臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

有鑒於國外探討高階經理人薪酬-績效敏感度的相關實證研究數量攀升，卻鮮少有以國內公司為樣本之相關文獻，本研究以2007年到2012年台灣上市公司資料為研究樣本，探討公司的股東及董監事會監督機制與高階經理人薪酬-績效敏感度之間的關係。本研究的主要貢獻為進一步將公司高階經理人之薪酬劃分為現金薪酬及股票薪酬，探討公司的監督機制對兩類薪酬-績效敏感度之影響。實證研究發現，不論是何種薪酬，當董事會規模大及經理人擔任董事人數多時，經理人薪酬-績效敏感度降低；而在股東監督機制方面，總薪酬及現金薪酬下的薪酬-績效敏感度在外部大股東持股監督加入後會增強，而股票薪酬下的薪酬-績效敏感度與外部大股東持股比例則呈相反狀況。此結果顯示，當公司已連結高階經理人薪酬與公司績效表現，藉以消弭經營者與股東之間的利益隔閡時，公司的監督機制可能產生加乘效果、或是出現替代的現象。

Owing that there is an increasing number of studies integrating executive pay-performance sensitivity yet with few using samples from Taiwan, this dissertation employs a data set of Taiwan listed firms from 2007 to 2012 to examine the association between pay-performance sensitivity and monitoring mechanisms from shareholders and the board. The main contribution of this study is to further divide executive compensation into cash compensation and equity compensation and explore the impacts of the monitoring mechanisms on these two types of pay-performance sensitivities. The empirical results suggest that pay-to-performance is less sensitive when board size is large and when many executives are in the board. As for the shareholder monitoring mechanism, pay-performance sensitivities under total and cash compensation is increased when blockholders monitoring is added, while equity pay-performance sensitivity shows the opposite relation. These results implicate that under the circumstances of firms connecting executive compensation and firm performance to mitigate the gap between managers’ and shareholders’ interests, corporate monitoring mechanisms may perform add-on effects or serve as substitutes.

1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 6
2-1 Pay-Performance Association 6
2-2 Monitoring Mechanisms and Executive Compensation 7
2-2-1 Board Monitoring Mechanism and Executive Compensation 7
2-2-2 Shareholder Monitoring Mechanism and Executive Compensation 8
3. Sample and Methodology 12
3-1 Sample 12
3-1-1 Sample Selection 12
3-1-2 Sample Description 12
3-2 Variables Description 13
3-2-1 Dependent Variables 13
3-1-2 Independent and Control Variables 14
3-3 Methodology 16
3-3-1 Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity Model 16
3-1-2 Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Monitoring Mechanism Model 17
4. Empirical Results 18
4-1 Pay-Performance Sensitivity 18
4-2 Total Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Monitoring Mechanisms 19
4-3 Cash Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Monitoring Mechanisms 20
4-4 Equity Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Monitoring Mechanisms 22
5. Conclusion 23
Reference 25

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