ implication on the redistributive policy of local governments are concerned, there seems to be some consensus that migration leads to sub-optimal redistribution. In this thesis, we combine the redistributive policies of regional governments with a model of tax competition. We show that there are situations that the level of public goods or income redistributive policy may be over- or under-supplied than the efficient level. This can be explained by the interaction of labor and capital mobility in response to tax and transfer policies. We also examine the effect of the number of jurisdictions on social welfare. In some cases, smaller number of jurisdictions may improve the social welfare. Finally, we introduce the corrective activity of central government into our model and find that the efficient level of public goods and income redistribution could be guaranteed by appropriate tax or subsidy schemes.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節　研究動機與目的 1
第二節　研究方法與架構 3
第三節　章節安排 3
第二章　文獻回顧 4
第三章 基本模型設定 9
第一節　私部門設定 9
第二節　地方政府行為 11
第三節　要素市場均衡與相關比較靜態分析 11
第四章 地區間Nash競爭均衡下的政策效率 15
第一節 地方政府間的Nash競爭均衡 15
第二節 地方公共財提供的效率問題 17
第三節 地方重分配移轉提供的效率問題 20
第四節 均衡下地區數目變動之相關探討 23
第五章 中央政府的干預措施 28
第一節 中央政府干預下之地方政府行為 28
第二節 中央政府矯正措施的制定 29
第三節 中央政府矯正後的均衡 32
第六章 結論 34
附錄 36
＜附錄一＞ 36
＜附錄二＞ 36
＜附錄三＞ 38
＜附錄四＞ 38
參考文獻 42

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