臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要探討在垂直市場結構下，外國廠商會選擇直接進入或併購的方式進入地主國上游市場，並分析外國廠商的進入模式對地主國的中間財價格、各均衡產量以及社會福利的影響。
本文考慮一個兩國模型，外國存在一家上游廠商以直接進入或併購方式進入地主國上游市場投資；地主國的上游市場存在多家提供中間財的本國廠商，上游廠商以統一定價的方式提供中間財給下游廠商，地主國的下游市場存在一家製造最終財的廠商。本文更進一步探討地主國上游市場的競爭程度以及兩國廠商相對成本效率對於外國廠商進入決策之影響，並藉此了解外國廠商是否與地主國期望的進入方式一致。
本文發現，外國廠商進入地主國上游市場的決策，取決於兩國上游廠商的相對成本及上游市場的競爭程度。當兩國上游廠商的成本差距小，外國廠商會選擇直接進入。反之，當兩國上游廠商的成本差距大，外國廠商會選擇併購。此外，相較於併購的進入模式，若外國廠商選擇直接進入，則下游廠商面對的中間財價格相對較低，且市場總產量較多。其次，若上游市場競爭程度相對低時，則隨著上游廠商家數增加，外國廠商選擇直接進入的誘因越高。最後，外國廠商的進入決策是否符合地主國的期望方式則取決於外國廠商的生產效率。唯有外國廠商的生產成本夠低時，外國廠商的進入模式才會與地主國政府所期望的進入模式一致。

This paper analyzes a foreign firm’s entry mode (Greenfield FDI or merge) under the vertical market. We analyze the impacts of the foreign firm’s entry mode on intermediate goods price, equilibrium output and host country’s welfare when the foreign firm enters the upstream market of host country.
In this paper, we consider a two country model. The foreign country exists an upstream firm who decides to enter the upstream market of host country by Greenfield of merge. The domestic country exists numbers of upstream firms and a downstream firm. The upstream firms provide intermediate goods to downstream firm in the uniform price. We further explore the influence of two country firms’ relatively cost and the competitive degree of upstream market on the foreign firm’s entry mode. Besides, we analyze whether the foreign firm’s entry is in accordance with host country’s anticipation.
We find that the foreign firm’s entry mode depends on the relative costs of the two countries’ upstream firms and the degree of competition in the upstream market. When the cost difference of the two countries’ upstream firms is small, the foreign firm will choose Greenfield; on the contrary, when the cost difference of the two countries’ upstream firms is large, the foreign firm will choose merge. Furthermore, the price (the total output) of intermediate goods under Greenfield regime is lower than that under merge regime. Next, if competition degree of the upstream market is relatively low, an incentive of the foreign firm to choose Greenfield is increasing with the number of upstream firms. Finally, whether the foreign firm’s entry mode which is consistent with host country’s hope depends on the foreign firm’s production efficiency. Only when the foreign firm’s production costs low enough, the foreign firm’s mode will in accordance with host country’s expectation.

摘要 i
誌謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 vi
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究程序 5
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 外人直接投資與出口 6
第二節 直接進入與併購方式 8
第三節 垂直市場 11
第参章 基本模型 15
第一節 直接進入 19
第二節 併購 21
第三節 外國廠商的進入模式 25
第四節 上游市場的競爭程度 31
第肆章 社會福利 36
第伍章 結論 47
參考文獻 50

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