臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

財會主管身為經營團隊重要一員，其主要職責於公司的財務、投資、資訊揭露，更重要能為管理階層提供策略上的建議。而近年來舞弊案件頻傳，財會主管被迫面臨道德上之選擇。因此我國之法令為確保財務報表之品質可靠性，嚴格規定財會主管需出具財務報告內容無虛偽或隱匿之聲明，是故當財會主管發生異動時，可能具有相當大的資訊意涵。
本研究以2000年至2007年之上市櫃公司共計430個樣本，探討財會主管在離職前後對盈餘管理之行為。本研究採用績效配對法，以當期資產報酬率做為績效配對指標，使對盈餘管理的衡量，能免於極端績效的影響，此外考量控制變數的影響，對績效配對之異常應計數進行廻歸分析。
研究結果顯示，有異動財會主管之樣本，並未發現績效配對之異常應計數有明顯下降之情形。但若進一步將異動原因區分為非自願性和自願性因素，則異動原因歸屬於非自願性異動之樣本，績效配對之異常應計數有明顯下降的情形。顯示異動原因屬非自願性異動時，在異動前舊任財會主管有較大的動機向上盈餘管理。

CFOs play important roles in the management team and are responsible to finance, investment, information disclosure, and provide management strategy suggestions. The role of CFO has gained the attentions from academia and regulations because of the fraudulent financial reporting in recent years. To make sure the quality of financial reports, CFOs have responsibilities to sign a statement stating that financial reports were presented fairly according to related regulations. Due to the vital role of CFOs, their turnover may reveal some inside information about the performance and prospect of the company.
The sample of this study was selected from listed companies in Taiwan from year 2000 to year 2007, and consists of 430 CFO turnover events. This study investigates whether CFOs use their discretionary power to benefit themselves on the events of CFO turnover. Performance-match method was used in this study to mitigate any possible residual effect of extreme financial performance on our discretionary accruals estimations. Furthermore, multiple regression models are used to control other variables affecting discretional accruals.
The results show that the change of performance-match abnormal accruals did not reduce significantly among CFOs turnovers. However, after classifying observations into voluntary and forced turnovers, performance-match abnormal accruals reduced significantly in the group of forced CFOs turnovers. And this implies that when CFOs turnovers were forced, the former CFOs have more incentives to increase accruals before change.

謝辭 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
目錄 VI
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機 1
第二節　研究目的 3
第三節　論文架構 5
第貳章　文獻探討 7
第一節　高階主管異動與公司績效 7
第二節　盈餘管理文獻 8
第三節　財務主管異動原因 10
第四節　自願性和非自願性異動文獻 12
第五節　績效配對方法 14
第參章　研究方法與設計 15
第一節　研究假說 15
第二節　變數定義 18
第三節　研究模型 26
第四節　樣本選取與資料來源 32
第肆章　研究結果與分析 36
第一節　敘述統計量 36
第二節　單變量分析 42
第三節　多變量廻歸分析 47
第四節　額外測試 52
第伍章　結論與建議 55
第一節　研究結論 55
第二節　研究貢獻 56
第三節　研究限制與建議 57
參考文獻 58

王凌葦，2004，上市公司財務主管異動宣告對股價報酬與企業經營績效之影響，國立中央大學財務金融學系碩士在職專班未出版碩士論文。
吳仲修，2008，財會主管異動原因與異常應計數，東海大學會計學系碩士班碩士論文。
周慈方，2004，財務主管異動之決定性因素與異動對後續經營績效及財務危機之關聯性探討，國立政治大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。
許立芊，2008，財會主管異動原因與公司績效，東海大學會計學系碩士班碩士論文。
陳信吉，2007，CEO異動、盈餘管理與公司治理－從家族的觀點探討，國立台北大學會計學研究所博士論文計畫書。
張慈恬，2006，財務主管更換對盈餘管理行為之影響，私立朝陽科技大學會計系未出版碩士論文。
黃旭輝，2006，經理人異動與股東財富效果，管理評論，第25卷，第一期(1月)：23-45。
Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B. W. Mayhew. 2003. Do nonaudit service compromise auditor independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review 78：611-639.
Bartov, E., F. A. Gul, and S. L. Tsui. 2001. Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30: 421-452.
Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (Spring): 1-24.
Chung, H., and S. Kallapur. 2003. Client importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals. The Account Review 78 (April)：931-955.
Dechow, P. M., and R. G. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14: 51-89.
Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan and A. Sweeny. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70 (April): 193-226.

Denis, D. J., and D. K. Denis. 1995. Performance changes following top management dismissals. The Journal of Finance 50(September)：1029-1057.
Fee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2000. Management turnover and product market competition: Empirical evidence from the U.S. newspaper industry. Journal of business 73 (2): 205-243.
Fee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2004. Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(February)：3-38.
Geiger, M. A. and D. S. North. 2006. Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of changes in discretionary accruals. The Accounting Review 81 (December)：781-809.
Gilson, S. C. 1989. Management turnover and financial distress. Journal of Financial Economics 25(December)：241-262.
Gibbs, M. 1995. Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(March)：247-277.
Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(April)：85-107.
Huson, M. R., P. H. Malatesta., and R. Parrino. 2004. Mangerial succession and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 74 (August)：237-275.
Kothari, S.P., Leone Andrew J., and Wasley Charles E. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(April)：163-197.
Leker, J. & Salomo, S. 2000. CEO turnover and corporate performance, Scandinavian. Journal of Management, 16, 287-303.
Mian, S. 2001. On the choice and replacement of chief financial officers. Journal of Financial Economics 60(April)：143-175.
Murphy, K. J. and J. L. Zimmerman. 1993. Financial performace surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (September)：273-315.
Reynolds, J. K., and J. R. Francis. 2000. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30(3): 375-400.
Warner, J. B., R. L. Watts, and K. H. Wruck. 1988. Stock prices and top management changes. Journal of Financial Economics 20：461-492.
Zmijewski, M. 1984. Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial istress prediction models. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (Supplement): 59-82.