臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自Jensen(1986)提出自由現金流量假說後，相關之研究議題不斷。伴隨著低成長機會的自由現金流量成為上市上櫃公司的一大問題，因為經理人可能為了個人私利，將現金流量投資於淨現值為負的投資計畫上，使得公司價值與股東財富降低，這就是代理理論的基本論點。為了掩飾此非利潤極大化的投資，經理人只好利用會計上的裁決權使財務報表的報導盈餘增加，也就是盈餘管理問題。然而，如果存在外部的利害關係者能做出有效的外部監督，那麼此種利用會計上裁決性應計項目從事盈餘管理的取巧行為將會受到限制。
本文的研究目的即是探討低成長卻伴隨高剩餘自由現金流量的公司是否會採用增加盈餘的會計裁決性應計項目來沖銷伴隨著負淨現值的投資所出現的低盈餘或是負盈餘，以及透過具聲譽的外部審計是否能減緩盈餘管理的程度。
本研究樣本為台灣上市上櫃公司，符合取樣條件的樣本公司為538家，研究期間為二○○一至二○○五年，由於需要二○○一年之期初資料，故共計取得2690筆資料。樣本公司之相關財務資料均取自於台灣經濟新報資料庫及各公司之公開說明書。研究結果發現，低成長具有高剩餘自由現金流量的公司確實會採用裁決性應計項目從事盈餘管理，以掩飾其不利投資產生的低盈餘或負盈餘。此外，我們也檢視了具聲譽的外部審計品質在緩和自由現金流量與裁決性應計項目間的關係所扮演的角色。結果顯示，台灣地區具聲譽的外部審計對緩和自由現金流量與裁決性應計項目之間的關係沒有顯著影響，但對低成長且擁有高自由現金流量的公司減少更換審計人員卻可以緩和經理人使用裁決性應計項目以操縱盈餘，表示外部利害關係人的外部監督對嚇阻經理人的投機盈餘管理仍有相當的作用。

There was a lot of research focused on the agency cost of free cash flow since the proposition of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). Free cash flow allied to growth opportunities, especially those with low-growth opportunities’ companies had been identified as a major agency problem where managers may have a great possibility to invest their free cash flow in negative or low net present value projects that will reduce shareholders’ wealth. In order to cover the effects of the non-wealth-maximizing investments, managers may use accounting discretion right including accounting accruals and GAAP policy to increase their reported earnings. This opportunistic behavior may have been restricted if external monitoring by outsider is effective. In this study, we examined the relationship between high free cash flow (FCF) of low-growth companies and the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals (DAC). Furthermore, we also want to know the role of high-quality auditors in mitigating the SFCF-DAC relation.
The sample consists of 538 companies’ yearly observations over the period 2001-2005. The research result confirms our hypothesis that low-growth firms with high free cash flow use income-increasing discretionary accruals and GAAP policy to boost reported earnings. Our results also show that high-quality auditors have no significant influence on moderation of the FCF-DAC relation in Taiwan. However long-term tenure auditors may have significant effect on moderation of the FCF-DAC relation under the conditions for low-growth companies with high free cash flow . It means that external monitoring still have impact on deterring managers’ opportunistic earnings management.

摘要......................................................................................................i
圖目錄............................................................................................... vi
表目錄............................................................................................... vi
第壹章 緒論.....................................................................................1
第一節 研究背景.............................................................................1
第二節 研究動機.............................................................................4
第三節 研究目的.............................................................................5
第四節 論文架構與研究流程.........................................................6
第貳章 國內外文獻回顧...................................................................8
第一節 代理理論……………………..…………...........................8
第二節 現金流量…………………...............................................14
第三節 自由現金流量與成長機會...............................................16
第四節 盈餘管理...........................................................................23
第參章 研究方法.............................................................................36
第一節 研究架構...........................................................................36
第二節 研究假說...........................................................................38
第三節 研究設計……...................................................................41
第四節 資料來源...........................................................................44
第肆章 研究結果……….................................................................47
第一節 單一變數結果…...............................................................47
第二節 迴歸分析結果…...............................................................50
第三節 健全性分析……...............................................................52
第伍章 結論與建議.........................................................................54
第一節 結論…...............................................................................54
第二節 建議...................................................................................56
參考文獻...........................................................................................57

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